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Abstract
Jason Bowers
Ontology, Priority, and Teleology: A Defense of Classical Platonism
(Under the direction of Thomas Hofweber, Laurie Paul, C.D.C. Reeve, and John T. Roberts)
Classical Platonism is the thesis that, metaphysically, the most fundamental elements of the 
world are ends or purposes, and that things are metaphysically dependent on their ends. Classical 
Platonists believe that teleology is a real feature of the world, and that metaphysical 
dependence--or “metaphysical priority”--is itself teleological. This dissertation defends Classical 
Platonism in four chapters.
 In chapter one I argue that the proper scope of ontological investigation is metaphysical 
priority rather than existence, but that priority cannot be “brute”--i.e. unanalyzable. My argument 
is that, when the topic is metaphysical, questions of existence have trivial answers, and 
ontological questions do not. So whatever the ontological questions are, they are not questions 
about existence. Instead, I argue that they are questions about priority. 
 In chapter two I argue for Classical Platonism by showing that the sense in which ordinary 
material objects are something “over and above” their parts is a teleological sense. The intuitive 
distinction between integrated objects, which are in some sense “prior” to their parts, and mere 
heaps, which are not, is that the former and not the latter are teleologically prior to their parts.
 In chapter three I present a detailed account of the Classical Platonist’s ontology, which is 
an ontology of Forms. The Forms include entities like perfect cat-health and perfect knifehood, 
which are standards against which the excellence of things like cats and knives are measured. 
iii
After explaining what the Forms are, I show that teleology is basic and indispensable to any 
theory of universals--i.e. properties and relations that are somehow “shared” in their entirety by 
distinct objects.
 In chapter four I respond to objections to Classical Platonism: that it allows for circular 
chains of metaphysical dependence, that it makes objects metaphysically dependent on what 
does not exist, and that it is unable to account for its own requirement that matter have a proper 
function. 
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1  Classical Platonism and Metaontology
Contemporary discussions of ontology have produced two kinds of theories about it: existence 
theories and brute priority theories. Both claim that ontology is ambitious—i.e. that it 
investigates substantive questions not asked by science—and yet each fails to account for this 
ambition. Existence theories fail because certain existence claims are trivial; brute priority 
theories fail because their notion of priority, when intelligible, is borrowed from science in a way 
that renders their project unambitious. In light of these considerations I propose a third option—
Classical Platonism—which identifies metaphysical priority with functional teleology. 
 1.  Two Accounts of Ontology
The idea that the world contains metaphysically basic elements—elements in virtue of which all 
other things exist and upon which all other things depend—is an intuitive one, but it does not 
admit of an uncontroversial analysis. Yet today metaphysicians have at their disposal a multitude 
of accounts of priority and dependence, and with them, a multitude of accounts of what it is to be 
a metaphysically fundamental element of being. The philosophical name for such an element is 
“primary substance.”
Ontology is the philosophical study of primary substance. It aims to discover what the 
primary substances are, to elucidate the relations in terms of which their primacy is defined, and 
to do so in light of various philosophical puzzles, such as the One over Many, the puzzle of 
change, and Theseus’ Ship. Ontological theories are theories about the world’s most 
metaphysically basic constituents—what they are, what makes them basic, and how they relate to 
everything else.
In characterizing ontology this way I invoke an Aristotelian doctrine, according to which 
“the question of being is just the question of substance.”1 This doctrine is controversial. Many 
philosophers claim that they cannot understand such obscure notions as that of priority and 
primary substance. To the extent that there is such a project as ontology, they think it should be 
concerned with what exists. They think that the question of being is not the question of 
substance, but a much simpler one, expressed in the three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables “what is 
there?” We’ll call this alternative view the existence theory of ontology, and its defenders 
existence theorists, and call the first view the priority theory of ontology, and its defenders 
priority theorists.2 
Just as realists and nominalists have competing philosophical theories about the nature of 
a well-established discipline, namely mathematics, so do existence theorists and priority theorists 
have competing philosophical interpretations of ontology, which, in the twentieth century, was 
most notably reestablished in the work of Armstrong, Kripke, Lewis, Quine, Van Inwagen, and 
others.3 There is an asymmetry, of course: realists and nominalists do metaphysics while 
theorizing about a science, whereas existence- and priority theorists do metaphysics while 
theorizing about metaphysics. Hence, the debate over ontology is a reflective one. The question 
of existence versus priority is a question about what we philosophers have been doing. This 
2
1 Metaphysics 1028b2-4.
2 Quine (1948) presents the most canonical piece of existence theory, though not under that name. 
Contemporary existence theorists include Azzouni (2004), Hofweber (2005), Sider (2009), and Van 
Inwagen (1998). For contemporary defenses of priority theory, see Fine (2001) and Schaffer (2009).
3 Armstrong (1974), Campbell (1980), Hirsch (1992), Kripke (1980), Lewis (1986), Quine (1948), Van 
Inwagen (1995), Wiggins (1980).
reflection is not new; indeed, the re-canonization of metaphysics in the twentieth century 
occurred alongside a debate about metaphysics--Quine’s and Carnap’s--in which existence 
theories were left alone to contend with the Positivist monster, and priority theory, long thought 
dead, went unrepresented. Yet today, the topic of metaphysical priority attracts new attention. 
Just as mathematical theories are easy to recognize despite the controversy between realists and 
nominalists, so are ontological theories easily recognizable too, despite the controversy between 
existence theorists and priority theorists. The debate between existence theorists and priority 
theorists is a debate over the scope and nature of ontological investigation, just as the debate 
between realists and nominalists is a debate over the scope and nature of mathematical 
investigation. 
Following Jonathan Schaffer, we’ll distinguish existence- and priority theories by their 
different attitudes toward questions of existence: priority theorists adopt the permissive stance, 
focusing their inquiry on the primary substances; while existence theorists adopt the restrictive 
stance, focusing their inquiry on what exists.4
To adopt the permissive stance is to hold that existence questions—i.e. instances of the 
schema “does X exist?”—have obvious answers when their topic is metaphysical, that the 
answer is usually “yes,” and that such questions are therefore not the end of metaphysical 
investigation.5 In other words, priority theorists hold that existence is cheap; everything exists in 
some sense. This includes numbers, fictional characters, round squares, the gods of every 
religion, and the mereological sum of Proclus the Successor and his eponymous lunar crater. 
3
4 Schaffer (2009).
5 The qualifier “when the topic is metaphysical” cannot be over-emphasized. To adopt the permissive 
stance is to take up an attitude towards existence questions in metaphysics, as opposed to existence 
questions that arise in the sciences. See premise (c) of the Triviality Argument below.
Yet priority theorists also claim to have sparse ontologies. For by their lights, one’s 
ontology includes not what one takes to exist, but what one takes to be the primary substances, 
which are some but not all of the things that exist. So although priority theorists will admit that 
numbers exist, they might also defend nominalism by arguing that numbers are not primary 
substances—i.e. that they are metaphysically dependent on something else. Similarly, priority 
theorists can admit that gods exist, but may also defend atheism by arguing that gods are 
fictional characters.6  
To adopt the restrictive stance, by contrast, is to hold that existence questions seldom 
have obvious answers when their topic is metaphysical, that their answers are not usually “yes,” 
and that subsequently, they are interesting and suitable for metaphysical inquiry. In other words, 
existence theorists hold that existence is not cheap, and they tend to be as frugal with its 
attribution as priority theorists are with their notion of substantial primacy.
4
6 See Schaffer (2009), §2.1 for an example of this strategy.
 2.  Their Mutual Presupposition: Ontology is Ambitious
What these two accounts of ontology agree on is that ontology is ambitious. In the anti-
metaphysical preamble to The Empirical Stance, Bas Van Fraassen presents two ways that 
ontology might proceed in its investigations, one of which is “ambitious,” the other of which is, 
by contrast, “modest.” He distinguishes them by their relation to science:
…Actually, this project [i.e. ontology] takes two forms, one apparently modest and the 
other ambitious. The modest is to bring to light the ontic commitments of our best 
theories in science; the ambitious is to continue science so as to answer questions 
scientists do not ask, but in the same way that science answers its questions. The modest 
project may be no more than a deep-going study of the sciences, although perhaps 
charged with a contentious presupposition about what such a study will bring to light. 
Leave that aside for now. Let us consider the more relevant ambitious project of an 
ontology to go beyond answers to questions already dealt with by the sciences 
themselves. This is the project to engage in metaphysics as an extension of the sciences, 
putatively pursued by the same means and realizing the same values.7  
To claim that ontology is ambitious, then, is to claim two things: first, that it “answers questions 
scientists do not ask,” and second, that it does so “in the same way that science answers its 
questions, putatively pursued by the same means and realizing the same values.” The second 
condition requires, among other things, that the answers to ontological questions are not trivial—
i.e. their answers are not immediately obvious to competent speakers of English in a way that 
renders further investigation unnecessary. If it turned out that either (a) ontological questions are 
already asked by scientists, or (b) that ontological questions all have trivial answers, then 
ontology would be unambitious. So any theory of ontology which entails either (a) or (b) is 
inconsistent with ontology’s ambition.
5
7 Van Fraassen (2002), pp. 11.
Both existence theorists and brute priority theorists argue that ontology is ambitious.8  
But because each side entails either (a) or (b), neither is able to account for this ambition. 
Existence theories entail (b), that the central questions of ontology are trivial; brute priority 
theories entail (a), that the central questions of ontology are, when intelligible, already answered 
by science.
6
8 Fine (2001) argues that the notion of grounding used in metaphysics is irreducible to any scientific 
notion, and hence that metaphysical questions are not answered by science. Sider (2007) claims that 
answers to the special composition question are all “empirically adequate,” suggesting—though not 
requiring—that it is a distinctly metaphysical question. Van Inwagen (1998) argues that metaphysics, not 
science, is charged with regimenting scientific language in a way that yields metaphysical results. For 
more on the question of how ontology could be ambitious, see Hofweber (forthcoming).
 3.  How Existence Theories Lose Ambition
The Triviality Argument,9 as I shall call it, is the most well-known argument against existence 
theories of ontology. It purports to show that existence theories are incompatible with ontology’s 
ambition because they entail (b), that the central questions of ontology have trivial answers:
c. If the task of ontology is to say what exists, then the ontological status of 
numbers, properties, propositions, composites, and fictional characters is trivial.
d. But the ontological status of numbers, properties, propositions, composites, and 
fictional characters is not trivial.
e. So it is not true that the task of ontology is to say what exists.
Because premise (d) follows from the idea that ontology is ambitious, and because (e) follows 
from (c) and (d), it is (c) that does all the philosophical work.
 Premise (c) is justified by a series of short arguments from trivially true premises, each of 
which shows that one of the kinds of entities in question exists. As an example, consider the 
following argument for the existence of numbers:10
f. There are just as many bachelors as there are unmarried men.
g. So the number of bachelors is the same as the number of unmarried men.
h. So there is a number that numbers both the bachelors and the unmarried men.
7
9 The most recent versions of this argument are presented in Fine (2001), Hofweber (2005), and Schaffer 
(2009). Only Schaffer and Fine use the argument against existence theories of ontology; Hofweber 
argues for a distinction between two kinds of quantification, only one of which expresses ontological 
commitment.
10 Hofweber (2005).
The argument looks sound. (f) is indisputably true, since it is true by definition. (f) and (g) are 
truth-conditionally equivalent, and (h) follows from (g) in classical predicate logic. So it seems 
the existence of numbers--which, according to existence theorists, is a central question of 
ontology--can be proven from analytic premises! Since the existence of numbers is so easily 
proven, it would seem to be a trivial matter, with little ambition in its philosophical investigation.  
Argument (f)-(h) is not one of a kind; recent literature has witnessed many variants, each 
of which concerns a different kind of entity. There are now trivial proofs for the existence of 
numbers, properties, propositions, composites, and fictional characters—virtually all the entities 
discussed by ontologists.11 Since existence theories claim that the task of ontology is to 
investigate which things exist, arguments like (f)-(h) together undermine the ambitiousness of 
existence theories.
Existence theorists are not helpless against the Triviality Argument.  Jodi Azzouni, an 
existence theorist,12 denies that the quantificational idiom “there is” in (h) carries any ontological 
commitment—i.e. that it implies anything about what exists.13 Distinguishing two sorts of 
quantification in natural language, Thomas Hofweber argues that (h) only follows from (f)-(g) 
under a reading of “there is” that carries no ontological commitment.14 Sider argues that (h) 
8
11 Fine (2001), Hofwever (2005), and Schaffer (2009). Hofweber’s arguments for numbers, properties, 
and propositions proceed from analytically true claims like (f)—e.g. “either it is true or it is false that it is 
raining; therefore there is a proposition that is either true or false,” and “either Fido is a dog or not; 
therefore there is a property that Fido either does or does not have.” Schaffer’s arguments for numbers 
and properties are similar, but his arguments for composites and fictional characters proceed from 
obvious empirical truths instead of proceeding from analyticities—e.g. “my body has parts, such as 
hands; therefore something has parts,” and “Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character; therefore something 
is a fictional character.”
12 Azzouni (2006), pp.82.
13 Ibid, pp.55.
14 Hofweber (2005).
establishes the existence of numbers only if the natural meaning of “there exists”--the one that 
“carves reality at the joints”--is determined by our use of claims like (f)-(g).15 Peter Van Inwagen 
employs the notion of paraphrase to argue that (h) might not carry ontological commitment, 
depending on available paraphrases.16 There are few knock-down arguments in philosophy, and, 
unsurprisingly, the Triviality Argument is not one of them.  
But an argument does not have to be knock-down for it to be sound, and I for one believe 
it is sound. Azzouni’s “separation thesis,” according to which quantificational idioms carry no 
existential commitment, precludes the most natural understanding of their truth conditions. 
Hofweber’s similar denial about inference-preserving quantification in natural language rests on 
the distinction between failing to refer and successfully referring to a nonexistent object--one that 
blurs when attempting to say what reference to nonexistents would have to be.17 Sider’s appeal to 
natural quantifier meanings employs a notion--naturalness--that is far richer than that of 
existence, and which leaves Sider’s view looking more like a priority theory than an existence 
theory. Finally. one cannot avoid a theory’s commitments by accepting something synonymous 
with it,18 but it is unclear what Van Inwagen’s notion of paraphrase could be if not something like 
synonymy. I conclude that existence theories fail to account for ontology’s ambition.  Brute 
priority theories, however, are no better off.
9
15 Sider (2009).
16 Van Inwagen (1998).
17 Hofweber (2000).
18 Alston (1957) and Jackson (1980).
 4.  How Brute Priority Theories Lose Ambition
Priority theories come in two types: brute priority theories, which hold that metaphysical priority 
is primitive and unanalyzable; and defined priority theories, which, as their name suggests, 
define metaphysical priority in more basic terms. 
 The Intelligibility Argument purports to show that brute priority theories are incompatible 
with ontology’s ambition:19
i. If the task of ontology is to say what is primary in a brute, purely metaphysical 
sense, then ontological questions are unintelligible.
j. But ontological questions are intelligible.
k. So it is not true that the task of ontology is to say what is primary in a brute, 
purely metaphysical sense.
Premise (j) just follows from the idea that ontology is ambitious, and (k) just follows from (i) and 
(j); therefore it is (i) that does all the philosophical work.  
Premise (i) is motivated by the idea that, while there are many intelligible notions of 
priority, none of them are primitively and distinctly metaphysical. Rather, what contemporary 
theorists call “metaphysical priority” is a family of vaguely similar relations, many of which 
come from the sciences, and none of which can be identified with the metaphysical notion 
without rendering ontology unambitious. This is revealed in the examples from Jonathan 
Schaffer’s defense of priority theory.
10
19 The argument is a variation on one presented in Hofweber (2009), though I ultimately draw a different 
conclusion. We agree that a primitive, distinctly metaphysical notion of priority is unintelligible, but he 
goes on to defend an existence theory of ontology while I defend a defined priority theory.
In “Monism” and “On What Grounds What,” Schaffer defends a brute notion of 
metaphysical priority, claiming all of the following as cases of it: (l) the relation between the 
quantum state of an entangled system and the states of its components, (m) the relation between 
an entity and its singleton, (n) the relation between Swiss cheese and its holes, (o) the relation 
between truths and the world, and (p) the relation between an action’s piety and Euthyphro’s 
gods’ love of it. The problem is that, although each of (l)-(p) is an example of a priority 
relation,20 none of them are examples of the same relation, nor are any of them particularly 
metaphysical.  
Consider the first case, (l). It is true that the quantum state of an entangled system is prior 
to its components, but only in a mathematical sense—i.e. only in the sense that the former is not 
mathematically derivable from the latter. Schaffer writes that “the EPR state is… not derivable 
from the state of its two particles,”21 and this is supposed to suggest something about their 
metaphysical status. But is mathematical derivability the same thing as metaphysical priority? 
Not if ontology is ambitious. The facts about mathematical derivability are already studied by 
another field, namely mathematics, and ontology has little to contribute.22 Example (l) does not 
illustrate anything primitively metaphysical, only something mathematical.
The same is true for (m). An entity is indeed prior to its singleton, but only in the sense 
that the latter is defined in terms of the former. In set theory, sets are defined by their members, 
11
20 R is a priority relation iff R is an anti-symmetric, irreflexive, transitive relation with a lower bound. Some 
of the relations from (l)-(p) are like priority relations, in that they have most but not all of these formal 
properties. Mathematical derivability, for instance, lacks asymmetry. Unless the properties they lack are 
distinctly relevant to our discussion, however, these priority-like relations will also be referred to as 
“priority relations.” 
21 Schaffer (2010).
22 Additionally, Schaffer’s claim that metaphysical priority is irreflexive is incompatible with its being the 
same thing as mathematical derivability.
not vice versa. The sense of priority according to which entities are prior to singletons, then, is 
the priority of set-theoretic definition. Yet set-theoretic definition is not the same thing as 
metaphysical priority—no more than the latter is the same as mathematical derivability. 
Metaphysical priority cannot be identified with the set-theoretic priority of entity to singleton, 
and so (m), like (l), fails to illustrate anything distinctly metaphysical.
Likewise for (n), the case of the Swiss cheese and its holes. The cheese is indeed prior to 
its holes in the sense that the holes are proper parts of it.23 The holes are in the cheese in the same 
way that pages are in a book or stitches are in a sweater. The priority of cheese to holes is a 
matter of mereology, which, like mathematics, has applications within ontology. But if ontology 
is ambitious, it should not reduce to mereology any more than it should reduce to set theory or 
mathematics.24  
Nor should metaphysical priority be identified with the relation obtaining between truths 
and the world—the “true of” relation. For one thing, most alleged cases of metaphysical priority, 
including (l)-(p), involve pairs of entities that cannot have truth values. Furthermore, because 
ontology does not tell us exactly which claims are true, its concern with truth would have to be 
the investigation of the truth predicate’s semantic and syntactic properties. But this latter task 
already falls in the domains of linguistics and logic.25 Linguistic science is one thing, 
12
23 The protagonist known as Argle defends this claim in a dialogue from Lewis and Lewis (1970). 
Alternatively, one might treat the holes as limits of the cheese. 
24 Some philosophers contend that mereology is a piece of metaphysics, and that mereology is somehow 
itself metaphysical. This is false. The reason why it is false is that we can develop all kinds of 
mereologies--classical ones, paraconsistent ones, fuzzy ones--and mereology is just the study of their 
formal properties. There is a metaphysical question about which mereology, if any, is the correct one--the 
one that “carves reality at the joints,” as it were. But such a question is no more part of mereology than 
the question of nominalism is part of algebra.
25 Lewis (2001).
metaphysics another, and the “true of” relation, which barely resembles a priority relation to 
begin with, certainly does not look like a metaphysical one.
(Schaffer mentions the notion of a truthmaker when the topic of truth arises, but 
truthmakers are traditionally a piece of existence-theoretic ontology—i.e. they are the things that 
have to exist in order for a certain claim to be true.26 The notion of a truthmaker thus incurs the 
Triviality Argument. Schaffer, of course, defines truthmakers in terms of metaphysical priority, 
but this does not explain the notion at work so much as presuppose it. It is fully compatible, for 
instance, with “metaphysical priority” naming nothing but a family of vaguely similar but 
ultimately non-metaphysical relations.)
Finally, the relation between the love of Euthyphro’s gods and the piety of an action they 
love is, if not causal, at the very least a counterfactual relation: had the action not been pious, the 
gods would not have loved it, and--if our intuitions match Socrates’--not vice versa.27 Yet 
metaphysical priority cannot be counterfactual dependence, for that would imply that every 
effect is metaphysically dependent on its cause--i.e. that causes are more fundamental than their 
effects, which seems false. When a baseball shatters a window by striking it, the shattering is 
counterfactually dependent on the striking, but the shattering is not less fundamental than the 
striking. Metaphysical priority is not counterfactual dependence. Just as (l)-(o) fail to distinguish 
a uniquely metaphysical relation, so does (p). 
Brute metaphysical priority is not a single, univocal relation obtaining across cases like 
(l)-(p). Nor can it be any one of the relations illustrated in (l)-(p). To the extent that brute 
13
26 Armstrong (2004).
27 See Hofweber (2009) for the original presentation of this criticism.
metaphysical priority is rendered intelligible through examples like (l)-(p), then, its study is 
ontologically unambitious. That is the Intelligibility Argument. 
Defenders of brute priority have three available responses to the Intelligibility Argument. 
First, they could argue that metaphysical priority is a univocal but multiply realizable relation, 
which is differently realized in each of (l)-(p). Second, they could argue that metaphysical 
priority is a univocal but determinable relation, whose determinants include the different 
relations from (l)-(p). Finally, they could argue that metaphysical priority is a brute, distinctly 
metaphysical relation in addition to the other relations from (l)-(p). None of these strategies, 
however, will save brute priority theories from the Intelligibility Argument.
First, one might argue that metaphysical priority is multiply realizable, like the properties 
of being food or being a wing. Just as a variety of physical objects can all count as food, provided 
that they play the same role in nourishing an organism, and just as a variety of physical objects 
can all count as wings, provided that they play the same role in facilitating flight, so, under this 
proposal, would each relation from (l)-(p) count as metaphysical priority, provided that they play 
the same functional role in each instance. But what could this common functional role be? 
Beyond some formal properties like irreflexivity, transitivity, and the like, which do not 
constitute a functional role in any obvious sense, the relations from (l)-(p) resemble one another 
very little, and there does not seem to be a common role they play in each example.  So appeals 
to multiple realizability will not save priority theories from the Intelligibility Argument.
Second, one might argue that metaphysical priority is a determinable relation, of which 
the relations in (l)-(p) are determinants. For this to be true, however, metaphysical priority must 
obey the logic of determinants and determinables. Central to this logic is the claim that no single 
14
thing can have more than one determinant of the same determinable at once. So if metaphysical 
priority is a determinable relation, and if the relations from (l)-(p) are among its determinants, 
then no two things can stand in more than one of the relations from (l)-(p) at once. Yet two things 
can stand in more than one of the relations from (l)-(p) at once: a pattern of dots on a dot-matrix, 
for instance, is not only mathematically derivable from the positions of the individual dots; it is 
defined in terms of them, and has them as proper parts. If metaphysical priority is a determinable 
relation, and if its determinants include the relations in (l)-(p), then no pair of objects can stand 
in more than one of the relations from (l)-(p) at once. Yet pairs of objects can stand in more than 
one of the relations from (l)-(p) at once. Appeals to determinable relations, therefore, will not 
save brute priority theories from the Intelligibility Argument.
Finally, defenders of a brute priority theory might hold that metaphysical priority is a 
brute relation in addition to those of mathematical derivability, parthood, and the like; and that 
the entities mentioned in (l)-(p) stand in relations of metaphysical priority in addition to the 
relations already mentioned. The problem with such an approach is that, if metaphysical priority 
cannot be defined, and if metaphysical priority is completely distinct from every other relation--
such as derivability, definability, and causation--then ontological questions, like whether wholes 
are prior to their parts, cannot be settled just by settling whether wholes are definable in terms of 
their parts, or whether their features are derivable from their parts’ features, or whether the facts 
about them supervene on the facts about their parts. For whatever the facts are about definability, 
derivability, and the like, it is still a fair question to ask, “what does that have to do with 
metaphysical priority?” Why should the metaphysical priority of a whole follow, for instance, 
from the non-derivability of its features? If metaphysical priority is brute, and entirely distinct 
15
from relations of derivability and the like, then there is no prima facie reason for inferring facts 
about the former from facts about the latter. An “in-addition” theory of brute metaphysical 
priority thus places ontology among the occult disciplines, leaving no clear method for its study. 
It will not save the brute priority theorist from the Intelligibility Argument.
In the end, there is no ambition in studying a brute relation of metaphysical priority. For 
as long as a tight circle of inter-definability links the notions of metaphysical priority and 
primary substance--with the primary substances just being whatever is metaphysically prior to 
everything, and metaphysical priority just being the relation borne by the primary substances to 
everything--ontology will have to operate by canvassing intuitions about brute metaphysical 
priority. Yet it is doubtful that we have such intuitions, especially once we distinguish brute 
metaphysical priority from other relations. Taking metaphysical priority and substantial primacy 
as primitives, then, will not suffice for the foundations of an ontological program. If ontology has 
ambition, there must be another way to account for it. Fortunately, there is.
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 5. Teleology and Philosophy
If instead of appealing to cheese, we turn to the example of an organism, and if instead of 
attending to the cheese’s holes we attend to the organisms’ organs, we find that wholes can be 
teleologically prior to their parts in addition to being mereologically prior to them; and that 
teleological priority obtains not only between organisms and their organs but also between other 
bits of the world, too: between actions, among artifacts, in agentive explanations, and in social 
institutions. The English language, moreover, affords a wealth of references to teleological 
priority: if we consider an example of an organism--such as a house cat--and consider the various 
relations is stands in to its organs, we find it natural to claim that the cat’s organs exist in order to 
sustain it; that sustaining the cat is their proper function; that sustaining the cat is their purpose; 
and that they exist for the sake of sustaining the cat. In so many ways, we state that the cat’s 
organs are teleologically dependent on the cat. The converse, however, is not the case.28 The 
organs exist for the sake of the cat, but the cat does not exist for the sake of its organs. The cat 
takes care of its organs, of course; and it works to keep them healthy in much the same way that 
the organs work to keep the cat heathy. But the cat cares for its organs as something necessary, 
rather than as its ultimate end. For ultimately, the cat exists in order to flourish and be happy as a 
whole cat. These ends are distinct, for we can imagine a cat placed on life support, whose organs 
are kept in perfect working order, but whose life is not particularly happy or healthy.29 A cat is 
prior to its parts, in other words, in a way that a piece of Swiss cheese is not prior to its holes, 
namely that it is teleologically prior to them. This is not just a fact about cats, of course, or about 
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28 See chapter 4, §1.
29 We will return to this thought experiment in chapter 3, §6.4-5, when we discuss whether an organism’s 
structure is the same thing as a spatial arrangement of its parts. 
organisms in general, even. For teleology exists in many diverse sorts of phenomena, including 
actions--which are performed for the sake of ends, evidence--which is presented for the sake of 
determining the truth, beliefs--which are held for the sake of knowledge, artifacts--which are 
produced for the sake of achieving certain ends, and more.
 Life itself is full of teleology, and this is easiest to see when attending to its self-
maintaining character, and especially to the role that flourishing plays in explaining such self-
maintenance. For it seems that every living thing aims to flourish. That is, every living thing aims 
to be as happy and as healthy as possible. This “aiming” need not be conscious; in fact, it usually  
isn’t. Trees do not consciously grow towards the sun, flowers do not consciously bloom, and 
animals do not consciously metabolize the food they eat. Yet blooming, growth, and metabolism 
are all proper functions of such beings. Trees function properly when they grow towards the sun, 
flowers function properly when they bloom in the right season, and animals function properly 
when they metabolize what they eat. To say that living things aim to flourish, then, does not 
mean that they consciously entertain the goal of flourishing. Rather, it means they are 
teleologically oriented toward it. Organisms live and breathe in order to be as well-off as 
possible. 
 In living for the sake of being as well-off as possible, there is a sense in which organisms 
live for the sake of achieving perfection. In aiming to flourish, organisms are teleologically 
oriented toward a certain ideal, and they exist for the sake of achieving it. This ideal, moreover, 
is an ideal of well-being: something associated with perfection and goodness. Summarily, it 
seems that wherever there is life, there is a teleological orientation towards perfection.
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 This teleological orientation of life towards perfection makes the study of teleology seem 
metaphysical in a way that mathematics, set theory, and mereology are not. Consider the 
question “what is the meaning of life?” The two most charitable readings of this often-asked 
question are both teleological. They are the following:
q. What are we here for?
r. What is the world here for?
The first reading, (q), is one on which people who ask what the meaning of life is are asking 
what they are here for. They want to know their purpose in life--what they should be doing with 
themselves. The first most charitable reading of the question “what is the meaning of life?”, then, 
is as a question about the purpose of human beings. 
 At first, it may seem that medicine--including psychological medicine--can answer the 
question of human purpose, since medicine is the science of human well-being. One might, in 
other words, identify human well-being with medical health. Yet such a view faces a prima facie 
difficulty: for it seems that human beings are capable of forgoing their biological and medical 
purposes in order to achieve other ends, which, even if not worth their cost in health, are still 
cases of fulfilling the human purpose. The lives of Mozart or Emily Dickinson spring to mind, as 
do others who sacrificed their physical or psychological well-being for higher pursuits. Similar 
cases include human beings who flourish and live a meaningful life by surgically altering their 
anatomy. If the human purpose were identical to medical health, it would seem that Mozart and 
Dickinson failed to achieve it. Yet we are inclined to say otherwise, and to invoke purposes that 
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transcend biology. The human good cannot be strictly identical to medical health; for it seems 
possible to achieve the human good ways that preclude being healthy.  
 In considering what the human purpose is, and what the human good is, we turn not only 
to medicine but also--and ultimately--to philosophy, where we ask what makes a human life 
worth living in the first place. The first charitable way to read the question, “what is the meaning 
of life?”, then, is as a distinctly philosophical question--one about the human purpose and what 
makes a human life worth living.
 Taken as a metaphysical question, the question of human purpose is a question about the 
nature of an entity, or a thing that is denoted by the phrase, “the human purpose.” Taken 
metaphysically, the question of life’s purpose becomes a question about what kind of a thing 
Human Health Itself is, and how human beings can be metaphysically dependent on it without 
philosophical absurdity. 
 The second charitable reading of “what is the meaning of life?” is more metaphysical 
than the first. Rather than interpreting it as a question about the human purpose, (r) asks about 
the purpose of the whole world. In asking what the meaning of life is, one could be charitably 
understood as asking about the whole world and its purpose, rather than asking about the 
purposes of human beings within it. The other charitable reading of the question “what is the 
meaning of life?”, then, is as a question of the whole world’s purpose. For the question of the 
world’s purpose is, if nothing else, a question about what justifies it, or what makes its existence 
worthwhile. It is the question “what’s the point?”, but applied to everything all at once. It is a 
philosophical question in that it is ultimately a question of justification and value.
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 Taken as a metaphysical question, the question of the world’s purpose also becomes a 
question about the nature of an entity that is denoted by the phrase, “the meaning of life.” Taken 
metaphysically, the question of life’s purpose becomes a question about what kind of an entity 
Goodness Itself is, and how the world’s constituents are dependent on it. 
Because organisms are teleologically prior to their parts, and because teleology seems to 
be a distinctly philosophical topic, it seems that examples of organisms demonstrate how 
ontology could be ambitious: by identifying metaphysical priority with teleological dependence. 
Such an account would not be a brute theory of metaphysical priority, however, and it would 
actually be Classical Platonism.
 
21
 6. Classical Platonism: Metaphysical Priority is Teleology
Before dying of hemlock poisoning in the Phaedo, Socrates claims that a correct theory of the 
Forms will explain why things exist, and that it will do so in terms of what is best for them.30 
This kind of normative explanation later came to be known as final or teleological causation, and 
identifying metaphysical priority with it was what separated Plato’s followers from the rest of 
antiquity.31 They saw the world as an intricately structured teleological hierarchy, with the Form 
of the Good at the top, pure mathematical patterns immediately below it, followed by goal-
directed systems which realize those patterns, and the material parts and aspects of such systems 
at the very bottom.32
Let Classical Platonism be the conjunction of two claims:33
s. The task of ontology is to say what the primary substances are.
and
t. Metaphysical priority is teleological dependence.
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30 Phaedo 99-101, and especially 97c-d: “If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it 
comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or be acted upon, or 
act.” (Tr. Grube.)
31 Gerson (2005), ch.1.
32 This is the famous Line Analogy of Republic 509c10-514a. See §9.
33 Today the word “Platonism” is usually used as a synonym for realism about transcendent universals, 
particularly numbers. If my account of Platonism is correct, realism about transcendent universals is 
entailed by (t) and another Platonic idea, namely that physical systems persist in order to realize certain 
abstract mathematical patterns.
Classical Platonists identify metaphysical priority with functional teleology, or the relation that 
things bear to their proper functions. In a Classical Platonist ontology, things ultimately exist for 
the sake of achieving certain ends; they exist in order to perform certain proper functions. Ends, 
purposes, and proper functions are therefore not only real but also real things--and 
metaphysically fundamental ones, at that. They are the Classical Platonist’s primary substances. 
Under Classical Platonism, the most fundamental elements of being are proper functions or 
purposes, which things exist in order to perform. 
 Metaphysical dependence, for the Classical Platonist, is the for the sake of relation. 
Paradigm cases of this relation are easy to produce: the purpose of a broom is to sweep, the 
purpose of the heart is to circulate blood, the purpose of my running is to get to class on time, 
and the purpose of a cat is to flourish in a distinctively feline sort of way. Skeptics demand more 
than paradigm cases, however. They want to know how teleological relations are different from 
causal and mereological ones, and why appeals to teleology are not simply confused appeals to 
other things.
 To distinguish the teleological for the sake of relation from other relations--for instance, 
causal and mereological ones, it is helpful to cite examples of things that are teleologically 
related but not causally or mereologically related. Our examples will be perfections. This is not 
only because perfections are teleologically related to objects without being mereologically or 
causally related to them, but also because the Classical Platonist’s ontology, as we will see, is 
primarily an ontology of perfections, or ways that things are supposed to be.34
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34 See chapter 3, §2-4.
 As examples of perfection, consider the two properties of perfect cat health and perfect 
broom-hood. Perfect cat health is the property that a cat would have if, from birth onward, 
without interruption, it flourished in the way that cats do, but with as little pain, injury, or 
sickness as possible. To achieve perfect cat health is to be maximally happy and healthy in a 
distinctively feline way. To my knowledge, no cat has ever achieved perfect cat health, and it 
seems unlikely that any real cats ever would. The matter is contingent, but for the sake of 
illustration we’ll suppose that no cat has ever been, nor will ever be, perfectly healthy. Likewise, 
perfect broom-hood is the property that a broom would have if, from the beginning of its career, 
it always facilitated sweeping and always produced perfectly swept floors when correctly used. 
Just as in the case of perfect cat health, the achievement of perfect broom-hood is a doubtful 
contingency; for the sake of illustration we will suppose no broom has ever done it.
 To distinguish teleological priority from causal and mereological notions, first note that 
individual cats neither cause nor are caused by perfect cat health, just as individual brooms 
neither cause nor are caused by perfect broom-hood. No cat ever achieves perfect cat health. Nor 
does perfect cat health cause any cats to come into being. The relationship between cats and 
perfect cat health is not causal. The same is true of brooms and perfect broom-hood. Brooms 
neither cause nor are caused by perfect broom-hood. Summarily, no causal relations obtain 
between items and their perfections.
 Nor are there any mereological connections between them: perfect cat health is not a 
spatial part of any cat, like a whisker or a tail, nor is it a cat-part by being one of a cat’s features. 
Nor is there any sense in which cats are parts of perfect cat health. The relationship between 
individual cats and perfect cat health is not mereological, nor is that between brooms and perfect 
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broom-hood. No broom is part of perfect broom-hood, nor is perfect broom-hood part of any 
broom. 
 Since neither causal nor mereological relations obtain between our examples and their 
perfections, the for the sake of relation, which does obtain between them, should not be confused 
with relations of causation or parthood. 
 Nor should it be confused with the modal notion of potentiality. Cats, we might suppose, 
have the potential to be perfectly healthy, even if none of them actually are; likewise for brooms. 
However, the relation of being for the sake of should not be confused with the modal relation of 
potentiality, for they are not the same. Cats and brooms have many potentials: cats have the 
potential to be covered in blue paint, and they also have the potential to drag themselves around 
using only their front paws. Brooms have the potential to rot, and they also have the potential to 
be warped and used as longbows. Yet a cat’s potential for perfect cat health and a broom’s 
potential for perfect broom-hood are importantly different from these other potentials. In 
particular, they differ with respect to their explanatory, normative, and constitutive roles. 
 First, a cat’s behavior and a broom’s use can both be explained by their potentials for 
perfection in a way that they cannot in terms of other potentials. When a cat suns itself, for 
instance, or eats, or pounces, we may say that it does so in order to be as healthy as possible; it is 
legitimate and proper to say that the purpose of a cat’s sunning is to be maximally healthy. This 
does not mean that the cat consciously entertains plans that culminate in health, of course, any 
more than a tree consciously plans to gather light by growing toward the sun. Cats do not 
consciously entertain the end of prefect cat health, but they have it as an end all the same, and 
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their behavior can be explained with a view to it in a way that it cannot be explained with a view 
to their potentials to be painted blue or to crawl using only forelegs. 
 Similarly, when a broom is used, we may say that it is used in order to sweep as well as 
possible, which requires utilizing the features that make it a good broom. As in the case of cats, 
the behavior of brooms--that is, our use of them--can be explained in light of their potential for 
perfection in a way that they cannot in light of their other potentials. The teleological for the sake 
of relation, therefore, is not just one of de re potentiality, for neither all of a cat’s potentials nor 
all of a broom’s play the explanatory role supplied by their perfections. 
 Second, appeals to perfect cat health and perfect broom-hood support normative 
judgments about cats in a way that appeals to other potentials do not. Cats are supposed to be as 
healthy as possible; the less healthy a cat is, the worse it is, and the more licensed we are to say 
that something is wrong with it. Likewise, brooms are supposed to play the broom-role perfectly, 
or as perfectly as possible; the less a broom is able to sweep, the worse of a broom it is, and the 
more licensed we are to describe it as malfunctioning. In addition to playing the aforementioned 
explanatory role, then, the notion of an end is also that of a proper standard against which 
achievements of it are measured.35
 Finally, in addition to playing explanatory and normative roles, ends also play 
constitutive roles: a broom can be so bad at sweeping that it isn’t even a broom any more but just 
a mess of materials, just as a cat can become so sick that it ceases to be a cat and becomes a 
corpse. Part of what it is to be a cat is to approximate perfect cat health to a minimal degree, just 
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35 Geach (1956)’s distinction between attributive and predicative adjectives is relevant here. There is a 
huge difference between being a bad cat and being a bad thing which also happens to be a cat. A 
particularly healthy cat might make a whole neighborhood sneeze with its shedding, in which case a good 
cat might be a bad neighbor, but for all that it would still not be a bad cat. Similarly, a good weapon can be 
a poor gift for an insane friend.
as part of what it is to be a broom is to approximate perfect broom-hood to a minimal degree. 
This does not mean that it is impossible to be a bad cat or a bad broom; it just means that being 
bad is really a matter of being less good, and being worst is a matter of being least good. The 
Platonic doctrine that badness is merely a privation of goodness is easy to see in this context, as 
is the identification of goodness and being, since a thing’s becoming progressively worse is 
accompanied by a literal disintegration.36 
 A thing’s end, then, stands in a constitutive relation to it, as well as in explanatory and 
normative relations. Even if our world requires ends to be causally or mereologically connected 
to their means, the end of relation should not be confused with relations of parthood, causality, or 
de re potentiality.
 When one thing is teleologically dependent on another, then, the latter plays certain 
explanatory, normative, and constitutive roles. Or to put the point more formally, X is 
teleologically dependent on Y only if, first, appeals to Y provide a final causal explanation for X; 
second, that Y provides a normative standard against which the excellence of X is measured; and 
third, that Y provides a constitutive standard against which it is determined whether X exists. 
 As an example, consider again Felix and his organs. Felix provides a final causal 
explanation for his organs’ existence: his organs exist for the sake of maintaining his health. 
When we ask what Felix’ organs are for, in other words, we learn that they are for keeping Felix 
healthy and fit. Second, we it is by reference to Felix’ overall health that we measure the 
excellence of his organs’ performance. In order for one of Felix’ organs to be working properly, it 
must contribute to his health in a certain way; and to the extent that it fails, it is not a good organ. 
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36 Korsgaard (2009), pp. 28.
Third, Felix’ health is not only a normative standard against which Felix’ organs are measured. It 
is also a constitutive standard. In order for various bits of cat-tissue to even count as organs, in 
other words, they have to be capable of contributing to Felix’ health somehow. A lump of cat 
tissue that was completely incapable of performing the functions of any organ could not even be 
said to be an organ. At the very best, it might look like one, or might have formerly been one; but 
it cannot be an organ without having the capacity to contribute to Felix’ health. So in considering 
the way in which Felix’ organs are teleologically dependent on him, we find that their 
teleological dependence consists in their being related to certain explanations and standards. We 
will return to this topic in chapter 2, §8, where we take up the question of teleological 
dependence in more detail. There we will distinguish two varieties of teleological dependence, 
only one of which is identical to metaphysical priority. These varieties of dependence are 
elucidated further, moreover, in chapter 3, §1.
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 7. Classical Platonism and Triviality
Classical Platonism states that the task of ontology is to identify the most teleologically 
fundamental things. In doing so, it escapes the Triviality Argument, since no rules of logic 
trivially license conclusions about teleology. Existence-theoretic accounts of ontology, as we 
saw, lose philosophical ambition precisely because there is a well-known rule of logic—
existential introduction—that allows the existence of metaphysically controversial entities to be 
inferred from trivially true premises. However, there is no analogous rule for teleology; there is 
no logical principle of “purpose introduction” or “teleos introduction” that would allow 
teleological primacy to be attributed on the basis of obvious truths. The Classical Platonist easily 
exorcises the specter of triviality.
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 8. Classical Platonism and Intelligibility
To avoid the Intelligibility Argument, the Classical Platonist needs to respond to two objections: 
first, that examples of value are just as heterogeneous as examples of priority were shown to be 
in §4, and second, that goodness is already studied by science, and so cannot be the subject of an 
ambitious philosophical research program. 
It may seem that examples of value are just as heterogeneous as examples of priority 
were shown to be earlier. As an examples, consider how the predicate “good” can be applied to 
cats and brooms. What makes something a good cat is very different from what makes something 
a good broom. The former consists in biological properties such as health, while the latter 
consists in more basic structural properties, such as having a certain shape.
 To answer this objection, it is sufficient to note that examples of goodness do have a 
certain unity that examples of priority lack: the features that make something a good cat are 
features that are good for the cat, just as the features that make something a good broom are 
features that are good for the broom.37 
 A good cat, for instance, is one that excels in its natural capacities. A good cat has, among 
other things, acute night vision. Acute night vision is one of the features whose possession makes 
a cat a good cat. Not only this, however: having acute night vision is also good for cats. Having 
acute night vision allows cats to flourish. 
 Likewise, a good broom is one that excels in performing its proper function. A good 
broom has, among other things, stiff bristles. Stiff bristles are part of what makes a broom a good 
broom. Not only this, however: having stiff bristles is also good for the broom. To see why, note 
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the following: you can harm a broom by altering its bristles. Dipping the bristles in plastic 
laminant, for instance, is bad for the broom--just as chalk dust is bad for computers, sugar is bad 
for your car’s gas tank, and sunlight is bad for ale. In each case, we find that artifacts can be 
harmed precisely by being prevented from performing their proper functions. Indeed, it seems 
that being prevented from functioning just is harm to an artifact. We will return to this point 
shortly. 
 In general, there is a single relation--the good for relation--that obtains between each kind 
of thing and its respective virtues. Hence, it isn’t true that feline goodness and broom goodness 
have nothing to do with each other, as, say, parthood and the true-of relations seem to. The goods 
of each kind of thing are indeed different, but they are systematically related nonetheless, and in 
a distinctively evaluative way. The Classical Platonist therefore accepts the following thesis:
u. The features that make something a good member of its kind are features that 
benefit it.
If a virtue is a feature that makes something a good member of its kind, then (u) provides a 
necessary condition for being a virtue. Virtues, according to (u), are beneficial to their 
possessors, even if not all beneficial traits are virtues.
 If (u) is true, there clearly cannot be a real kind for every predicate. For consider the 
predicate “un-benefitted self-harmer,” whose extension includes exactly those things that harm 
themselves without accruing any benefit, and whose best instances do this the most. If the 
predicate “un-benefitted self-harmer” picks out a real kind, then (u) is false; it would not be good 
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for a self-harmer to be a good self-harmer. Likewise, if (u) is true, then the predicate “un-
benefitted self-harmer” does not pick out a natural kind, even if there happen to be some 
unfortunate creatures in its extension. The real kinds, on the Classical Platonist picture--the 
natural kinds, in other words--are the kinds whose virtues are beneficial to their instances. 
 A natural worry for Classical Platonists, then, is the naturalness of kinds that, in light of 
(u), they cannot countenance. In particular, three sorts of kinds would seem to pose problems: 
artifactual kinds, whose instances include brooms and desks; material kinds, whose instances 
include water and methane; and certain biological kinds, like black widow spiders and praying 
mantises, whose virtuous members engage in self-destructive behavior. 
 First, the question of whether the Classical Platonist can countenance artifactual kinds 
turns on whether artifacts are capable of undergoing benefit and harm, as well as whether their 
virtues are always beneficial to them. Both claims are controversial, but neither one is obviously 
false. On the contrary, our talk of artifacts frequently appeals to facts about what benefits or 
harms them: oil is good for bicycles, chalk dust is bad for computers, and biodiesel is good for 
car engines, for instance. Not only does such talk appear in ordinary, non-technical discourse, 
however; it also appears in the technical manuals and professional documents that detail an 
artifact’s proper use.38 The Classical Platonist assumes the legitimacy and correctness of such 
talk; on her view, artifacts can be harmed and benefitted.39 Countenancing artifactual kinds while 
accepting (u), then, need not be absurd or even counterintuitive. On the contrary, appeals to 
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38 The online help page for Mac OS X.5, for instance, includes a section entitled, “Protecting your 
computer from harmful applications.” Its two first sentences are particularly illustrative: “Some harmful 
applications exist that can cause problems for your computer. Frequently, a harmful application will try to 
appear as an innocent document, such as a movie or graphic file.”
39 Whether they can be harmed or benefitted independently of the existence of minds, or whether their 
welfare can ever be as important as the welfare of living beings, are both additional questions that will not 
be discussed here.
benefit and harm are ubiquitous in our talk of artifacts, both professional and quotidian.
 More worrisome than artifactual kinds are ordinary physical and chemical kinds, like 
water and methane. The idea that something could be good or bad for methane seems wrong, as 
does the idea that something could be good methane or bad methane. It is tempting to conclude 
that (u) is trivially true of chemical kinds, in which case they pose no threat as a counterexample, 
but that option is not available to the Classical Platonist. For on her account, everything has a 
position in one, single teleological hierarchy. Since matter exists, it has to fit into the hierarchy 
somehow; and the most obvious way is by having a proper function. So actually, Classical 
Platonists are committed to there being a sense in which a bits of methane could be good 
methane, and also a sense in which something can be good or bad for methane. The problem of 
elucidating these senses is also known as the Matter Problem, whose solution is taken up in 
chapter 4, §4. Briefly, the solution lies in the research program of Deep Ecology, which identifies 
nature as being a certain kind of natural home for life, or a colossal natural habitat. For the time 
being, we will note that (u) cannot be trivially true of chemical kinds, in which case the Classical 
Platonist indeed has a problem. 
 Self-destructive biological kinds include the black widow spider, whose male members 
allow themselves to be decapitated and devoured by the females after mating. They do so, it 
seems, as part of their proper functioning and mode of life. Yet it would not seem to be good for 
a male black widow to be a good black widow. Nor is it good for a male praying mantis to be a 
good praying mantis. Nor, it seems, is it good for salmon to be good members of their kind, 
either, since their characteristic activity of spawning frequently comes at the cost of their health 
and life. Creatures like black widows, mantises, and salmon threaten (u) as potential 
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counterexamples. 
 In light of such examples, the Classical Platonist should remember Diotima’s speech in 
the Symposium, in which she characterizes reproduction--which includes not only biological 
reproduction but also the production of art by artists and theories by theorists--as a means for 
pursuing immortality.40 In contemporary terms, we would say that Diotima advocates a 
counterpart relation between parents and offspring. The offspring stand in for the parents, or 
represent them de re.41 Crucially, they represent their parents in such a way as to enable their 
parents to live through them. This does not require a wild metaphysic, according to which 
parents are reincarnated in their offspring. It only requires that one’s well-being be tied to the 
well-being of one’s offspring. Reproduction, on Diotima’s account, is a way of achieving second-
rate immortality, or eternal counterparthood, and it is good for the parents that reproduce for 
them to achieve it. 
 There is a sense in which reproduction can be good for a parent, even if it culminates in 
her death. For the Classical Platonist, this sense is true of black widows, praying mantises, and 
other animals who sacrifice their lives as key points in their development. It may not be true for 
more complicated creatures such as ourselves, however, or it may be true in a different way--say, 
by allowing theories and works of art to count as the offspring of theorists and artists. As a 
defense of (u), then, the Classical Platonist should claim that members of self-destructive 
biological kinds enjoy a beneficial second-rate immortality through reproduction.  
 The second objection is that, for any kind of thing that has a good, there is already a 
science that studies that kind, which is distinct from metaphysics or any branch of philosophy, 
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41 Compare with Sider (2000), pp.188-208, Johnston (2010), Chapter 5.
and which discovers the good of that kind of thing. By studying cat biology, goes the objection, 
we learn about feline health and flourishing, which is the feline good; by studying botany we 
learn about various ways for plants to flourish; by practicing housekeeping, we learn what makes 
a good broom. Goodness, goes the objection, is already studied by other disciplines, in which 
case ontology is no more ambitious under a Classical Platonist account than it is under a brute 
priority-theoretic account.
 The proper response to this objection is to note the difference between identifying various 
features that happen to be goods, and giving a metaphysical account of them. The former task is 
performed at least partially by the crafts and sciences, as when veterinarians study feline health 
and housekeepers figure out what makes a good broom. The latter task, however, consists in 
giving a theory of reified values--the Good and the other Forms--and to explain how such entities 
are related to one another, to their instances, and to the constitution of reality as a whole. 
Ontology, according to the Classical Platonist, is the development of a highly specialized theory 
of universals, which, among other things, serve as standards of proper functioning and well-
being. A full development of this theory is provided in Chapter 3, which is a technical discussion 
in the metaphysics of properties. 
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 9. The Classical Platonist Picture
In his treatise On Ends, Cicero identifies philosophy’s most pressing task with investigating “the 
end, the final and ultimate aim,” where this end is something that not only “gives the standard for 
all principles of well-being and right conduct”, but which also “nature pursue[s]” as the thing 
that is “supremely desirable”:
For what problem does life offer so important as all the topics in philosophy, and especially 
the question raised in these volumes--what is the end, the final and ultimate aim, which 
gives the standard for all principles of well-being and right conduct? What does nature 
pursue as the thing supremely desirable, and what does she avoid as the ultimate evil?42
By Cicero’s account, then the most pressing task for philosophy is to discover a single thing, 
which is simultaneously life’s ultimate goal, a second-order standard of well-being--that is, a 
standard against which the propriety of standards of well-being are measured--and something 
that nature pursues as the ultimate good. 
 Cicero’s three criteria excellently illustrate both the Classical Platonist answer to the 
question, “what is the meaning of life?” as well as to the question of how ontology can be an 
ambitious research program. For as we have seen, Classical Platonism claims that metaphysical 
priority is teleological in nature, and in so doing promises three things. 
 First, if Classical Platonism is true, then the task of ontology is to investigate “the final 
and ultimate aim,” which is the Good. Ontology, under a Classical Platonist interpretation, is 
ambitious by treating metaphysical questions as being questions about value. 
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42 On Ends, I.iv-v.11-12, Tr. H. Rackham (2006).
 Second, if Classical Platonism is true, then the primary substance--the Good--is what 
“give[s] the standard for all principles of well-being and right conduct.” For as we will see, a 
thing’s ability to perform its proper function affects whether it is a good member of its kind. A 
heart, for instance, cannot be a good heart without performing the proper function that hearts are 
supposed to perform; nor can a cat be a healthy cat without flourishing and living in the way that 
cats are supposed to. 
 Finally, the question of what nature pursues as ultimately desirable is not only one for 
ethics, but, if Classical Platonism is true, also one for metaphysics. For if (u) is true, then living 
things pursue not only what makes them function better, and which makes them excellent 
members of their kind; they also pursue that which is good for them. On the assumption that we 
all really want is that which is good for us, Classical Platonism can be summarized with Cicero’s 
third principle as well. 
 As subsequent chapters will reveal, the teleological structure of a Classical Platonist 
ontology is four-tiered, not unlike the one illustrated by the Republic’s Line Analogy.43 We may 
represent it as follows:
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43 Republic 509c10-514a. I will not argue here that Plato was a Classical Platonist.
Like Plato’s original Line, the above diagram is divisible into two basic sections, with the bottom 
two categories--Matter and Integrated Wholes--being visible, concrete things in space and time, 
and the top two categories--the Good and the other Forms (that is, proper functions)--being 
invisible, intelligible, abstract things with neither a spatial location nor a temporal extent. Since 
the top two sections contain the Classical Platonist’s primary substances (the Good being the 
only real primary substance). We will close this chapter with a brief discussion of the Good--i.e. 
Goodness Itself--and how the Good is related to various goods like health and efficient 
functioning. 
 According to the Sun Analogy, the Good makes things understandable in the way that the 
sun makes things visible, and the Good is a source of being in the same way that the sun is a 
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source of nourishment.44
 The reason why nothing can be seen without the sun is that the sun is the source of all 
light, and only illuminated things can be seen.45 The Good, then, must be the source of 
something analogous to light, the exposure to which renders something understandable. For 
Classical Platonists, this thing is logical or mathematical structure: the more structured 
something is, the easier it is to understand, to study, and to become familiar with; the less 
structured something is, the more difficult it is to do such things. When a philosopher wants to 
solve a problem or understand a theory, she does so by exposing it to logical structure--e.g. by 
drawing distinctions, defining terms, using examples, constructing analogous arguments and 
counterexamples, and so on. For this reason, Plato argued that the Good is a unique object of a 
philosophical craft--dialectic--which not only facilitates the correct understanding of science but 
also supports the refutation of sophistic attacks on science.46 The Good, then, is a source of 
logical order, much like the sun is a source of light. 
 It would be absurd to maintain that the Good causes logical order in the way that the sun 
causes light, for then the Good would have to be a body of some kind. Instead, just as the sun is a 
paradigm case of light--something that is more illuminated than anything else, which illuminates 
itself, and without which nothing else could be illuminated--so should the Good be understood as 
a paradigm case of logical structure, self-evident, without which nothing could make any sense. 
A natural way to understand the Good, then, is to think of it as something like consistency or 
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44 Republic 510b-511e5. See Reeve (2003), (1995).
45 Despite the importance of the fire in the Cave allegory, the sun analogy is easiest to communicate 
under the supposition that the sun is the only source of light. This supposition is easily jettisoned once the 
analogy is grasped in its simplest form.
46 Republic 508d-511e, 527-534d. Reeve (2003).
unity, or something without which logical order is impossible.47 The Neoplatonists, stressing this 
feature of the Good, called it “the One.”48
 The reason why the sun is the source of nourishment is that it not only sheds light but 
also determines natural cycles, such as migration patterns, births, deaths, and the seasons.49 The 
sun, in other words, is responsible for the basic conditions that allow life to thrive. Similarly, the 
Good must be responsible for the basic conditions that allow things to exist. Since the Good is a 
paradigm case of logical structure, and a foundational principle for all other logical structures, it 
follows that, for the Classical Platonist, nothing can exist unless it exhibits a minimal degree of 
consistency and order.  To say that the Good is a source of being, then does not mean anything 
exotic or “spooky”. What it means is that, just as the necessary nutrients for growth are 
counterfactually dependent on the sun, so is the world’s logical order counterpossibly dependent 
on the Good. A world which--per absurdum--lacked the Good would be a world without any 
logical order or consistency. It could not even be described as a possible world. Classical 
Platonists thus have a rationalist ontology: nothing can exist without some degree of unity or 
structure.
 One may well ask: what is so good about being logically structured? Yet there are many 
ways to be good, and many ways to be structured; without further qualification, the question is 
under-specified. One might ask what is so good for cats about having a certain structure, and the 
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47 The fact is complicated in light of developments in paraconsistent logic. The Classical Platonist who 
does not want to be committed to classicism about logic should identify the Good with some principle of 
order even more general than PNC, which paraconsistent systems share with classical ones. Assuming, 
of course, that there is such a notion.
48 Gerson (2005), Remes (2008).
49 Republic 546a-d. See also Aristotle, Physics 194b10-15, Generation and Corruption 336a15-20, 
338b1-5, Generation of Animals 777b15-778a2, and Metaphysics 1071a11-16.
answer will appeal to what we know about cats. One might ask what is so good for brooms about 
having a certain structure, and the answer will appeal to what we know about brooms. In asking 
what is so good for things in general about having logical structure in general, the answer will 
appeal to what we know about things in general.
 Things in general, for the Classical Platonist, are the primary substances, which, in 
addition to the Good, include the Forms, which are kind-specific standards against which the 
well-being and elegance of material particulars are measured. The question of what is so good 
for structures about being logically ordered sounds strange at first--for how could abstract 
structures be beneficiaries?--but in fact there is a simple way to understand it. If one thinks of 
theoretical elegance, order, and consistency as perfections, and if one thinks of them as 
perfections of intelligible structures generally, and not just of man-made theories, it is natural to 
think of various purposes as achieving a kind of perfection in nature’s order. The Forms, in other 
words, exist in order to be theoretically elegant, and their unique good,--which is the Good, just 
as a cat’s unique good is its distinctively feline mode of health--consists in achieving this aim. 
Furthermore, because the Forms are changeless, it follows that structural universals are eternally
—and necessarily—achieving perfection to the same degree.50 It is no wonder that Plato’s theory 
of the Forms became a piece of classical theology, treating the gods as ideally beautiful, perfect 
beings that structure the world, and which do so by being things that nature strives to imitate.51
 Returning to the issue of whether Classical Platonism affords ambition, the answer is that 
it in fact does. Even if cat goodness is the domain of veterinary science and broom goodness is 
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50 The problem of explaining how could there be processes that involve no change is one addressed by 
Aristotle in Metaphysics !.6 with his discussion of dynameis and energeiai. See Reeve (2000), ch.6.
51 Dodds (1951), pp.283-311, and Siniossoglou (2008), ch.1, 2 and 5. See also Iamblichus, De Mysteriis I.
3; Julian, Against the Galileans 43a-52c; Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 113-166; and Sallustius, 
Concerning the Gods and the Universe.
the domain of housekeeping, the Good, as well as the goodness of things in general, is not 
already the domain of any discipline. Except ontology, that is. According to Classical Platonism, 
ontology is the project of explaining how all things are dependent on the Good, which requires a 
great deal of work in the metaphysics of properties and value. The project is indeed ambitious, 
and proper to both philosophy and metaphysics.
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2  Classical Platonism and Priority Monism
Priority Monists claim that whole cosmos is metaphysically prior to its parts. Priority Pluralists 
claim that the smallest parts of the cosmos are metaphysically prior to the whole. As for the 
various wholes that are in the cosmos, both Monism and Pluralism are silent. Their silence is 
telling, however; for there are some cases where it seems that the whole is more basic than the 
parts, and other cases where it seems that the parts are more basic than the whole. When we ask 
about wholes and parts in general, we find that the correct thesis is neither general Monism nor 
general Pluralism. The correct thesis, I argue, is Classical Platonism, which states that a whole is 
prior to its parts if and only if the whole is teleologically prior to its parts--i.e. when the parts 
have the proper function of being integrated into the whole. Classical Platonism accurately 
predicts our intuitions about the priority of wholes to parts, while adding content to the elusive 
question of priority. These facts constitute a formidable argument for Classical Platonism.
 1. Heaps and Wholes
There is a philosophical tradition, arguably beginning with Aristotle, which not only 
distinguishes mere heaps from integrated wholes, but which also does so on the basis of 
metaphysical priority.1 It says that integrated wholes are metaphysically prior to their parts, 
whereas mere heaps are not; and that the world’s most metaphysically basic material elements 
1 Topics 150a15-20; Physics 185b11-15; Metaphysics 1023b26-36, 1024a1-10, 1041b30-1042a3. See 
Koslicki (2008), pp.122-164 and Reeve (2000), ch.3. 
are integrated wholes. Thus Aristotle connects the question of wholes’ integration to that of 
priority and substance:
Again, if the part are prior to the whole, and the acute angle is part of the right angle, and 
the finger part of the animal, the acute angle will be prior to the right angle, and the finger 
to the man. But it is considered that the latter are prior; for in the formula the parts are 
explained from them; and the wholes are prior also in virtue of their ability to exist 
independently. The truth is probably that “part” has several meanings, one of which is “that 
which measures in respect of quantity.” However, let us dismiss this question and consider 
of what, in the sense of parts, substance consists.2
Here Aristotle notes that if certain parts are prior to wholes--such as an acute angle, which is part 
of a larger right angle; or a finger, which is part of an animal--then we will have the unacceptable 
result that geometric figures and animals cannot explain their parts in the ways that they are 
supposed to. And while there are different kinds of explanation, the one that concerns Aristotle in 
the Metaphysics, and which concerns us here, is that which is tied to metaphysical priority and 
primary substance. It is the question of when a whole is metaphysically something more than its 
parts. It is, in other words, the question “of what, in the sense of parts, substance consists.”
 This philosophical tradition--which we will call material priority-theoretic ontology--has 
recently been defended by Jonathan Schaffer, who, like Aristotle, distinguishes mere heaps from 
integrated wholes on the basis of metaphysical priority; and who, like Aristotle, defends the view 
that the world’s most basic material elements are certain integrated wholes, rather than their 
parts. His view, in its fleshed-out form, is known as Priority Monism.3
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2 Metaphysics 1034b27-1035a.
3 Schaffer (2009), (2010).
 Schaffer introduces his Priority Monist view with a simple question about metaphysical 
priority. The question is this: between a material whole and its parts, which one is metaphysically 
prior to the other? Which one is more basic, metaphysically speaking? Thus Schaffer asks: 
Which is prior, whole or part? Consider a circle. Imagine it divided into any two 
semicircular parts. Is the circle prior, with the semicircles existing in virtue of the circle? 
Or are the semicircles prior, with the circle existing in virtue of the semicircles?4
Replacing the circle and semicircle with the material universe and its parts, Schaffer poses the 
question of Monism not in terms of circles, but in terms of the universe as a whole: 
In place of the circle consider the cosmos (the ultimate concrete whole), and in place of the 
semicircles imagine the cosmos divided all the way down into particles (the ultimate 
concrete parts). Which is ultimately prior, the one whole or its ultimate parts?5
Thus we have a debate over the metaphysical priority of the cosmos as a whole: if Monism is 
true, the whole cosmos is prior to its parts; but if Pluralism is true, the smallest particles are prior 
to the whole cosmos. The question of Monism, then, is not the question of “which is prior, 
whole or part?” Rather, it is which is prior, the whole cosmos or its smallest particles? The latter 
question is more specific than the former, and its answer settles fewer questions in priority-
theoretic ontology. 
  Rather than asking about the material cosmos alone, one might ask about wholes and 
parts in general. For if indeed the whole cosmos is prior to its parts, what does this say about all 
the other wholes and parts? Is every whole prior to its parts? Or, if a whole is only sometimes 
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4 Scahffer (2010).
5 Ibid. Despite its dramatic connotations, the word “cosmos” will serve as a mere synonym for the physical 
universe. 
prior to its parts, then when? Rather than asking about the cosmos, in other words, one might ask 
about the conditions for whole-to-part priority in general. When exactly, in other words, do we 
have an integrated whole rather than a mere heap? This is the question we will deal with in this 
chapter, and its answer will give us an argument for Classical Platonsim.
 For the purposes of our discussion, the term “mere heap” will include many things in its 
extension that are not literally heaps. In particular, they will include classes of entities that we 
will call mere aggregates and mere portions. For like heaps, mere aggregates and mere portions 
are not integrated wholes. They are not sharply distinguished from their environment. Rather, 
they are--like heaps--arbitrary portions of stuff.
 Mere aggregates are arbitrary collections of concrete objects, which need not be spatially 
close or related in any interesting way. The whole whose parts are the Eiffel Tower and 
Betelgeuse, for instance, is a mere aggregate, as are all of the following: the whole whose parts 
are Antarctica and the planet Mars; the whole whose parts are my two thumbs and the three most 
threadbare rugs in Canada; the whole whose parts are a pair of plates and a certain walrus; and so 
on. What makes these items mere heaps in the technical sense is that they are not among the 
things we would classify as real objects, or as integrated wholes. On the contrary, they barely 
seem like objects at all, and seem much more like a philosopher’s invention. 
 Likewise for mere portions, or what Van Inwagen calls arbitrary undetached parts.6 Such 
entities include the middle two-thirds of a butter knife, the northernmost sixteenth of an office 
building, and the innumerably many overlapping portions of asphalt, which, despite being 
shaped exactly like Milo’s Venus, collectively make up US Highway I-5. Like mere aggregates, 
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mere portions will be counted in the extension of the term “mere heap” because they are no more 
cases of real objects than mere aggregates are. They seem more like philosopher’s inventions 
than constituents of the world, and they are certainly not sharply distinguished from their 
environment in the way that integrated wholes are. 
 In addition to being distinguished by priority relations, then, mere heaps and integrated 
wholes are also easily distinguished by example. Piles of sand, mere aggregates, and arbitrary 
undetached parts of material objects are all mere heaps; while organisms, machines, crystals, and 
tightly-knit ecosystems are integrated wholes. In ordinary English, we speak of a whole being 
“over and above” its parts, as well as being “more than the sum of” them; in so doing, we 
distinguish integrated wholes from mere heaps. Mere heaps are things like piles of sand, the sum 
of the Eiffel Tower and Betelgeuse, and the middle two-thirds of a butter knife; integrated wholes 
are things like house cats, computers, mushrooms, and steamships. Mere heaps are just bits of 
stuff, arbitrarily distinguished from their environs; whereas integrated wholes are well-defined, 
structured objects. They are what we might call “the real objects,” as opposed to mere materials. 
Table 1 below lists several intuitive examples, in addition to those just described.
TABLE 1. Examples of Mere Heaps and Integrated Wholes
Mere Heaps Integrated Wholes
   A pile of snow
   A cat carcass
   Some scrap metal
   A puddle of mud
   The sum of the Eiffel Tower and 
Betelgeuse
   The middle two-thirds of a butter 
knife
   An igloo
   A cat
   A steamship
   A tree
   The Eiffel Tower
   
   A butter knife
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The fact that we can distinguish mere heaps from integrated wholes by example, as well as on 
the basis of metaphysical priority, then, is important to our investigation; for it allows us an 
opportunity to discover just what metaphysical priority is, and with it, what the primary 
substances are. In the last chapter we found that brute notions of metaphysical priority are 
unintelligible, and that, while promising and provocative, a teleological analysis of priority still 
lacks decisive arguments in its favor. The fact that we can distinguish mere heaps from integrated 
wholes by example, however, suggests a clear method for producing such an argument. For if 
mere heaps are distinguished from integrated wholes both by example and on the basis of 
metaphysical priority, the fact that there are examples permits us to check an analysis of 
metaphysical priority against intuitive cases. We can actually test an analysis of metaphysical 
priority, in other words, by seeing how well it conforms to our judgments about the examples. So 
if an analysis of priority treats organisms as mere heaps, for instance, while treating piles of sand 
as integrated wholes, we are within our rights to reject it as false; for if anything is an integrated 
whole, an organism is, and if anything is a mere heap, a pile of sand is. The fact that there are 
intuitive examples of mere heaps and integrated wholes, then, allows us to test different accounts 
of priority. For the sake of precision, we can treat such accounts as competing answers to a 
question about wholes’ metaphysical priority to their parts. We will call this question the Special 
Priority Question, or SPQ:
 SPQ: Under which conditions, exactly, is a material whole metaphysically prior to its 
  parts?
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The word “conditions” in SPQ should be read loosely, so as to include not only relations that 
might obtain among the parts but also various environments that a whole might be in. It should 
not be read, however, so as to allow a list of individuals--like in Table 1--to count as an answer to 
it. A proper answer to SPQ, in other words, must be general. For the same reason that Socrates 
dismisses Euthyphro’s first answer to the question of what piety is--“why, it’s what I’m doing 
right now!”--so should we dismiss such answers to SPQ. Rather than asking which particular 
wholes are prior to their parts, SPQ asks which necessary and sufficient general conditions 
obtain for the priority of material objects to their parts.
 This chapter’s thesis is that Classical Platonism correctly answers SPQ. What 
distinguishes integrated wholes from mere heaps, in other words, is that the parts of an integrated 
whole are teleologically dependent on it. The parts of an integrated whole have the proper 
function of being integrated into it; and not only their well-being but also their very existence 
requires them to be capable of this integration. The correct answer to SPQ, in other words, is 
“when the parts are teleologically dependent on the whole.” To see why Classical Platonism 
supplies the correct answer to SPQ, however, it is illustrative to examine less successful answers 
first; so that by noting where they fail, we better see how the teleological answer succeeds.
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 2. A First Answer to SPQ: Fungibility
The first proposed answer to SPQ says that a whole is prior to its parts exactly when it can 
survive the replacement of one. If a whole’s parts are fungible, in other words, then there is a 
sense in which it something over and above them. A whole with fungible parts is not an 
extensional mereological sum, for instance, which is defined in terms of its parts. A whole with 
fungible parts is not like a mathematical set, which has its components necessarily. The 
Fungibility Answer to SPQ--henceforth “the Fungibility Answer”--says that a whole is prior to its 
parts exactly when it can survive the loss or the gain of one:
The Fungibility Answer: A material whole W is metaphysically prior to its parts, the Ps, 
iffdef: W can survive an addition to, or subtraction from, the Ps.
 
Since the metaphysical priority of whole to part is, by the above definition, what distinguishes 
mere heaps from integrated wholes, the Fungibility Answer entails that something is an 
integrated whole exactly when it can survive a change in parts, and a mere heap otherwise. So 
according to the Fungibility Answer, something is a mere heap exactly when it cannot survive a 
change in parts. 
 If the Fungibility Answer is correct, then it should cohere with intuitive cases. It should 
predict, for instance, that piles of sand, mere aggregates, and arbitrary undetached portions of 
matter are all mere heaps; and that organisms and machines are integrated wholes. So let us ask: 
does the Fungibility Answer cohere with intuitive cases? 
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 No. The problem with the Fungibility Answer is that every material object--even piles of 
sand, mere aggregates, and mere portions--can survive a change in parts. Intuitively, such things 
are mere heaps, and they are importantly distinguished from integrated wholes such as organisms 
and machines. If the Fungibility Answer is correct, however, the distinction between mere heaps 
and integrated wholes is not intuitive. It does not distinguish piles of sand from organisms, but 
rather counts them--and every other material object, too--as integrated wholes. If the Fungibility 
Answer to SPQ is correct, no material objects are mere heaps. Yet some material objects are 
mere heaps. So the Fungibility Answer to SPQ is not correct. 
 To see why the Fungibility Answer fails, it is sufficient to note that every material object--
even piles of sand, mere aggregates, and mere portions--can survive a change in parts. 
 First. consider a pile of sand. A pile of sand can persist through the removal of a single 
grain. If we have a pile of sand, in other words, and if remove a single grain from it, this does not  
destroy the pile. The pile could be destroyed if we scattered the grains widely in every direction, 
perhaps, but just removing a single grain from the top of the pile will not do it. The same pile of 
sand can exist both before and after the removal of a single grain. Whatever other questions may 
arise about the persistence conditions of sand-piles do not concern us;7 it is sufficient for our 
purposes to note that a pile of sand can survive the removal of a single grain. 
 Just as piles of sand can survive changes in parts, so can mere aggregates. Consider the 
whole whose parts include the Eiffel Tower and the red star Betelgeuse. Call this object 
“Eiffelgeuse.” Because parthood is a transitive relation, Eiffelgeuse not only has the Eiffel Tower 
and Betelgeuse as parts; it also has the Eiffel Tower’s parts and Betelgeuse’s parts as parts, too. 
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7 It does not concern us here, for instance, that if we allow heaps of sand to survive the removal of a 
single grain, we thereby encounter a Sorites paradox. For whatever the correct solution to the Sorites is, it 
had better not entail mereological essentialism.
So the various beams that compose the Eiffel Tower are each a part of Eiffelgeuse, as are the 
hemispheres of Betelgeuse. Eiffelgeuse has all the parts of both the Eiffel Tower and of 
Betelgeuse. 
 If Eiffelgeuse is indeed a single material object, as opposed to a mathematical set, it can 
survive a change in parts. To see why, it is sufficient to note that Betelgeuse and the Eiffel Tower 
can each survive a change in their parts. Since Betelgeuse and the Eiffel Tower are each a part of 
Eiffelgeuse, it follows that Eiffelgeuse has parts that can survive changes in parts. Yet parthood 
is transitive. To survive a change in your parts’ parts is to survive a change in your parts. So 
Eiffelgeuse--a mere aggregate--can survive a change in parts. Like piles of sand, then, mere 
aggregates can survive changes in parts. 
 Finally, even mere portions can survive changes in parts. Consider, for instance, the 
middle two-thirds of a butter knife. Call it “Middly.” Suppose that the butter knife is chipped in 
the middle, and that Middly consequently loses a part. Now suppose for reductio that Middly 
cannot survive a change in parts. If Middly cannot survive a change in parts, it would follow that 
the chipping of the butter knife destroys Middly. Since Middly is the middle two-thirds of the 
butter knife, however, it would also follow that the middle two-thirds of the butter knife is 
destroyed. Yet this is absurd. Chipping a butter knife does not destroy most of it. So it cannot be 
that Middly is destroyed by the loss of a part; it must be that Middly, an arbitrary undetached 
portion of a material object, can survive a change in parts instead. So arbitrary undetached 
portions of material objects can survive changes in parts.
 Piles of sand, mere aggregates, and arbitrary undetached portions of matter can all 
survive changes in parts. The Fungibility Answer says that the capacity to survive a change in 
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parts is sufficient for being an integrated whole. So the Fungibility Answer entails that piles of 
sand, mere aggregates, and mere portions are all integrated wholes. Yet this is incorrect. A pile of 
sand is not really anything over and above its parts--not, at least, in the way that an organism 
seems to be. Likewise for objects like Eiffelgeuse and Middly. They do not seem to be wholes 
whose organization distinguishes them from their environment. On the contrary, many of 
Eiffelgeuse’s parts are separated by an astronomical distance! Far from being integrated wholes, 
Eiffelgeuse and Middly are mere heaps.
 A good answer to SPQ correctly draws the intuitive distinction between mere heaps and 
integrated wholes. The Fungibility Answer does not correctly draw this distinction. So we should 
not accept the Fungibility Answer.
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 3.  A Second Answer to SPQ: Life
While eschewing talk of metaphysical priority, Peter Van Inwagen famously defends a view of 
material composition according to which a group of parts compose a whole only if that whole is 
alive.8 Thus, on Van Inwagen’s view, the particles that we would ordinarily think of as 
composing a table do not actually do so. For tables are not alive, and particles can allegedly only 
compose things that are alive. So Van Inwagen’s view assigns a privileged place to organisms as 
the only existing material composites; it denies that there are such things as tables, chairs, stars, 
and planets, but it affirms there are such things as cats, dogs, trees, and mushrooms.9 On Van 
Inwagen’s view, a whole is composed of parts if and only if it is alive.
 Our next answer to SPQ treats metaphysical priority in much the same way that Van 
Inwagen treats composition. It holds that there are nonliving composites like sand piles, but, on 
the basis of the fact that they are not alive, denies that they are prior to their parts. Call this the 
Life Answer to SPQ:
The Life Answer: A material whole W is metaphysically prior to its parts, the Ps, iffdef:  
W is alive.
The Life Answer to SPQ states that a whole is metaphysically prior to its parts exactly when the 
whole is alive. The Life Answer holds, in other words, that all and only living wholes are 
integrated, and that all other material beings are mere heaps.
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Life Answer to SPQ, requires that the whole is not only alive but also has a life, which living colonies do 
not. (See discussion below.)
9 This controversial feature of his view--which Van Inwagen calls “the Denial”--will not be taken up here. 
 Though successfully distinguishing heaps of sand, Eiffelgeuse, and Middly from 
integrated wholes, the Life Answer to SPQ is incorrect. It is incorrect for two simple reasons: 
first, that life is not sufficient for the metaphysical priority of whole to part, and second, that it is 
not necessary either. 
 The fact that life is insufficient for the metaphysical priority of whole to part can be 
demonstrated by considering living heaps of organisms, or living colonies with little to no 
organization beyond the spatial connectedness of their parts.10 As an example, consider garden 
hedges. Garden hedges begin their lives as separate plants, and grow as individual trunks from 
separate seeds. Each individual hedge is an integrated whole. When their branches come into 
contact and rub up against one another however, they merge, and multiple individual hedges 
become one composite hedge. The composite hedge is a single living thing. Yet it is not anything 
over and above its parts; for it is not an organism. The individual hedges are not organs of the 
composite, and they are not dependent on the composite to exist in the way that a cat’s heart is 
dependent on the cat. The individual hedges could grow and live perfectly well on their own, 
without being integrated into the composite. In these respects the individual hedges are only 
accidentally integrated into a composite, and in a way that makes the composite seem little more 
than the individuals. The composite does not seem to be metaphysically prior to its parts. Yet it is 
alive. So life is not sufficient for being metaphysically prior to one’s parts.
 A second counterexample to the Life Answer’s sufficiency is the phenomenon of slime 
mold.11 A certain kind of slime mold, dictyostelium, spends most of its life as a heap of amoebic 
bacteriophages. Its cells operate autonomously, and they share no central nervous system. 
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Though it has no central nervous system, scarcity of food will occasionally cause the slime 
mold’s cells to coalesce into an eyeless, brainless mass, which can move and respond to light, but 
which immediately loses cohesion and breaks into its constituent amoebae when food is 
discovered. Biologists have categorized the slime-mold as a colony of organisms rather than as a 
whole organism. So life does not seem sufficient to make a whole prior to its parts. 
 Composite hedges, slime molds, and other living colonies are indeed intricate, but their 
intricacy is primarily due to the intricacy of their relatively unrelated parts. Living colonies have 
integrated wholes as parts, but they are more like mere heaps of integrated wholes than they are 
like integrated wholes of integrated wholes. Composite hedges and slime-mold are not super-
organisms. Nor are they organisms. They are more like mere heaps of organisms than anything, 
and a correct answer to SPQ should categorize them as such; yet the Life Answer categorizes 
them as integrated wholes. This counts as a mark against the Life Answer.
 The fact that life is not necessary for being an integrated whole is much easier to 
demonstrate. For machines are paradigm cases of non-living integrated wholes. Cars, computers, 
pianos, igloos, and irrigation systems are all importantly distinguished from their environment, 
and distinguished on the basis of their parts’ integration. Far from being mere heaps of parts, they  
are not only integrated wholes but necessarily so. For a machine whose parts lay in a heap is no 
longer a machine in the fullest sense. Rather, such a thing would be a dismantled machine at best 
and broken machine at worst. Neither item is fully a machine, however; for the former is merely 
a set of parts that potentially constitute a machine, while the latter are merely parts that used to. 
To really, fully be a machine, one’s parts require some minimal degree of integration.12 Machines 
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mechanism.
are necessarily integrated, and they are importantly distinct from mere heaps. They are prior to 
their parts even though they are not alive.13 
 While supported by cases of organisms, cases of machines and living colonies show that 
the Life Answer to SPQ is inadequate. Let us turn to an answer which may sound better at first--
and indeed, which has received a respectable defense--but which ultimately fails for reasons 
entirely different than the Fungibility and Life answers. 
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structures of organisms, distinguishing the two primarily by the means of their transmission: the structures 
of organisms reside in the semen of the male parent, which moves so that, when it is applied to the 
menses of the female, the latter will be shaped by the former so as to take on the parents! appearance. 
Artifacts" structures, by contrast, reside “in the soul of the artisan,” who imposes it on matter using the 
motion of his limbs. Allegedly, then, the motions of the artisan!s limbs bear the same relationship the the 
matter of the resulting artifact as the motions of a male parent!s semen bears to the menstrual blood that 
will initially constitute his child. See Physics 199a34-199b10, GA 730b10-731a1, 731a24-731b10, 
767a36-b25, Metaph. 1032a32-b10, 1034a8-15, 1034a30-b10, 1070b30-34, 1071b26-31.
5. A Third Answer to SPQ: Emergence
The Emergence Answer to SPQ states that a whole is metaphysically prior to its parts exactly 
when it has emergent features; and that mere heaps are distinguished from integrated wholes on 
the grounds that mere heaps lack emergent features. 
The Emergence Answer: A material whole W is metaphysically prior to its parts, the Ps, 
iffdef: W has emergent features.14
The Emergence Answer thus defines metaphysical priority in terms of emergence. In so doing, it 
naturally accrues the question, “what is emergence?”
 On pain of circularity, emergence cannot be defined in terms of metaphysical priority, 
metaphysical basicness, or any other such ontological notion. It will not do to claim that a whole 
is metaphysically prior to its parts exactly when it has emergent features; and that a whole has 
emergent features just in case it is metaphysically prior to its parts. For whether true or not, such 
an account cannot be informative. 
 Accounts of emergence usually proceed in terms of derivability, predictability, 
explanation, conceptual novelty, or holism, and it is seldom for any one of these notions to be 
taken as primitive. Consequently, philosophers have produced a multitude of accounts of 
emergence, which are so great in number as to warrant a book of its own.15 Fortunately, we need 
not embark on a detailed critique of every account of emergence in order to answer the question 
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requires the whole not only to be alive but also to have a life, which living colonies do not. (See 
discussion below.)
15 See Bedau and Humphreys (2008).
of whether any such account correctly distinguishes mere heaps from integrated wholes. For no 
matter how nuanced, accounts of emergence that proceed in terms of any of these notions will 
face the difficulty of saying exactly what the facts about the parts are, from which certain facts 
about the whole supposedly cannot be derived, predicted, explained, or captured without 
conceptual novelty. 
 The most usual way of defining emergence is in terms of derivability: a whole has an 
emergent property exactly when some fact about it cannot be derived from any of the facts about 
its parts.16 
EA1: A material whole W is metaphysically prior to its parts, the Ps, iffdef: some fact 
about W cannot be derived from any fact about the Ps.
If we agree with EA1 that emergence consists in the non-derivability of holistic facts from facts 
about the parts, and if, as EA1 states, we take the condition of emergence as an answer to SPQ, 
then we find integrated wholes distinguished from mere heaps solely on the basis of whether 
facts about them can be derived from facts about their parts.
 The problem in explaining emergence this way is that there are no ontologically neutral 
positions on what the facts about the parts are. Depending on which things are counted as 
features of the parts, different things will count as facts about the parts; and depending on what 
one allows to count as facts about the parts, different sorts of facts about the whole will count as 
emergent.
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 As an example, consider the fact that water is the combination of hydrogen and oxygen 
molecules, and that, although water is a liquid, neither hydrogen nor oxygen are liquids. The 
property of being liquid, therefore, is an oft-cited candidate case of emergence.17 Whether the 
case is genuine depends on a number of things, however, including the facts about hydrogen and 
oxygen. One would think that such facts are easy to discover: just ask the chemist. Yet even with 
an exhaustive account of hydrogen’s and oxygen’s chemical properties, there remain some purely  
ontological questions hydrogen and oxygen, as there would be about any parts. 
 Consider, for instance, whether it is a fact about hydrogen that, when combined with 
oxygen in certain proportions and at certain temperatures, it produces liquid water. It is certainly 
a fact about hydrogen in one sense, namely that the sentence “hydrogen, when combined with 
oxygen in certain proportions and at certain temperatures, produces liquid water” is true, and its 
grammatical subject refers to hydrogen. The statement is about hydrogen in the sense that 
hydrogen is its grammatical subject. The fact that its predicate explicitly mentions water’s 
liquidity, moreover, suggests that being liquid is not an emergent property of water. 
 The example of being liquid is not special, however; with the appropriate grammatical 
transformations, any fact about a whole can be treated as a fact about is parts. For any statement 
about a whole--say, “the whole is such-and-such,”--one can easily consider a part of the whole, P, 
and construct a true sentence, which has P as the grammatical subject, and whose predicate is 
“...composes, along with the so-and-sos, a whole that is such-and-such.” If such measures are 
sufficient to derive facts about a whole from facts about its parts, and if being derivable in this 
manner is incompatible with the whole’s having some emergent feature, then any facts about a 
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whole can be derived from the facts about its parts, and no features of any whole are emergent. 
So presumably, there is more to a fact’s being derivable from one’s parts than grammatical 
subjectivity. But what? 
 One might distinguish the facts about hydrogen’s intrinsic features from the facts about 
its extrinsic or relational features; and state that the facts which are really about hydrogen are the 
ones concerning hydrogen’s intrinsic features. On such a proposal, it would be a fact about 
hydrogen that it produces water when combined with oxygen only if such a feature is intrinsic to 
hydrogen. 
 Intrinsicness, in turn, is typically defined in terms of either the capacity to differ between 
duplicates or else in terms of loneliness.18 Neither conception settles the ontological question 
about what a thing’s features really are, however. 
 Take the first conception of intrinsicness, for instance, according to which F is an 
intrinsic feature of X just in case every possible duplicate of X has F. Duplicates, in turn, are 
defined in terms of either resemblance or natural properties: either X and Y are duplicates just in 
case X and Y resemble exactly; or else X and Y or duplicates just in case X and Y have exactly 
the same natural properties. The problem with using either conception of intrinsicness to 
elucidate what a thing’s basic features, however, is that doing so presupposes either a notion of 
basic resemblance or of naturalness, both of whose extensions turn on the same considerations 
as that of what a thing’s metaphysically basic features are. 
 It is unclear whether two hydrogen molecules could have exactly the same natural 
properties, for instance--so that they were exact duplicates--but with only one of them producing 
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liquid water when combined with the proper amounts of oxygen. For the matter would depend on 
whether the feature of producing liquid water when combined with oxygen is natural. If it is, then 
exact duplicates cannot differ with respect to it, which would make it intrinsic, and which, by 
EA1, would imply that liquidity is not an emergent feature of water molecules. Contrarily, 
however, one might argue that the tendency to produce liquid water when combined with oxygen 
is not a natural property but rather something else, which is metaphysically dependent on more 
fundamental features of the world. In short, there is a purely ontological question about how to 
determine the ways in which duplicates differ, if the notion of duplication is to be understood in 
terms of sharing natural properties. This question of which properties are the natural ones, 
moreover, turns on the same sorts of considerations as SPQ itself.
 Likewise for defining duplication in terms of resemblance. It is unclear whether two 
hydrogen molecules could resemble exactly, for instance--so that they were exact duplicates--but 
with only one of them producing liquid water when combined with the proper amounts of 
oxygen. For producing liquid water when combined with oxygen seems to be a respect in which 
the two molecules can resemble; and if it is, then exact duplicates cannot differ with respect to it. 
Contrarily, one might argue that the tendency to produce liquid water when combined with 
oxygen is not a real respect in which objects resemble; and that sharing such a trait is a mere 
“Cambridge resemblance.”19 Again we find a purely ontological question about how to 
determine the ways in which duplicates differ, if indeed duplication is defined in terms of 
resemblance; and again such a question turns on the same sorts of considerations as SPQ itself. 
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 If, moreover, we turn to the notion of loneliness to elucidate the question of what a 
thing’s basic features are, we find the same problem. Suppose that a feature F is intrinsic to a 
quantity of hydrogen just in case the hydrogen could be F while being the only thing in the 
universe. Even if correct, this definition would not settle the question of what hydrogen’s basic 
features are. For suppose there are such features as the disposition to produce liquid water when 
combined with oxygen. If there is such a feature, there is no reason why something could not 
possess it in isolation. A grain of salt in a waterless universe is still water-soluble. Likewise, a 
quantity of hydrogen in an oxygen-less universe can still have, all on its own, the feature of 
being disposed to produce liquid water when combined with oxygen. Moreover, for any whole W, 
which has any purportedly emergent feature F, one can always find among W’s parts--the Ps--
some part X that has, all on its own, the feature of being disposed to produce an F thing when 
combined with the other Ps. So long as one is willing to believe in such things as dispositions, 
then, one need not acknowledge any feature as emergent in EA1’s sense! One may dispute the 
ontological status of dispositions--that is, dispute whether they are really among the world’s most 
basic features--but such a dispute would appear to turn on the same notion of priority mentioned 
in SPQ. 
 To distinguish mere heaps from integrated wholes on the basis of EA1-type emergence--
that is, to distinguish them on the basis of what can be derived from facts about their parts--is to 
raise ontological questions about which features the parts really have, and what the facts about 
the parts really are. Because such questions are ontological--that is, concerned with identifying 
the world’s most basic features--our diversion to them as an answer to SPQ is hardly 
illuminating. If one answers SPQ by saying, “it depends on what the metaphysically primary 
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features of the parts are,” this fails to illuminate the notion of metaphysical priority. It would be 
one thing if the metaphysical priority of whole to part depended on certain physical facts, or 
biological facts, or ethical facts; but to say that it depends on ontological facts is just plain 
uninformative, even if it is true. EA1 is not the correct answer to SPQ.
 Nor can EA1 be rehabilitated by replacing “derived from” with “predicted by observing,” 
or “explained by.” For the same problem arises: depending on which sorts of things one counts 
as features of the parts, different things will be predictable. Likewise, different things will be 
explainable by the parts, depending on what the parts are, as will different things be expressible 
with concepts that apply to them. In the context of answering SPQ, claims about emergence 
either presuppose or else require an answer to the question of what a part’s real features are--as 
opposed to features that it merely seems to have because it satisfies some predicate. Because 
such a question is ontological, furthermore, and concerns the question of which things are among 
the world’s most metaphysically basic features, the ensuing presuppositions are uninformative at 
best and question-begging at worst. The Emergence Answer to SPQ is not correct. 
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 6. The Correct Answer: The Whole is Prior Just In Case it is Teleologically Prior
The Teleological Answer to SPQ states that a whole is metaphysically prior to its parts exactly 
when it is teleologically prior to them--that is, when the parts not only have the proper function 
of being integrated into the whole, but also depend for their existence, their nature, and their 
well-being on performing that function. The Teleological Answer states, in other words, that all 
and only integrated wholes are teleologically prior to their parts. 
 More specifically, let us say that a whole is teleologically prior to its parts exactly when 
four conditions hold: first, that the whole has parts with mereologically integrative proper 
functions, or proper functions whose performance consists in being integrated into the whole; 
second, that such parts could not exist without their mereologically integrative proper functions; 
third, that such parts could not be the kinds of things that they are without their mereologically 
integrative proper functions; and finally, that the well-being of such parts is identical to the 
excellence with which they perform their mereologically integrative proper functions. So 
formally, we may state the Teleological Answer to SPQ as follows:
The Teleological Answer: A material whole W is metaphysically prior to its parts, the Ps, 
iffdef: (i) some of the Ps have a proper function F, which is performed by of being part of 
W; (ii) the Ps that have F cannot exist without their ability to perform F; (iii) the Ps that 
have F cannot be the kinds of things that they are without their ability to perform F; and 
(iv) the well-being of Ps that have F is identical to the excellence with which they can 
perform F.
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 First, and most importantly, the the Teleological Answer gets the right result with all the 
intuitive cases. Consider first the case of an organism--a house cat, say. Felix the house cat’s 
parts are his organs, and those organs have the proper function of supporting Felix in various 
ways. Felix’ heart sustains him by pumping his blood, and in order to sustain Felix in this 
manner, the heart has to be an integrated part of him. The proper function of Felix’ heart, then, is 
performed by being part of Felix.20 Furthermore, Felix’ heart is not special in this respect; the 
same is true of all his organs. His kidneys perform their proper function by being part of Felix, as 
do his eyes, brain, skin, and so on. Condition (i) is true of an organism and its parts.
 Not only must Felix’ organs be parts of Felix to perform their proper functions, however; 
they also must be capable of performing their proper functions to exist. If we remove one of 
Felix’ organs, for instance, and damage it so that it cannot ever perform its proper function again, 
we will have destroyed it. A heart that is removed, for instance, might still be a heart for a while, 
but it could not remain a heart for long without medical technology. For if the heart is left out for 
a few hours, so that its tissue dies and it can no longer be rehabilitated as a working blood-pump, 
we should say that the heart has been destroyed. It is no longer a heart, but an ex-heart.21 It is a 
dead heart, which is a heart in the same way that a counterfeit passport is a passport--namely, by 
not being one. The same goes, moreover, for Felix’ other organs. His kidneys, eyes, brain, and 
skin only exist to the extent that they are capable of performing their proper function. Their 
capacity to perform their proper function is essential to them, in other words. They need to be 
able to perform their proper function if they are to exist at all. Like (i), (ii) is also true of 
organisms and organs.
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 Just as an organism’s parts depend for their existence on being able to function properly, 
so do they depend for their nature on their proper functions, too. What makes a certain lump of 
tissue a heart, in other words--as opposed to a kidney or some skin--is its proper function. The 
heart is a heart because it has the proper function of pumping blood; likewise for the kidney, the 
eyes, the brain, the skin, and all of Felix’ other organs. Organs get their nature from their proper 
functions; (iii) is true of organisms and their organs. 
 Finally, the health and well-being of a biological organ is identical to the excellence with 
which it performs its mereologically integrative proper function. A healthy heart, for instance, is 
just one that performs the heart-function well. Indeed, to perform the heart-function well just is 
to be a healthy heart. Hearts do not have their jobs contingently, and they do not yearn for a 
vacation or to live a little for themselves. Like other organs, their well-being is exhausted by how 
well they perform their mereologically integrative functions. On the Teleological Answer to 
SPQ, then, organisms are integrated wholes.
 Piles of sand, Eiffelgeuse, and Middly, however, have no parts with mereologically 
integrative proper functions. For neither a pile of sand nor Middly has any parts with proper 
functions, mereologically integrative or otherwise. Eiffelgeuse, however, has a part--the Eiffel 
Tower--whose parts have mereologically integrative proper functions; but such functions are 
related only to their integration into the Eiffel Tower. The Eiffel Tower’s parts have the proper 
function of being integrated into the Eiffel Tower, in other words, but not of being integrated into 
Eiffelgeuse. On the Teleological Answer to SPQ, piles of sand, Eiffelgeuse, and Middly all come 
out as being mere heaps. 
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 The Teleological Answer corrects for the shortcomings of the Life Answer, too. For the 
Life Answer falsely implied both that living colonies are prior to their members and that 
complicated machines are nothing more than their parts. Rather than implying such things, the 
Teleological Answer corrects for them both. 
 First, consider living colonies, such as garden hedges. As we noted, the constituent 
individuals that make up a composite hedge do not need to constitute the composite in order to 
exist. On the contrary, the individual hedges exist before they are integrated into a composite, 
and they need not be integrated into a composite in order to be hedges, or to flourish and live 
well. Individual hedges do have a mereologically integrative proper function, though, since they 
sustain the composites of which they are parts. Yet such functions are not essential to them, nor 
do they determine the individual hedges’ natures or standards of well-being. On the Teleological 
Account, living colonies are more like mere heaps than they are like integrated wholes.  
 Second, consider complicated machines and their parts. Consider again my car and its 
ignition lock, for instance. My car’s ignition lock has the proper function of helping the car run, 
as do my car’s other parts. Specifically, the ignition lock helps the car run by allowing its engine 
to be started with a key, and in order to help the car run like this, the ignition lock has to be 
integrated into the car. The ignition lock must be part of the car to perform its proper function. 
Furthermore, the ignition lock is not special in this respect; the same is true of all the car’s parts, 
from engine valves to windshield wipers. Condition (i) is true of machines and machine parts.
 Not only do my car’s parts perform their proper function by being part of the car, 
however; like organs of an organism, they also must be capable of performing their proper 
function to exist. Again, if we remove my car’s ignition lock, for instance, and damage it beyond 
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repair so that it cannot perform its proper function, we will have destroyed it. It would be a 
broken lock, which is a lock in the same way that a dead heart is a heart. The same goes, 
moreover, for my car’s other parts. My car’s engine valves, steering wheel, tires, and ignition 
lock only exist to the extent that they are capable of performing their mereologically integrative 
proper functions. Like (i), (ii) is also true of machines and machine parts.
 Just as a machine’s parts depend for their existence on being able to function properly, so 
do they depend for their nature on their proper functions, too. What makes a certain lump of 
metal an ignition lock, in other words, is its proper function. The ignition lock is a lock because it 
has the proper function of facilitating key-triggered engine ignition; likewise for the engine 
valves, the tires, and the car’s other parts. Machine parts depend not only for their existence but 
also for their nature on the capacity to perform their proper functions; (iii) is true of machines, 
too. 
 Finally, the well-being of a machine’s part is identical to the excellence with which it 
performs its mereologically integrative proper functions. For as we noted in chapter 1, §8, it is 
not necessary for something to be alive in order for it to be benefitted or harmed; and the things 
that appear to be good for non-living things are what facilitate their proper functioning. Since the 
only way for such things to be harmed is for them to be prevented from functioning properly, 
however, and since the only way for such things to be benefitted is for their proper functioning to 
be facilitated, it follows that there is nothing more to their benefit than their proper functioning. 
Like organs, the parts of a machine are well-off exactly to the degree that they perform their 
functions well. Their excellence in proper functioning is their well-being. On the Teleological 
Answer to SPQ, then, machines are also integrated wholes.
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 The Teleological Answer fares better than the Life Answer, then, for it confirms that 
machines can be prior to their parts even when living colonies are not. 
 In addition to getting the right result in intuitive cases, and to avoiding its competitors’ 
shortcomings, however, the Teleological Answer also predicts that cases of cities and ecosystems 
will be both philosophically controversial and difficult, with intuitions supporting both the 
priority of whole to part and the priority of part to whole; and indeed, such cases are 
philosophically controversial and difficult, with intuitions lying on both sides. So in addition to 
tracking our intuitions in clearer cases, such as heaps and organisms, the Teleological Answer 
also tracks them in more difficult cases. This is a further consideration in its favor. 
 In the case of a city, for instance, one can easily find intuitions to the effect that a city is 
nothing more than a collection of citizens, working together; and that the city exists merely to 
facilitate the needs and well-being of its individual citizens. Such intuitions support not only the 
priority of civic parts, however; they also buttress a politically liberal view of the state, which 
puts the well-being of citizens before the state’s well-being, which emphasizes the importance of 
individuality and individual rights; and which, while intuitive and laudable, is nonetheless 
opposed by an alternative philosophical tradition. 
 The alternative, which goes back at least to Plato and Aristotle, and whose contemporary 
political influence may be traced to Hegel, holds that cities and states are colossal agents, which 
can flourish or suffer, and whose flourishing and suffering is more important than the flourishing 
and suffering of its civic parts.22 Though loathsome to minds that cherish the rights of individual 
citizens, this opposite view of the state has intuitive support, too. If we consider, for instance, the 
70
22 Consider also the 2010 US Supreme Court ruling that publicly chartered corporations are single 
persons with legal rights to free speech.
ease with which individuals commit suicide when separated from their community, or how they 
feel that they have nothing to live for when they are jobless and ignored, it becomes more 
intuitive to see citizens as serving a mereologically integrative proper function that is essential to 
them. Yet we tend to think that there is more to a citizen’s well-being than her civic performance, 
and we tend to think that citizens can also change their various civic functions. Both facts tell 
against cities being integrated wholes. When considering the priority of cities to citizens, there 
are intuitions on both sides, as well as philosophical controversy.
 As the Teleological Answer predicts, these intuitions on both sides are teleological. On 
one hand, to judge that citizens are prior to cities is to think that the city is merely there for the 
sake of benefitting the citizens. One attends, in other words, to the idea that cities are made in 
order to benefit citizens, and not the other way around. So in judging that citizens are prior to 
their cities, one thereby judges them to be teleologically prior. 
 In judging that cities are prior to citizens, however, one likens a city to an organism, 
which can suffer or do well, whose organs are different civic administrations, whose individual 
cells are citizens, and whose well-being is supported by administrations and citizens in the same 
way that organisms are supported by their organs and cells.23 On such a view, a city is like an 
organism, and as in the case of organisms, the parts exist merely for the sake of the whole. The 
intuitions backing both sides of the debate over cities’ priority to citizens, then, are teleological. 
Again, this confirms the Teleological Answer to SPQ.24
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 7.  Possible Counterexamples to the Teleological Answer
The Teleological Answer to SPQ is faced with three sorts of counterexamples to its necessity. 
Against the necessity of the Teleological Answer, one might cite the following: first, the priority 
of geometric figures to their irregularly-shaped undetached portions; second, the priority of 
Moorean organic unities--such as the unity of a wrong-doing and its punishment--to their parts; 
and third, the priority of natural, non-living composites to their parts, such as diamonds, stars, 
and methane molecules. Let us examine each in turn. 
 The first potential counterexample to the Teleological Answer’s necessity is that of a 
geometric figure and an unarticulated--i.e. un-drawn--portion of it. Schaffer introduces the case 
in his “Monism”: “But also consider some gerrymandered division of the circle. Here it seems 
that the circle is prior--the gerrymander is just an arbitrary partition on the circle.”25 A geometric 
circle, then, seems prior to arbitrary partitions made within it. Yet geometric circles are not 
teleologically prior to their gerrymandered divisions; their divisions have no purpose, and they 
do not exist in order to support the well-being of the circle. So the case of the geometric circle 
would appear to be a counterexample to the Teleological Answer’s necessity: the arbitrary 
partitions made within the circle do not exist for the sake of the circle, but they appear posterior 
to it all the same.  
 The first thing to note about this example is that the arbitrariness of the circle’s division 
is doing all the work in making the circle seem metaphysically prior. For by Schaffer’s own 
admission, a circle’s division into non-arbitrary parts--such as two semi-circles--is not a clear 
case where the whole is obviously prior to the parts, and so not a case that can be used as a 
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counterexample to proposed answers to SPQ. The arbitrariness of the circle’s sub-portion is 
essential, then, to such portions’ being effective counterexamples. 
 What does this arbitrariness really consist in, though? In saying that a portion of 
something is arbitrary, we usually mean that its distinction from other portions is artificial and 
unprincipled. In this sense, and in Schaffer’s counter-example, an arbitrary portion of something 
cannot “stand out” all on its own. It has to be distinguished without appealing to any natural 
markers. It is something that one does not naturally notice, but to which one’s attention must be 
deliberately and selectively directed. 
 What this means is that an arbitrary portion of a geometric figure like a circle would 
usually be detected after one detects the figure itself, and this is certainly true of the example of 
the circle. There is a relation of temporal priority, in other words, between the detection of the 
circle and the detection of its gerrymandered divisions. In the case of the geometric circle, the 
example works only by first imagining the whole circle, and then only afterwards imagining its 
gerrymandered divisions. When one imagines the circle first and the gerrymandered divisions 
afterward, it seems that the circle is prior to the divisions.
 The example can be made to work the other way, however. To see how, just consider any 
random, irregular polygon. Suppose that it is drawn on a sheet of paper. Now imagine someone 
inscribing the polygon in a circle, but not by just drawing a circle around the polygon. Instead, 
imagine the circle being constructed out of other irregular polygons, which fit together neatly 
with the original polygon to form it. Finally, once they are fitted together, imagine that someone 
erases the lines dividing them, so we end up with a plain, geometric circle. In such a case, when 
the various polygons have been fitted together and their divisions erased, does it really seem after 
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the fact that the circle is prior to its constituent polygons? No. It seems that the polygons are 
prior, since in our story they existed before the circle, and the circle was built out of them. The 
fact that the gerrymandered divisions came first, in other words, seems to make all the 
difference.
 A circle can seem prior to its gerrymandered divisions, then, and the divisions can also 
seem prior to the circle. Are either of these seemings supported by a distinctly philosophical or 
metaphysical notion of priority, though? It seems not. Rather, our intuitions seem tied to the mere 
temporal ordering in which the circle and division are presented. If the whole is drawn first, it 
seems prior to the parts; but if the parts are drawn first, they seem prior to the whole. The 
intuition that the geometric circle is prior to its gerrymandered divisions is not a counterexample 
to the Teleological Answer, then. For the geometric circle is not prior to its parts in any 
metaphysical sense, but only in a temporal sense. 
 The second potential counterexample to the Teleological Answer’s necessity comes from 
the end of G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, in which he discusses the goodness of punishing 
wrong-doing, even when both the wrong-doing and the punishment lack any goodness on their 
own:
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Where evils do exist, as in this world they do, the fact that they are known and properly 
appreciated, constitutes a state of things having greater value as a whole even than the 
same appreciation of purely imaginary evils. This state of things, it has been said, is never 
positively good on the whole; but where the evil, which reduces its total value to a 
negative quantity, already unavoidably exists, to obtain the intrinsic value which belongs 
to it as a whole will obviously produce a better state of things than had the evil existed by  
itself, quite apart from the good element in it which is identical to the appreciation of 
imaginary evils, and from any ulterior consequences which its existence may bring 
about.26
According to Moore, the proper response to real wrong-doing “constitutes a state of things 
having greater value as a whole” than either the response or the wrong-doing all on their own. 
Neither the wrong-doing nor its punishment is particularly good on its own, then, but their unity 
is better than their combined individual values. So here it seems that we have a whole which is 
greater than the sum of its parts. It is not a “mere heap” of events, or “one darn thing after 
another,” as we might say. On the contrary, the parts are integrated so as to produce something 
that is better overall than the combined worth of its parts. 
 Yet it does not seem at first like the punishment of a wrong-doing is teleologically prior 
to both the punishment and to the wrong-doing. It is natural to say that the punishment is 
inflicted for the sake of punishing wrong-doing, of course, but it seems ridiculous to think that 
the wrong-doing is always committed for the sake of being punished! At most, only one of the 
parts of Moore’s example seems teleologically dependent on the whole, even though both are 
supposed to be metaphysically dependent on it. Thus, Moore’s case appears to be a 
counterexample to the Teleological Answer’s necessity. 
 To see why Moore’s case is not a genuine counterexample to the Teleological Answer, it 
is sufficient to consider the teleological features of both punishment and wrong-doing. For if we 
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26 Principia Ethica (1903), §133.
are already inclined to see the world through a teleological lens, it is not far-fetched to think of 
the unity of a wrong-doing and its punishment as like that of a broken limb and a crutch, which 
work together to facilitate correct behavior. 
 If we imagine someone with a broken limb, whose broken limb prevents her from 
moving properly, it is legitimate to describe the improper movement of her broken limb as being 
a deficient version of normal limb movement. It is legitimate, in other words, to say that the 
movement of the broken limb is not only bad for the limb’s possessor, but also bad in the 
attributive sense.27 Not only would it be a bad thing that is also movement, in other words; it 
would also be bad movement. That is, the motion of the broken limb would be a bad member of 
its kind.
 The deficiency of a broken limb’s motion, moreover, reveals its teleological dependence 
on something else, namely moving well. The fact that the limb’s motion is deficient, in other 
words, reveals that it is supposed to be better. The limb not only moves deficiently, then, but also 
moves in order to move well. Moving well is the limb’s proper function. Since the limb does not 
move well, it does not perform its proper function; yet the limb has the proper function of 
moving well all the same.
 Similarly, if we liken a wrong-doer to someone suffering from an injury, whose injury 
prevents her from behaving lawfully, we may describe her lawless behavior as being a deficient 
version of normal, lawful behavior. The behavior of the wrong-doer is not only bad for the 
wrong-doer and her victims, but also bad in the attributive sense. Not only would it be a bad 
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27 Geach (1956).
thing that is also behavior, in other words; it would also be literally bad behavior. That is, the 
behavior of a person would be a bad member of its kind.
 Moreover, just as a broken limb’s motion is teleologically dependent on moving well, so 
is wrong-doer behavior teleologically dependent on proper behavior. A properly functioning 
person, we should say, behaves lawfully; and their behavior exhibits proper functioning to the 
extent that it is (among other things) lawful. Wrong-Doer behavior, then, is behavior which, like 
the motion of a broken limb, fails to perform its proper function. Just as a limb moves in order to 
move well, so does one behave in order to behave correctly. Just as the deficient, improper 
motion of a broken limb exists for the sake of being a healthy limb’s healthy motion, so would 
the deficient, lawless behavior of a wrong-doer exist for the sake of being the lawful behavior of 
an uninjured person.28
 Finally, when we consider the role that a crutch plays in the movement of a broken limb, 
we find that its purpose is to facilitate proper motion, so that the crutch and the limb end up 
working together to produce better motion. Improving the motion of the crutched broken limb, 
then, is something for the sake of which both the broken limb moves and the crutch exists. The 
broken limb and the crutch are therefore both teleologically dependent on their composite. 
 Likewise, when we consider the role that punishment plays as a response to wrong-doing, 
it is natural to think that its purpose is to correct wrong-doer behavior while facilitating lawful 
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28 The teleological dependence of wrong-doer behavior on lawful behavior does not require wrong-doers 
to consciously try to behave lawfully. This is easiest to see when we treat the conscious trying as part of 
the behavior.
behavior.29 It stands, in other words, to wrong-doer behavior as a crutch stands to a broken limb’s 
deficient motion, namely that it exists in order to correct the deficiency. The improved behavior 
of punished wrong-doer, then, is something for the sake of which both the wrong-doer behaves 
and the punishment is meted out. Just as with the broken limb and the crutch, so are both the 
parts of Moore’s example teleologically dependent on their composite. 
 So just as a broken limb and its crutch work together in order to facilitate proper motion, 
so do wrong-doer behavior and punishment work together in order to facilitate proper behavior. 
In each case, both parts are teleologically dependent on the whole. For this reason, Moore’s case 
is no counterexample to SPQ’s Teleological Answer.
 This is revealed when we apply conditions (i)-(iv) of the Teleological Answer to Moore’s 
case. Our examination has already revealed that (i) is true of Moore’s case, since a wrong-doing 
has the proper function of being proper legal behavior, and since, given that it is a wrong-doing, 
the achievement of its proper function can only occur through integration into a corrective 
whole. Likewise, punishment’s corrective nature gives it a mereologically integrative proper 
function, too, which it cannot perform without being integrated into a whole that includes a 
wrong-doing. 
 Not only is (i) true of Moore’s case, however, but so are (ii) and (iii), since it is essential 
to a wrong-doing that it was committed by an agent who could have behaved properly. Indeed, 
one of the key features that distinguishes a real wrong-doing from a mishap or an unfortunate 
accident is that wrong-doings are committed with a certain degree of responsibility. Specifically, 
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29 The analogy can still hold if retributivism is true, though it does so more tenuously. The retributivist can 
treat retributively punished wrong-doer behavior as being like a the motion of a crutched broken limb, and 
say that wrong-doer behavior is a deficient member of its kind by being unpunished. This appears to 
require wrong-doer behavior to be a different natural kind than lawful behavior, however, since the latter is 
not deficient by going unpunished.  
wrong-doings are committed by agents that could have done otherwise and could have done 
better. Without these potentials, there is no wrong-doing, and without these potentials there is 
also no possibility of the wrong-doing’s performing its proper function. For wrong-doing to exist 
at all, and for it to even count as wrong-doing, it must at least be possible for the wrong-doer to 
perform what was in fact her behavior’s proper function--namely, behaving legally and properly. 
 Likewise for punishment. In order for something to count as punishment, it has to at least 
possess the potential to correct for wrong-doer behavior. A stimulus that could never affect 
wrong-doer behavior under any circumstance could hardly be called a punishment in any real 
sense; at the very best it would be something that one might mistreat as punishment, or mis-
identify as punishment. So (ii) and (iii) are true of Moore’s case. 
 Finally, (iv) is true of Moore’s case, too, since a wrong-doer’s behavior is good and 
healthy to the extent that it is being treated; and a punishment is good and well-functioning to the 
extent that it effectively treats wrong-doer behavior. Again, Moore’s case is no counterexample 
to the Teleological Answer to SPQ.
 The last potential counterexample to the Teleological Answer’s necessity is the priority of 
natural, non-living composites to their parts, where such composites include diamonds, stars, 
planets, galaxies, and methane molecules. Such things are not mere aggregates or mere portions, 
and they seem to be more integrated than a mere pile of sand. Yet their parts do not appear to 
exist for the sake of the whole. Neither a planet’s unarticulated hemispheres nor a diamond’s 
constituent molecules exist for the sake of the planet or the diamond; nor do the atoms in a 
methane molecule exist for the sake of the molecule. So it would appear that diamonds, stars, 
and molecules are counterexamples to the teleological answer’s necessity. 
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 To answer these potential counterexamples, the Classical Platonist must solve the Matter 
Problem, which is taken up in chapter 4, §4-5. Briefly, the solution is to include ecosystems 
among the various integrated wholes, and to count the entire universe as a colossal ecosystem. Its 
non-living parts, moreover--including stars, diamonds, and methane molecules--exist for the sake 
of supporting life and facilitating life’s flourishing. This requires a commitment to what has 
come to be known as “Deep Ecology.” As we will see, then, Classical Platonism responds to 
cases of stars and diamonds by finding ecosystemic teleology for them. 
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 8.  Teleological Dependence and Contingency
To say that some parts are teleologically dependent on their whole is to say that their proper 
function is to sustain and support the whole. As an example, consider a cat--Felix--and his 
organs. Felix’ organs have the proper function of sustaining and supporting Felix. 
 Yet even while satisfying the description “sustaining Felix,” there are ways for Felix’ 
organs to fail to perform their proper functions. First, there are possible circumstances in which 
Felix’ parts sustain Felix in an unnatural or unhealthy way; and second, there are possible 
circumstances in which Felix’ parts perform their proper function after they are transplanted into 
other cats. This second reason, moreover, raises the question of whether Classical Platonism has 
to admit contingent relations of metaphysical dependence, or whether relations of metaphysical 
dependence must always be necessary. First, however, the topic of unnatural sustenance. 
 For Felix’ parts to perform their proper function, it is not enough that they sustain Felix 
somehow or other; rather, they each have specific tasks that they are supposed to perform. If 
Felix’ heart miraculously began to filter his blood instead of pumping it, while his kidneys 
simultaneously began to pump his blood rather than filter it, there would be a sense in which 
Felix’ parts sustain him. Yet his parts would not be functioning properly. In order for a whole’s 
parts to teleologically depend on it, then, it is not enough that they sustain the whole somehow or 
other. Rather, they must have specialized tasks or roles that they play in sustaining the whole. 
 We will return to these roles--reified--in the next chapter, when we introduce the 
Classical Platonist’s theory of the Forms. 
 Second, and more importantly, however, is the fact that Felix’ parts are only contingently 
a part of him; which raises the question of how Felix’ parts can actually be metaphysically 
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dependent on Felix. For if the Teleological Answer is correct, Felix’ parts are metaphysically 
dependent on Felix. Yet they do not seem particularly dependent on Felix; for when it comes to 
specifying what his organs’ existence, nature, and well-being is dependent on, we find that it is 
not Felix but his organs’ proper functions that do all the work. It is Felix’ heart’s proper function, 
in other words, that determines its standards of persistence and well-being. Felix appears to have 
little to do with it. Likewise, it is Felix’ kidneys proper function that determines their standards 
of persistence and well-being, too, with Felix appearing to play little or no role. The work of 
metaphysical dependence, it seems, is being done by proper functions rather than wholes. So in 
what sense are an integrated whole’s parts metaphysically prior to it?
 The problem is exacerbated by the fact that Felix has his parts contingently. They can 
exist without him, and he without them. Felix can die, and his parts can continue to function 
properly in other cats; or Felix can continue living, and be the recipient of organ transplants 
rather than a donor. Thus, we have a philosophical puzzle: how can Felix’ organs be 
metaphysically dependent on him if they can exist and be well-off without him, too?
 The solution to this puzzle is to distinguish two different sorts of teleological dependence, 
which so far have been given similar treatments: one that is defined in terms of beneficiaries and 
one that is defined in terms of processes.30 On a beneficiary-based reading, a thing’s purpose or 
function is couched in terms of what it benefits, while on a process-based reading, it is couched 
in terms of the activities that do the benefitting. When speaking of Felix’ organs, for instance, we 
may say that his organs exist for his sake, since he is the one who benefits from their functioning, 
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30 Johnson (2008), ch.2. 
and we may also say that his organs are for sustaining him, since that is the activity which results 
in such benefits. The former reading is a beneficiary-based one; the latter is process-based.
 Depending on our reading of the phrase, “the purpose of Felix’ organs,” we will get 
conflicting answers to the question of what Felix’ parts are really metaphysically dependent on. 
If we think of Felix as the purpose of the organs, and treat their teleological dependence on Felix 
as metaphysical, then metaphysical priority will turn out to be the same relation as beneficiary-
based teleological dependence. If, however, we think of sustaining Felix as the organs’ purpose, 
then it would seem that Felix’ organs are not metaphysically dependent on Felix as much as they 
are dependent on their own proper functions; in which case metaphysical priority will turn out to 
be process-based teleological dependence. 
 As mentioned above, we find that the relation of process-based teleological dependence 
is the relation that does all the metaphysical “heavy lifting” when discussing the priority of parts 
and wholes. For it is the parts’ proper functions that determine their persistence conditions, their 
conditions of flourishing, their natural kind, and their very existence. When considering what 
makes something a heart, or what makes hearts incapable of surviving certain conditions, or what 
makes it true that something is good for a heart, we find the answer lying not with the organism 
that possesses it; but rather with the proper function of the organ itself, on which the organ’s 
existence and nature seems throughly dependent. 
 Thus, Classical Platonism defines metaphysical priority as process-based teleological 
dependence, which is the kind of dependence that Felix’ organs exhibit with respect to their 
mereologically integrative proper functions. Strictly speaking, then, Felix’ organs are 
metaphysically dependent on their proper functions, rather than on Felix. 
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 Moreover, there is an important and logically necessary tie between the process-based 
teleological dependence of Felix’ organs on their purposes and the beneficiary-based teleological 
dependence of Felix’ organs on Felix. The tie is an explanatory one: an organ has its beneficiary-
based functions because it has its process-based ones. The reason why Felix’ heart is for Felix, in 
other words, is that Felix’ heart has a certain proper function, the performance of which requires 
the benefit of creatures like Felix. Likewise, the reason why my car’s ignition lock is for the car 
is that it has a certain proper function, too, whose performance also requires its integration into 
something like my car. Relations of beneficiary-based teleological dependence are explained in 
terms of relations of process-based teleological dependence, then. This is another mark in favor 
of identifying metaphysical priority with process-based teleological dependence.
 The identification of metaphysical priority with process-based teleological dependence 
does not falsify the Teleological Answer to SPQ, however; for the relations of beneficiary-based 
teleological dependence are the ones that make integrated wholes seem prior to their parts, and 
they are necessarily connected to relations of metaphysical priority. They stand in relations of 
beneficiary-based teleological dependence on their wholes, in other words, precisely because of 
the relations of metaphysical priority that their proper functions bear to them. 
 While not falsifying the Teleological Answer to SPQ, then, the problem of contingency 
requires its qualification: integrated wholes are not just wholes that are metaphysically prior to 
their parts. Rather, they are wholes whose parts are teleologically dependent on them in a 
beneficiary-based way, and whose parts are teleologically dependent on them in a beneficiary-
based way because their parts are metaphysically dependent on certain proper functions:
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The Qualified Teleological Answer: A material whole W is integrated just in case its 
parts, the Ps, are metaphysically dependent on a mereologically integrative proper 
function; where the Ps are metaphysically dependent on a mereologically integrative 
proper function iffdef: (i) some of the Ps have a proper function F, which is performed by 
being part of something of the same natural kind as W; (ii) the Ps that have F cannot exist 
without their ability to perform F; (iii) the Ps that have F cannot be the kinds of things 
that they are without their ability to perform F; and (iv) the well-being of Ps that have F is 
identical to the excellence with which they can perform F.
The correct answer to SPQ, then, requires us to recognize that there are in fact two sorts of 
teleological dependence, which are necessarily connected. One of them is the relation borne by 
various parts to their integrated whole, while the other is metaphysical priority, which things bear 
to their proper functions. The first relation is not the very same as metaphysical dependence, 
therefore, but it obtains because of metaphysical dependence.
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 9.  Conclusion: The Argument for Classical Platonism
Because a whole seems metaphysically prior to its parts exactly when it is teleologically prior to 
them; and because metaphysical priority is itself an elusive concept in need of definition; one 
should conclude from our examination of SPQ that metaphysical priority just is a kind of 
teleological dependence. More specifically, one might conclude that the teleological dependence 
between things and their proper functions, which explains the difference between mere heaps and 
integrated wholes, is the sake relation as metaphysical priority. 
 Yet such a conclusion would be an acceptance of Classical Platonism.
 This conclusion is strengthened, moreover, once we notice that integrated wholes also 
have proper functions, and that they are dependent on their proper functions in the same way that 
their parts are dependent on certain mereologically integrative proper functions. An organism 
like Felix, for instance, has a certain standard of health as his proper function; which not only 
determines which things are good for him and what he can survive, but which also makes him 
the kind of thing that he is, which is a cat. If Felix could not be treated with feline medicine, then 
he would not be a cat but something else. Likewise, a broom or a car have proper functions--
namely sweeping and driving--and their having these proper functions determines not only what 
is good or bad for them, but also what they can survive, and indeed what kinds of things that they  
are. Once we notice the explanatory roles that functions play in the ontology of material objects 
generally, in other words--as opposed to focusing on the explanatory roles that link parts to 
integrated wholes--we find the same metaphysical issues being decided by proper functions, and 
in exactly the same way that moved us to conclude that the proper parts of integrated wholes are 
metaphysically dependent on their proper functions. Thus, we are moved to Classical Platonism.
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 Classical Platonism is that it provides a systematic answer to SPQ, answering not only the 
question of when a whole is metaphysically prior to its parts, but also stating why. On the 
Classical Platonist picture, an integrated whole is metaphysically more than its parts by being 
teleologically prior to them in a beneficiary-based sense; and such teleological dependence is 
explained, moreover, by process-based teleological dependence. The ontological distinction 
between mere heaps and integrated wholes, in other words, which is supposed to be due to a 
relation that is identical to metaphysical priority, is in fact due to relations of process-based 
teleological dependence. So process-based teleological dependence is metaphysical priority; 
Classical Platonism is true. 
 Classical Platonism does not deductively follow from the Teleological Answer to SPQ, 
then, but it might be said to abductively follow, or to follow as the best sort of explanation for 
why material wholes only seem to be integrated when they are teleologically prior to them. 
Whether it actually counts as the best explanation for the Teleological Answer’s truth will depend 
on Classical Platonism’s tenability. What exactly are Classical Platonism’s posits--the Forms--
and what philosophical work can they do without running us into absurdity? These questions will 
be the focus of our next chapter. 
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3  A Classical Platonist Theory of the Forms
The notion of a Platonic Form is underwritten by five other technical ideas, namely that having a 
Form is different from instantiating one; that things can have more than one Form; that each 
thing has exactly one primary Form; that Forms are determinable types of processes; and that 
there are constitutive means to instantiating a Form. This chapter will elucidate these five 
technicalities. In so doing, we will generate a comprehensive metaphysics of both proper 
functions and of properties.
 1.  Two Notions of Purpose
At the outset of any Platonic metaphysics, it is necessary to distinguish two ways of reading 
teleological idioms like “for the sake of”: one in terms of beneficiaries and one in terms of 
processes.1 On a beneficiary-based reading, a thing’s purpose or function is couched in terms of 
what it benefits, while on a process-based reading, it is couched in terms of the activities that do 
the benefitting. When speaking of brooms, for instance, we may say that brooms are for people, 
since it is people who benefit from their use, and we may also say that brooms are for sweeping 
floors, since that is the activity which results in such benefits. The former reading is a 
beneficiary-based one; the latter is process-based. On a beneficiary-based reading, stereos are for 
music lovers, while on a process-based reading, stereos are for playing music. On a beneficiary-
based reading, cat food is for cats, while on a process-based reading, cat food is for feeding cats. 
1 Johnson (2008), ch.3. 
Claims about purposive action exhibit the same ambiguity: Bonnie and Clyde robbed a bank for 
themselves, but they also did it for the money--that is, they robbed the bank for the sake of 
getting the money, which is a process. When Odysseus told his fellow Achaeans to construct an 
enormous wooden horse, he did so both for their sake and for the sake of sneaking them into 
Troy. On a beneficiary-based reading, Odysseus’ actions are for the Achaeans, who are the 
beneficiaries; on a process-based reading, they are for the process of sneaking the Achaeans into 
Troy. Claims about biological functions also exhibit the beneficiary/process ambiguity: Xylem 
and phloem exist for the sake of an entire plant, but they also exist for the sake of transporting 
nutrients and hormones within it. A cat’s heart pumps blood for the sake of the cat, but also for 
the sake of circulating blood throughout the cat’s body. In both cases, the former is a beneficiary-
based reading and the latter a process-based one. Our talk of purposes and proper functions is 
systematically ambiguous between beneficiary- and process-based readings, whether we discuss 
the purposes of artifacts, actions, or biological organs. 
 On a Classical Platonist account, purposes are Platonic Forms, and their instances are for 
them. Yet Platonic Forms cannot be benefitted. So the sense in which a thing’s purpose is its 
Platonic Form is not the sense in which its purpose is its beneficiary. Platonic Forms are not 
beneficiaries, and so metaphysical priority is not beneficiary-based teleological dependence.
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 2.  Participation, or: Having a Proper Function
The relationship between having a proper function and performing it is normative: when 
something has a proper function, it is supposed to perform it--albeit in specific ways and under 
specific conditions. A heart, for instance, has the proper function of circulating blood throughout 
the body, and indeed, the heart is supposed to circulate blood throughout the body; that’s what 
the heart is for. Similarly, the proper function of a broom is to sweep, and brooms are supposed 
to sweep; the proper function of an eye is to detect light, and eyes are supposed to detect light, 
and so on. There is a normative relation between hearts and blood circulation, brooms and 
sweeping, and eyes and light-detection. It is the supposed to perform relation, which obtains 
between each thing and its proper function. There is a normative relation between things and 
their proper functions, then: they are supposed to perform them. 
 At first, it might seem false to say that, without exception, things are supposed to perform 
their functions. Consider nuclear weapons, whose function is to exterminate life. Consider 
torture devices, whose function is to inflict pain on it.2 Surely they are not supposed to perform 
their proper functions, are they? In fact, there is a sense in which they are, and another sense in 
which they are not. These senses are none other than the two sides of the de re/de dicto 
distinction: torture devices are supposed to perform their proper functions de re, but not de 
dicto.3
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2 Assuming, of course, that nuclear weapons and torture devices really have such functions. One might 
hold that they have more beneficial functions than that--such as preventing war and gathering 
information, but these commitments are shaken by the fact that there are certain ways that such artifacts 
are supposed to go about preventing war and gathering information. In any case, the credulous reader 
should substitute more malevolent items for bombs and torture devices, if she finds the current examples 
objectionable.
3 Kripke (1980), Plantinga (1978). Indeed, as we will see, the notion of a proper function is formally very 
similar to that of an essence, in that ascriptions of either one require quantifying into a modal context. In 
the case of ascribing proper functions to things, the modality is deontic.
 To illustrate, first note that it is a serious wrong for torture devices to perform their proper 
function. For it is not supposed to be the case that such functions are performed. A sense in 
which torture devices are not supposed to perform their proper function, then, is that a certain 
claim--or dictum--is not supposed to be true, namely the claim that torture devices are 
performing their proper function. Similarly, if nuclear weapons ever perform their proper 
function, that too is a serious wrong. It is not supposed to be the case that nuclear weapons 
perform their proper function. Nuclear weapons are not supposed to perform their proper 
function, then, in the sense that a certain claim--i.e. “nuclear weapons are performing their 
proper function” is not supposed to be true. So there is a sense in which torture devices and 
nuclear weapons are not supposed to perform their functions, namely that certain claims--
dictums--are not supposed to be the case. De dicto, nuclear weapons and torture devices are not 
supposed to perform their proper functions.
 However, there is also a sense in which torture devices are supposed to torture people, 
and nuclear weapons are supposed to exterminate life; and this sense is best captured in the idea 
that being for torture and being for life-extermination are properties of torture devices and 
nuclear weapons, respectively. Being for torture and death is how they are, and facts about how 
they are do not imply anything about what ought to be the case. Scissors, for instance, are 
supposed to cut. That’s their function. It does not follow from this that it is supposed to be the 
case that scissors are cutting. Scissors are still for cutting, even when there is no need for their 
use. The claim about what is supposed to be the case does not follow from the claim about what 
scissors are supposed to do. Similarly, immune systems are supposed to fight off bodily 
infections. That is their proper function. It does not follow, however, that it is supposed to be the 
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case that immune systems are fighting off bodily infections. For immune systems have the proper 
function of fighting infection even in healthy individuals. So there is a sense in which things are 
supposed to perform their functions, regardless of what those functions are, and it is associated 
with treating functions as properties of things. So conceived, a proper function is a way that a 
certain individual--a res--is supposed to be. De re, torture devices are supposed to torture people.
 We have, then, two ways to interpret instances of the schema “x is supposed to perform 
its function.” Interpreted de dicto, they are claims about what is supposed to be the case; 
interpreted de re, they are claims about how individuals are. Consider the following argument:
a. The bomb is supposed to end the war.
b. The bomb is an immoral killing machine.
c. So an immoral killing machine is supposed to end the war.
In the same way that claims about scissors and immune systems admit of a de dicto and a de re 
reading, where the former is false and the latter is true, so do (a) and (c) of this argument. On a 
de dicto reading, the conclusion is false, and obviously so. It is never supposed to be the case that 
wars are ended through mass killing. On a de re reading, however, the conclusion is true. The 
bomb is de re supposed to do a particular thing, even though that thing is a moral wrong. Yet the 
corresponding de dicto claim does not follow. From the fact that the bomb is de re supposed to 
annihilate all life, it does not follow that it is supposed to be the case that the bomb annihilates 
all life. Again, there is a sense in which things are supposed to perform their functions, regardless 
of what those functions happen to be. It is that they are de re supposed to. 
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 Some readers may wonder why, in distinguishing the sense in which torture devices are 
supposed to perform their function from the sense in which they are not, I have appealed to the 
de re/de dicto distinction instead of to modal restrictions.4 To illustrate, consider the claim “a 
baboon cannot speak Finnish, but I can.”5 It is true. Baboons, unlike me, lack the necessary 
anatomy for such a feat. Thanks to my anatomy, I can speak Finnish. But, as Lewis says, “don’t 
bring me on your trip to Helsinki--for I cannot speak Finnish!” There is a sense in which I can 
speak Finnish, then, and also a sense in which I cannot. And rather than being a case of the de re/
de dicto distinction, what we have are two features to which we may restrict our attention in 
considering what is possible. If we consider just my anatomy, and ask what someone with my 
anatomy is capable of, we find that she can speak Finnish. But if we pay attention to my personal 
history instead of my anatomy, and ask what is compossible with it, we find that speaking 
Finnish is not. Thus, the senses in which I can and cannot speak Finnish should not be 
understood in terms of the de re/de dicto distinction; they should be understood in terms of 
modal restriction--that is, as restricting our attention to different features, which are held fixed 
when considering what is possible. If we treat restrict our attention to just my anatomy and ask 
what is compatible with it, we find that I can speak Finnish; if we treat my personal history as a 
constant, too, we find I cannot. 
 Modal restrictions elucidate the senses in which I can and cannot speak Finnish, but not 
the senses in which torture devices should and should not perform their function. To see why, 
consider an artifact whose function should never be performed under any circumstances, no 
matter what. Suppose, for instance, that the evil Mad Bomber creates the Omni-Bomb, whose 
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4 One such reader, Meg Wallace, contributed helpful discussion on this point. 
5 The example and its foregoing interpretation are from Lewis (1976).
intended purpose is to annihilate all life in the universe in the most excruciating possible way. 
Suppose The Mad Bomber has taken special care to ensure that the Omni-Bomb will do exactly 
this, and that the Omni-Bomb’s parts are delicately arranged to make it happen. There is a sense 
in which the Omni-Bomb is supposed to annihilate all life-- for that is its function--but there are 
no possible situations in which it is supposed to be the case that the Omni-Bomb annihilates all 
life. There is a sense in which the Omni-Bomb is supposed to annihilate all life, but it cannot be 
explained as a restriction of our attention to the situations in which all life ought to be 
annihilated; for there are no such situations. What is true for the Omni-Bomb is true generally: 
the sense in which things are supposed to perform their function cannot be explained as a 
restriction of our attention to the situations in which their function is supposed to be performed.6
 It would be misleading to call the de re sense in which things are supposed to perform 
their proper functions “de re obligation,” since the word “obligation” distinctly connotes social 
institutions, such as laws and promises. We would not say, for instance, that hearts have an 
obligation to circulate blood, or that brooms have an obligation to sweep, since there is no social 
institution contracting them to do so. Yet philosophers’ usual name for deontic necessity--the 
necessity of should and supposed to--is “obligation,” particularly in technical discussions of the 
de re/de dicto distinction. Proper functions are cases of deontic necessity de re; so when I claim 
that something is de re obligated to perform its function, I do not mean that it has entered a 
contractual agreement, or that the thing is an agent. I only mean that it is supposed to do that 
thing, and supposed to do it de re, in the sense just carefully described. 
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6 Nor can it be explained in terms of intention or design, for we may imagine biological organs that should 
never perform their proper functions. Consider an unfortunate species that evolves to have an omni-
bomb-like spandrel ability.
 In ordinary English, de re obligation is denoted with possessive terms: eyes have the 
proper function of detecting light, brooms have the purpose of sweeping, cats have the proper 
function of flourishing, and so on. Yet such talk is philosophically imprecise; there are many 
different ways to have something. Consider all the different meanings of “have” in the following 
sentence:
d. I have long hair, and if I want to have fun then I will have cake.
Here the word “have” appears to have(!) three subtly different meanings, none of which are 
obviously the same as the sense in which things have proper functions. Such uses and more, 
however, are so common in English as to be ineliminable. So when we discuss Classical 
Platonism, we will often need to use the word “have,” and it would be helpful if “have” were not 
itself a technical term of the theory. It is best if, in our metaphysical theorizing, we leave the 
word “have” where we found it--in ordinary language--and pick a different name for the specific 
relation that obtains between a thing and its proper function.
 Following the canonical translations of Plato, we will say that a thing has a proper 
function exactly when it participates in a Platonic Form. A thing participates in a Form, in turn, 
just in case it is de re supposed to instantiate it, in the way that hearts are de re supposed to 
circulate blood, brooms are de re supposed to sweep, and things in general are de re supposed to 
perform their proper functions. To have a proper function, then, is to participate in a Form.
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 3. Instantiation, or: Performing a Proper Function
Many things have proper functions without performing them. A broom has the proper function of 
sweeping floors, even while leaning against a wall. An eye has the proper function of detecting 
light, even while its owner sleeps. A cell phone has the proper function of sending and receiving 
signals, even when it is turned off, and so on. Performing a function is therefore distinct from 
having it; performance is not participation.
 The philosophical literature on types already has a name for performance: instantiation. 
To instantiate a type is to be a token of that type. Proper functions--i.e. the Forms--are types of 
processes, and their tokens are individual performances of them. To instantiate a Form, then, is to 
do something; an ontology of Forms is an ontology of processes. 
 Things perform their proper functions by exhibiting certain features over time.7 As the 
heart performs its proper function, for instance, it has certain properties: first it has one shape, 
then another; first its muscular tissue contracts, then it expands; at different times it has different 
features. We may say that something instantiates a Form by having these features. To instantiate 
the Form of the Heart, for instance, is to perform the proper function of hearts; to instantiate the 
Form of the Broom is to perform the proper function of brooms; to instantiate the Form of the 
Cat is to perform the proper function of cats; and so on.8
 Why use both terms? Why complicate matters by using “instantiation” as well as 
“performance”? Because, in addition to avoiding awkward-sounding phrases like “perform a 
Form” and “a Form performed by,” the term “instantiate” conveniently reminds us that 
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7 With the exception of Aristotelian activities, which are proper functions that can be instantaneously 
performed in their entirety. ...
8 There are naturally many ways to perform these functions. We will return to this point when we discuss 
Platonic Determinants--certain sorts of structural universals that are dependent on the Forms--and the 
objection David Lewis raises against them.
performing a function is just a special case of having properties, and that Forms play roles both 
in the metaphysics of teleology and in the metaphysics of predication.9 
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9 We will encounter the Classical Platonist account of predication when we turn to the topic of Platonic 
Determinants, in §5-8 of this chapter.
 4.  Multiple Purposes and Primary Forms
Very often, things have have more than one proper function. In some cases, different functions 
are had by different parts of a single item, as with a Swiss army knife. In more interesting cases, 
however, the entire thing has more than one proper function. As an example, consider a cat, 
Felix, who is at once a cat, a pet, and a mascot. Felix therefore has three proper functions. He 
participates in three Platonic Forms: the Form of the Cat, the Form of the Pet, and the Form of 
the Mascot. Or consider a festively decorated mannequin, placed in a cornfield, which properly 
functions not only as a scarecrow but also as a Halloween decoration. The mannequin would 
participate in both the Form of the Scarecrow and the Form of the Halloween Decoration.10 
 When considering objects that have more than one proper function, it is crucial to 
remember that having a proper function is different from merely serving some purpose or other. 
As they sleep, Juliet’s shoulder might function as a pillow for Romeo, but this does not mean 
that Juliet’s shoulder has a pillow’s proper function. Juliet’s shoulder serves the pillow function, 
but it is not one of her shoulder’s proper functions. The mere fact that something can be used for 
various purposes, then, does not mean that it has many proper functions. A thing’s proper 
functions are the functions it has a de re obligation to perform. Juliet’s shoulder does not 
participate in the Form of the Pillow.
 At first, it may seem problematic for something to participate in more than one Platonic 
Form, since the obligation to instantiate one Form might conflict with the obligation to 
instantiate another. Suppose, for instance, that Felix would be a better pet if he were neutered, 
since he would destroy less furniture, but that he would also be a worse mascot, since he would 
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10 Assuming, of course, that there are such Forms. The question of which Forms there are--i.e. the scope 
of the Forms--will not be taken up here.
not behave in an excitable way that humors fans. Would it improve Felix to be neutered? Would 
it make him better? Since he participates in the Form of the Pet, it would; but since he 
participates in the Form of the Mascot, it would not. From the assumption that Felix participates 
in more than one Form, we seem to get the result that Felix both would and would not be 
improved by a neutering. So it seems Felix cannot participate in more than one Form. 
 One quick solution to this problem would be to deny that Felix can be harmed simpliciter, 
and to maintain instead that Felix can only be harmed relative to some standard. Yet this seems to 
get things wrong. For there do seem to be things that are just plain good for Felix--cat food, for 
instance--and it also seems like some standards of harm are objectively more relevant to Felix’s 
well-being than others. 
 Fortunately, there is a simpler way to deal with Felix; we can rank his proper functions. 
Just as, in ordinary English, we distinguish a thing’s primary function from its auxiliary or 
secondary functions, so does Classical Platonism distinguish a thing’s primary Form, which is 
the Form it participates in most, from its secondary Forms, which it participates in less. To have 
many proper functions, then, is to participate in many Forms, and to have a primary function is 
to participate in one Form more than in any other. 
 So participation admits of degrees; is not an all-or-nothing matter. In admitting of 
degrees, however, it accrues no mystery, for participation was just defined as the de re obligation 
to instantiate, and the familiar fact that obligation admits of degrees would naturally suggest that 
participation does so too. We all know that an agent can be more or less obligated to do 
something, and we also know that artifacts are supposed to do some things more than they are 
supposed to do others. To participate in a Form, then, is to be de re obligated to instantiate it, and 
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the Form that one participates in most of all--one’s primary Form--is just the Form one is most 
obligated to instantiate. So there is no harm in allowing participation to admit of degrees. 
Degrees of obligation are readily intelligible, and they can be used to model our understanding of 
what it is to have a primary proper function. 
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 5.  Platonic Forms as Determinable Types
There are many ways for something to perform its proper function: something can perform its 
function slowly or quickly, well or poorly, beautifully or hideously, with a flourish or in a 
humdrum way, and so on. Since things can perform their proper functions in different ways, and 
since things perform their proper functions by instantiating Platonic Forms, there must be many 
ways to instantiate a Platonic Form. 
 Unlike participation, however, instantiation does not admit of degrees. Nor does it admit 
of variety. A Form’s instantiation is an all-or-nothing matter, and there is only one kind of 
instantiation. Things that perform the same function in different ways should not, therefore, be 
thought of as instantiating the same Form to different degrees. Nor should they be thought of as 
standing in different kinds of instantiation relations, since there is only one kind of instantiation. 
Rather, they should be thought of as bearing the same instantiation relation, to the same Form, 
but to different determinants of that Form. Instead of allowing for degrees of instantiation, or for 
different kinds of it, the Classical Platonist treats Platonic Forms as determinable types of 
processes, and proliferates her ontology with special determinants of them. Classical Platonism 
holds that the Forms are determinable types, on which certain determinants--Platonic 
Determinants--are metaphysically dependent.11
 A Platonic Determinant is a maximally specific way of performing a proper function. 
There are no ordinary English names for such things, so examples of Determinants are best 
generated in stages. First, consider one of the general ways in which something--a broom, say--
can perform its proper function. A broom might perform its function well, for instance. When a 
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11 Henceforth, “Determinant” with a capital “D” will refer to Platonic Determinants. 
broom performs its function well, however, there are still many ways for it to perform its 
function well. A broom might perform its function well, say, by having densely-packed bristles, 
or it might perform its function well by having stiff bristles, or it might perform its function well 
in some other way. These ways get even more specific: a broom might perform its function well 
by having densely-packed bristles, arranged precisely thus-and-so, made of chemicals XYZ, 
while wielded exactly so on such-and-such a floor; or it might perform its function well in 
exactly the same way, but on a slightly different floor; and so on. With some imagination, we can 
imagine a maximally specific way for a broom to perform its function: a way that is specific 
down to the level of microscopic detail, and which is so exact in all its aspects that few 
sweepings would ever have it in common. Such an entity is a Platonic Determinant--specifically, 
a Determinant of the Form of the Broom. 
 Like the Forms, Platonic Determinants are abstract, occupying neither space nor time; 
and like the Forms, Determinants are properties that can be instantiated by things. A particular 
object, such as a broom or a cat, instantiates its Form by instantiating one of its Form’s 
Determinants. Just as something is colored by being of a specific shade, or hot by being a 
particular temperature, so does a cat instantiate the Cat Form by instantiating one of its 
Determinants.
 Unlike Platonic Forms, however, Determinants are maximally specific: there are many 
ways to instantiate a Form, but only one way to instantiate a Determinant. Furthermore, because 
Platonic Determinants are maximally specific ways to perform a proper function, and because 
proper functions, as discussed in §3.2, take time to perform, it follows that Platonic Determinants 
are maximally specific sorts of events. Determinants of the Form of the Broom, for instance, are 
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various possible sweepings, each of which is completely precise in all its properties, including 
duration. Likewise, the Form of the Cat’s Determinants are various possible cat lives, each of 
which begins with the genesis of a kitten, and which may end in a variety of ways.12
 Platonic Determinants are not the same as their instances. A specific way for a broom to 
sweep is different from the broom that actually sweeps that way, just as a certain sort of cat life is 
different from the cat who lives it. Again, like the Forms, Determinants are properties rather than 
material particulars, and they are different from things that instantiate them.
 Classical Platonism’s four-tiered ontology therefore admits of a further division at the 
level of proper functions. For in addition to proper Platonic Forms, which are determinable types 
of processes--proper functions, specifically--there are also their Determinants, which are 
metaphysically dependent on the Forms:
In the above diagram, upper-case letters represent the Forms and lower-case letters represent 
their Determinants. Determinants are teleologically dependent on Forms, since the Forms are 
103
12 Platonic Determinants are therefore very much like Lewisian possibilia, with the exception of the fact 
that they are not concrete, and that they are not naturally grouped into spatially unified worlds. See §7.
themselves just ways to achieve the Good, and Determinants are just ways to achieve the Forms. 
Matter, likewise, is the means for supporting and constituting integrated wholes, and integrated 
wholes have as their goal the achievement of the Forms via the Determinants. 
 In current philosophical terminology, Platonic Determinants are best described as 
structural universals, which makes them candidates for Lewis’ famous criticism in “Against 
Structural Universals.”13 According to Lewis, structural universals cannot exist because they 
require brute necessary connections between distinct existences, which is absurd. It is to that 
criticism, therefore, and to the Classical Platonist response, that we now turn.
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13 Lewis (1986b).
6.  Platonic Determinants and the Problem of Structural Universals
A structure is a property whose instances have parts of a specific type and arrangement. The 
property of BEING A BROOM, for example, is a structure. Anything that has the property of BEING A 
BROOM must have parts--namely, a handle and a brush--and those parts must be arranged in a 
certain way--namely, with the brush at the end of the handle, bristles pointed away from it. 
 A universal is a repeatable property or relation; it can have multiple instances, and it is 
somehow shared in its entirety by each instance. If REDNESS is a universal, then an apple’s red 
color is one and the same thing as any other apple’s red color. If REDNESS is a universal, no red 
apple has a mere part of REDNESS; each apple has the whole color. 
 A structural universal, then, is a repeatable property, whose instances have parts with 
repeatable properties.14 David Lewis’ example is METHANE, instantiated by all and only methane 
molecules: anything that instantiates METHANE must have exactly one part that instantiates 
CARBON, four parts that instantiate HYDROGEN, and the relation BONDED must hold between each 
part that instantiates HYDROGEN and the part that instantiates CARBON.15 A simpler example is 
BINARY STAR-HOOD, instantiated by exactly those pairs of stars that orbit a common center of 
mass. Anything that instantiates BINARY STAR-HOOD has to have two parts that instantiate STAR-
HOOD, and those parts have to be related in a certain way. A third example is the Platonic 
Determinant CAT LIFE #17, instantiated by all and only cats who live a very specific sort of life, 
and whose instances’ parts have properties like CAT HEART-HOOD and CAT BRAIN-HOOD. Structural 
universals are repeatable properties, whose instances’ parts have certain repeatable properties.
 Structural universals provide elegant answers to several questions in metaphysics, 
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14 Armstrong (1978), vol. 1, pp. 116-117 and vol. 2, pp. 68-71.
15 Lewis (1986b).
including that of what resemblance is, what a law of nature is, and what a possible world is, but 
there is a well-known problem with them: they require necessary connections between distinct 
existences. Any two things--if they are indeed two and not one--can exist apart from one another. 
The universal METHANE is one thing, while the universal CARBON is another. BINARY STAR-HOOD is 
one thing; STAR-HOOD another. CAT LIFE #17 is one thing; CAT BRAIN-HOOD another. Structural 
universals are distinct from the universals had by their instances’ parts. So how could they be 
necessarily connected? Why must CARBON be present wherever METHANE is? Why must STAR-
HOOD be present wherever BINARY STAR-HOOD is? Why must CAT BRAIN-HOOD be present wherever 
CAT LIFE #17 is? Never mind the features that are specific to cats and stars, or to methane 
molecules; this is a problem about all structures.16 Never mind the meanings of the predicates 
that name the universals; the fact that one universal is called “binary star-hood” while another is 
called “star-hood” does not explain how one could be necessarily connected to the other--no 
more, at any rate, than does naming the relation between them “necessitation.” Instead of calling 
them “star-hood” and “binary star-hood,” call them “Zim” and “Zam.” The point is that Zim is 
one thing, and Zam is another. They are distinct. Whence the necessary connection?17
 The problem is best put as an inconsistent triad:
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16 Including mathematical ones. Consider a dot-matrix universe, whose only non-structural property is the 
universal DOT-HOOD, and whose structural properties include universals like BEING A PAIR OF ADJACENT 
DOTS and BEING FOUR ADJACENT DOTS ARRANGED IN A SQUARE.
17 The problem is raised in Lewis (1986b). Proposed solutions include Armstrong (1986), Bigelow (1986), 
Bigelow and Pargetter (1989), Forrest (1986), Hawley (2010), and Pagès (2002). 
e. There are no necessary connections between distinct entities.18
f. A structural universal is distinct from the universals it involves.19
g. There is a necessary connection between a structural universal and the universals it 
involves.
Since the inconsistency between (e)-(g) is evident, and the truth of both (f) and (g) is built into 
the very idea of a structural universal, the source of trouble must lie in (e). Standard solutions to 
the problem of structural universals, therefore, deny (e), producing various accounts of 
involvement as a result.20 Standard solutions, in other words, attempt to explain the necessary 
connection between universals by showing that it is a familiar sort of connection--like the 
connection between parts and a whole, or between a definition and the terms in which it is 
defined. Unfortunately, none of them are successful.
6.1. The Mereological Account. 
 The Mereological Account of involvement states that structural universals have parts, and 
that their parts are the universals they involve. Consider again the structural universal METHANE. 
On the Mereological Account, not only do individual methane molecules have parts, but so does 
the universal METHANE itself; the universals CARBON, HYDROGEN, and BONDED are the universal 
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18 Lewis (1986a) pp. 87-91, (1986c), and (1998).
19 The term “involvement” is a placeholder for whatever necessary connection obtains between a 
structural universal and the universals instantiated by its instances’ parts. Entities x and y are distinct just 
in case both (x is neither a part of y nor is y a part of x) and (x and y do not overlap--i.e. there is no z such 
that z is a part of both x and y).
20 Proposed counterexamples to (e) often invoke strange entities, such as states of affairs, haecceities, 
mathematical objects, and instantaneous processes, which an opponent of structural universals is well 
within her rights to reject. I will not discuss any of these acrimonia here.
METHANE’S proper parts. Under the Mereological Account, involvement is proper parthood, and 
the reason why a structural universal is always found with the universals it involves is that a 
whole is always found with its parts.21 
 The problem with the Mereological Account is that a structural universal can involve 
another universal several times at once, but a whole cannot have the same part several times at 
once. So the relation of involvement is not proper parthood. To see why, consider a very simple 
structural universal: BEING A PAIR OF STARS, which involves the universal STAR-HOOD. Under the 
mereological account, STAR-HOOD is a proper part of BEING A PAIR OF STARS. It is not an improper 
part, for then we would have one universal rather than two. So in addition to the property of 
STAR-HOOD, there must be something that makes up the rest of BEING A PAIR OF STARS. But what? 
Not STAR-HOOD again. For although there is a sense in which something can have a part twice, it 
is not the sense required here. If my car’s steering wheel is detached and then re-attached, we can 
say that my car has had its steering wheel as a part twice: once before the re-attachment, and 
once after. But BEING a PAIR OF STARS does not have STAR-HOOD twice in the way that my car has 
its steering wheel twice. BEING A PAIR OF STARS has STAR-HOOD twice simultaneously, not serially. 
 The problem cannot be solved by identifying the parts of BEING A PAIR OF STARS with 
STAR-HOOD and BEING A PAIR OF. For consider two structural universals, one of which is BEING A 
PAIR OF STARS AND A CAT, the other of which is BEING A PAIR OF CATS AND A STAR. Both universals 
involve STAR-HOOD, CAT-HOOD, and BEING A PAIR OF. If BEING A PAIR OF STARS is just the sum of 
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21 The mereological account of involvement is thus the same thing as what Lewis (1986b) calls “the 
pictorial conception” of structural universals. Under that name, it has been defended by Armstrong (1986), 
Bigelow (1986), and Forrest (1986). As Hawley (2010) observes, the Mereological Account presupposes 
not only that mereological essentialism is true of structural universals, but also that such a condition is 
supposed to preclude the possibility of separating a structure’s involved universals--which, as she 
rightfully demonstrates, it does not. Though I take it to be correct, I will not discuss Hawley’s criticism of 
the Mereological Account further.
STAR-HOOD and BEING A PAIR OF, then BEING A PAIR OF STARS AND A CAT is identical to BEING A PAIR 
OF CATS AND A STAR, since each would have to be identical to the sum of STAR-HOOD, CAT-HOOD, 
and BEING A PAIR OF. The problem remains: a structure can involve the same universal several 
times at once, but a whole cannot have the same part several times at once. So involvement 
cannot be parthood.22
 Defenders of the Mereological Account have attempted to solve the problem: Peter 
Forrest distinguishes two subtly different notions of parthood, arguing that one of them permits a 
single part to be had several times at once,23 and David Armstrong cites instances of asymmetric 
relations as counterexamples to the uniqueness of mereological composition, after which he 
argues that, if the uniqueness of mereological composition is false, there is nothing absurd about 
having the same part several times over.24 However, neither response solves the problem. 
Forrest’s distinction, which is drawn in terms of structure, ultimately fails to explain how a part 
can be had many times,25 and Armstrong’s counterexample to the uniqueness of mereological 
composition is doubly ineffective: not only does it invoke a brute, asymmetric truthmaking 
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22 A friend of the mereological account might appeal to the notion of attachment, and say that, in the case 
of BEING A PAIR OF CATS AND A STAR, the universal BEING A PAIR OF is attached to the universal CAT-HOOD but 
not to STAR-HOOD, while in the case of BEING A PAIR OF STARS AND A CAT, the universal BEING A PAIR OF is 
attached to STAR-HOOD but not CAT-HOOD. Formally, there is no inconsistency in this move. The problem, 
rather, lies in the notion of attachment. Whatever it is, it cannot be the ordinary, familiar spatial notion. For 
how could  a purely numeric feature like BEING A PAIR OF be spatially attached to anything?
23 Forrest (1986).
24 Armstrong (1986).
25 Forrest’s distinction between parthood and A-parthood is drawn in terms of structure: only appropriately 
structured things can stand in the latter relation, while all sorts of things, structured and unstructured 
alike, can stand in the former. His own example: to just be part of a cake, it is sufficient to be some of the 
cake, no matter how scattered or strangely shaped. To be A part of a cake, however, one must have 
structure; one cannot be scattered or molecule-thin, for instance. The problem with Forrest’s elaboration 
is that the notion of structure does not by itself explain how a part can be had multiple times at once. A 
structured whole like the Eiffel Tower cannot have one of its beams several times at once, yet each beam 
stands in the A-parthood relation to the Eiffel Tower.
relation that is as mysterious as involvement,26 but it is also irrelevant to the problem. If the 
uniqueness of mereological composition is false, that just means that the same parts can compose 
more than one whole. It does not mean that the same part can be had several times at once, nor 
does it explain how such a feat is possible. Neither Forrest’s nor Armstrong’s responses work. 
The Mereological Account of involvement fails to solve the problem with structural universals.
6.2. The Linguistic Account. 
 The Linguistic Account of involvement holds that structural universals are compound 
words in a Lagadonian language--that is, a language in which each thing functions as its own 
name,27 and whose simple words are non-structural universals. So construed, a structural 
universal is analytically tied to the universals it involves; it is defined in terms of them. 
Furthermore, the possibility of recursive definition guarantees that there is no worry about 
involving the same universal several times at once. The connection of involvement, under the 
Linguistic Account, is analyticity.28
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26 Suppose a thing x has a contingent feature F. Armstrong takes a claim’s truth to be necessary for the 
existence of its truthmaker, so even though x is F, x cannot be the truthmaker for “x is F.” Furthermore, 
since the truthmaking relation is asymmetric, and since the supervenience of a proposition’s truth on its 
truthmaker is symmetric, it follows that the truthmaking relation isn’t supervenience. So to ground the truth 
of “x is F”, Armstrong claims that there must exist something in addition to x, which is named by the 
gerundive phrase “x’s being F.” But why? x is one thing; x’s being F another. Never mind the fact that one 
of the entities is called “x’s being F.” Call them Zim and Zam instead. They are distinct. So why can’t one 
cease to exist, leaving the other unchanged? The answer must appeal to the brute truthmaking relation, 
which, given the ontology it directs us to, is no less mysterious than that of involvement.
27 “A state-description in a Lagadonian language will be a set-theoretic construction out of the predicates 
and the negation symbol, whatever those are, together with the members of a given domain, each one 
serving as its own name.” Lewis (1986a) pp. 145.  
28 Lewis (1986b) pp. 104: “On the linguistic conception, a structural universal is a set-theoretic 
construction out of simple universals, in just the way that a (parsed) linguistic expression can be taken as 
a set-theoretic construction out of its words. ... And there can be no mystery about how these connections 
can be necessary: they hold by definition. They are just consequences of a semantic recursion which 
defines satisfaction of complex predicates in terms of the satisfaction of simple ones that are the 
vocabulary from which the complex predicate is built up; in other words, which defines the instantiation of 
structural universals in terms of the instantiation of simple universals they involve.”
 If it is essential to languages that they can be spoken or written, then the fact that things 
cannot be spoken or written would show that Lagadonian languages are not really languages of 
any kind, in which case Lagadonian analyticity cannot be a substantive account of involvement. 
Indeed, there is reason to doubt the very idea of a Lagadonian language. Its “vocabulary” is a 
domain of objects, not words. Consequently, its “analyticities” are necessary connections 
between things, not meanings. Appeals to Lagadonian analyticities, therefore, do nothing to 
elucidate the mystery of necessary connections between things.
 Aside from worries about Lagadonian languages, however, the Linguistic Account entails 
that it is impossible for matter to be infinitely complex. 
 Matter is infinitely complex just in case every node of every structured material object is 
itself structured. As an example, take a methane molecule, which is a structured object. The 
nodes of its structure are its constituent atoms. Each atom has an inner structure, whose nodes are 
quarks. If matter were infinitely complex, the quarks themselves would have inner structure, with 
nodes that have inner structure, whose nodes also have inner structure, and so on ad infinitum. To 
say that matter is infinitely complex, then, is to say that structured objects are divisible in this 
way, and that there is structure “all the way down.” 
 The Linguistic Account entails that, necessarily, the structure stops somewhere--that there 
is a “bottom level of nature,” which has no structure of its own. For on the Linguistic Account, 
structural universals are definitions in a language--albeit a language whose predicates are 
universals and set-theoretic constructions of universals, not words. If linguistic definitions must 
be finite in length, or if the set theory used to construct Lagadonian definitions includes the 
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axiom of regularity,29 then the Linguistic Account cannot allow for the possibility of infinitely 
complex matter. For on the Linguistic Account, the definitions in nature’s language cannot be 
infinitely long. To prevent infinitely long Lagadonian definitions, there must be simple, non-
structural properties. So the Linguistic Account entails that infinite material complexity is 
impossible.
 Such a conclusion, however, is too great to be drawn from a metaphysics of properties. It 
may turn out that matter is finitely complex, of course; but if it is, this would be a contingent 
affair. It would still be possible, in other words, for the world to have contained infinite material 
complexity, even if, as a matter of fact, there is no such thing. Infinite material complexity is 
possible, but the Linguistic Account entails that it is impossible. So the Linguistic Account is 
false.30 
 
6.3. The Constitution Account.
 In “Mereology, Modality, and Magic,” Katherine Hawley presents an account of 
involvement in terms of constitution rather than parthood, arguing that the relation tying 
METHANE to the universals HYDROGEN, CARBON, and BONDED is the same as that tying a clay 
statue to the clay from which it is made.31 On Hawley’s account, CARBON is present whenever 
METHANE is because METHANE is partially constituted by CARBON, and a thing’s constituent 
elements must be present wherever it is. On Hawley’s account--which we will call the 
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29 The axiom of regularity states that no set is an element of itself.
30 Lewis (1986b). See Schaffer (2007) for a similar argument against a form of mereological nihilism.
31 Hawley (2010).
Constitution Account--the relation between a structural universal and a universal instantiated by 
its instances’ parts is constitution.
 At first it should seem that the Constitution Account suffers from the same problem as the 
Mereological Account. For just as a whole cannot have the same part more than once at the same 
time, nor can a whole be constituted out of the same elements more than once at the same time. 
A clay statue, for instance, cannot be made up of the same clay twice at once; a single bit of clay 
cannot simultaneously constitute one and the same statue multiple times. That simply isn’t how 
constitution works. Likewise, the universal METHANE cannot be made up of the same universal 
CARBON multiple times at once; the universal CARBON cannot partly constitute the same structure 
more than once at the same time. Nor can the universal STAR-HOOD constitute anything twice at 
the same time, such as the structural universal BEING A PAIR OF STARS. On its face, the 
Constitution Account is flawed in the same way as the Mereological Account. 
 Hawley’s response to this problem can be presented in two short steps. First, note that 
two different wholes can be constituted of the same matter at once--as a clay statue and a lump of 
clay are constituted by the same clay. Second, note that when structural universals differ only in 
the number of one of their involved universals’ instances--as do STAR-HOOD and BEING A PAIR OF 
STARS--they are constituted out of the same universals. The difference between STAR-HOOD and 
BEING A PAIR OF STARS, then, might be treated as the same sort of difference that obtains between a 
clay statue and a lump simultaneously constituted out of the same clay. Yet which sort of a 
difference is this, exactly?
 On Hawley’s account, a clay statue and a clay lump can be made of the same clay, but 
made of the same clay in different ways. Likewise, the structural universals METHANE and BUTANE 
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are differently constituted by HYDROGEN, CARBON, and BONDED; just as STAR-HOOD and BEING A 
PAIR OF STARS are differently constituted from STAR-HOOD; and BEING A PAIR OF STARS AND A CAT is 
differently constituted from STAR-HOOD, CAT-HOOD, and BEING A PAIR OF than BEING A PAIR OF CATS 
AND A STAR. Hawley countenances different ways for the same elements to constitute different 
things at the same time, then. Her own explanation’s lucidity warrants quoting it at length: 
 
...statue and lump are supposed to be analogous to being methane and being butane, 
which share all their parts... [H]owever, there is a sense in which statue and lump ‘differ 
in respect of their composition’, and this may help us understand both the differences 
between being methane and being butane, and the consequent differences between their 
instances. Statue and lump share all their basic parts, but there is a sense in which each 
stands in a different relation to those parts (on this view). For example, the statue imposes 
a certain spatial arrangement upon the parts, in the sense that that very statue could not 
have had an entirely different shape, whilst the lump is more tolerant. Perhaps there is a 
similar sense in which being methane, being butane, and being isobutane stand in 
different relations to the same parts (being carbon, being hydrogen, and a bonding 
relation). What relations? Well, those relations which underpin the relevant standards of 
coinstantiation. Of course this isn’t terribly illuminating. My point is just that advocates 
of structural universals need not take the differences between methane, butane, and 
isobutane as brute facts, but can instead see these differences as grounded in the different 
relations each universal bears to its parts.
On Hawley’s proposal, then, “the differences between methane, butane, and isobutane,”--as well 
as between all other such structural universals--are due to there being “different relations” 
between “each universal and its parts.” The difference between METHANE, BUTANE, and 
ISOBUTANE, then, is that each one stands in a different sort of relation to the involved universals 
HYDROGEN, CARBON, and BONDED. Similarly, the difference between STAR-HOOD, BEING A PAIR OF 
STARS, and BEING A TRIO OF STARS is that each one stands in a different relation to STAR-HOOD. 
More specifically, the structural universal BEING A PAIR OF STARS stands in the relation of HAVING 
TWO PARTS, EACH OF WHICH INSTANTIATES to the universal STAR-HOOD; and that the structural 
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universal BEING A TRIO OF STARS stands in the relation of HAVING THREE PARTS, EACH OF WHICH 
INSTANTIATES to the universal STAR-HOOD. Hawley avoids the problem with the Mereological 
Account, then, by treating structural universals as relational entities. She does not specify which 
relational entities, but she has two options. They may either be relations of variable polyadicity, 
whose respective relata are the structural universal’s instance and the involved universals; or they  
may be relational properties, which are instantiated by standing in certain relations to involved 
universals. Because each of these options has enjoyed a recent defense, however, it is to them 
that we now turn. 
 
6.4. The Relational Account. 
 On the Relational Account of involvement, structural universals are not really monadic 
properties. Instead, they are complex relations between their involved universals’ instances.32 
METHANE, on the Relational Account, is a relation between things that instantiate HYDROGEN, 
CARBON, and BONDED. Far from speaking of a single molecule instantiating METHANE, it would be 
closer to the truth to say that five atoms have been METHANED together. Similarly, BINARY STAR-
HOOD is not really an intrinsic property of any one thing on the Relational Account. On the 
Relational Account, it would be more correct to say that two stars are BINARIED.
 The problem with the Relational Account is that it accords a secondary status to 
structured objects, construing them as mere marriages of parts. In so doing, it appears to deal 
inadequately with organisms, whose conditions of flourishing seem to differ from those of their 
organs. To see why, first consider the Platonic Determinant CAT LIFE #17. Under the Relational 
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32 Pagès (2002). Bigelow and Pargetter’s original account, on which Pagès’ appears to be a variant, is 
discussed below.
Account, CAT LIFE #17 is really just a relation between parts and stages that instantiate CAT 
HEART-HOOD, CAT BRAIN-HOOD, and the like. Instead of saying that a single thing is a cat, it would 
be more correct to say that various parts are CATTED together.33 
 Next, consider a Nozickean pleasure machine for cats: a life-support system, which 
directly stimulates a cat’s brain with electrodes, causing pleasant hallucinations of life as a 
healthy cat. Suppose that the machine also feeds, exercises, and administers medicine to its 
inhabitant, facilitating statistically normal growth and development. Yet however well the 
machine feeds the cat and maintains its health, it cannot make the cat perfectly well-off. For even 
if one is inclined to say that a cat is well-off in the machine, it cannot be denied that such a cat 
would be missing out on something. Her disconnection from reality would be a harm; it would 
prevent her from being perfectly well-off. So a cat cannot be perfectly well-off in the pleasure 
machine. 
 A cat’s parts, however, might differ from a cat in this respect. For in the pleasure 
machine, a configuration of cat parts is kept in perfect harmony. Each organ functions perfectly 
within the whole organism; each contributes to homeostasis. The respiratory system still supplies 
the blood with oxygen, the gastrointestinal system still metabolizes, the optic nerves are 
stimulated with photo-technology, and so on. Its parts are in constant harmony, kept in perfect 
working order. In that sense, they are perfectly healthy. There is a sense, then, in which a 
configuration of cat parts can be perfectly healthy in the pleasure machine, even when the cat 
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33 Or perhaps CONCATENATED. 
they compose is not. It is therefore natural to conclude that cats and other organisms are more 
than just their parts; for it seems that their parts can flourish when they do not.34
 The Relational Account, which treats structured objects as configurations of parts, cannot 
allow organisms to be anything more than that. The Relational Account therefore requires a 
contentious answer to a philosophical question about organisms, and this counts against the 
Relational Account. Whether organisms are mere configurations of parts is both controversial 
and separate from the problem of structural universals, and one should not be forced to take a 
side simply to solve a technical problem in one’s theory of properties. So the Relational Account 
does not adequately solve the problem with structural universals.
6.5. The Relational Property Variant.35 
 Bigelow and Pargetter identify structural universals with “highly conjunctive second 
order relational propert[ies]”. Sticking to the letter of their account, structural universals are not 
really relations, like BEING NEXT TO, or BEING OLDER THAN. Instead, they are “relational 
properties,” like BEING AN UNCLE or BEING A NATIVE ATHENIAN.36 METHANE, on this account, is a 
property something has in virtue of standing in a highly complicated relation to the universals 
that METHANE involves. Rather than being a relation between the atoms that instantiate 
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34 One may make similar arguments about the organs--i.e. that an eye cannot be perfectly healthy unless 
it is develops under real light rather than under phototechnics; that a muscle cannot be perfectly healthy 
unless it grows as a result of real exercise; and so on. Yet the standard of health that requires organs to 
be in contact with their environment to be healthy also requires their integration into an entire organism to 
be healthy. If an eye cannot be perfectly healthy without responding to real light, it also cannot be 
perfectly healthy unless it is really responding, to it--i.e. sending signals through the body of a whole 
organism. So the intuition that the pleasure machine harms the cat’s parts rests on the more basic 
intuition that the pleasure machine harms the whole cat. The intuition that the machine does not harm the 
cat’s parts, however, does not presuppose that the machine fails to harm the whole cat.
35 Although I use the term “variant,” Bigelow and Pargetter’s view was developed prior to Pagès.
36 Bigelow and Pargetter (1989), pp. 224.
HYDROGEN, CARBON, and BONDED, METHANE is a property of methane molecules, whose name 
includes phrases like “having a part that instantiates...” and “having two parts that stand in the 
relation of...”, which they instantiate by being suitably related to HYDROGEN, CARBON, and 
BONDED. On the Relational Property account, the property of BEING A PAIR OF STARS is really just 
the property of HAVING TWO PARTS THAT INSTANTIATE STAR-HOOD, and the property of BINARY STAR-
HOOD is really just the property of HAVING TWO PARTS THAT BOTH INSTANTIATE STARHOOD AND 
ORBIT A COMMON CENTER OF MASS. The property of METHANE is considerably more complicated.37 
Summarily, Bigelow and Pargetter’s account holds that a structural universal is a way of having 
one’s parts configured. 
 The problem with Bigelow and Pargetter’s account is that, like the Relational Account, it 
treats structured objects as mere configurations of their parts. By their account, CAT LIFE #17 is 
the property of having certain sorts of parts, which instantiate CAT BRAIN-HOOD, CAT HEART-HOOD 
and the like. To be a cat, in other words, is simply to have cat-parts in a certain arrangement; cats 
and their lives are are configurations of cat parts. Yet this is the same unwelcome result that the 
Relational Account has. So as a theory of structural universals in general, their account fails.
6.6. The Classical Platonist Account
 Classical Platonism, which identifies Determinants with certain sorts of structural 
universals, holds that the instantiation of a structural universal is the achievement of an end, and 
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37 With the relata highlighted, the relational property of METHANE would be best named with the following 
predicate: ... HAVING A PART THAT INSTANTIATES CARBON AND HAVING A SECOND PART THAT IS DISTINCT FROM 
THE FIRST PART, WHICH INSTANTIATES HYDROGEN WHILE BEING BONDED TO THE FIRST PART, AND HAVING A THIRD 
PART THAT IS DISTINCT FROM BOTH THE FIRST AND THE SECOND PARTS, WHICH INSTANTIATES HYDROGEN WHILE 
BEING BONDED TO THE FIRST PART, AND HAVING A FOURTH PART THAT IS DISTINCT FROM EACH OF THE FIRST, 
SECOND, AND THIRD PARTS, WHICH INSTANTIATES HYDROGEN WHILE BEING BONDED TO THE FIRST PART, AND 
HAVING A FIFTH PART THAT IS DISTINCT FROM EACH OF THE FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, AND FOURTH PARTS, WHICH 
INSTANTIATES HYDROGEN WHILE BEING BONDED TO THE FIRST PART.
that the instantiation of its involved universals is the achievement of the end’s constitutive 
means. According to Classical Platonism, a structural universal is an end to which the involved 
universals are constitutive means, and a structural universal is necessarily connected to the 
universals it involves because an end is only achieved when its constitutive means are achieved 
as well. According to Classical Platonism, the involvement relation is that of constitutive 
means.38
 Intuitively, constitutive means can be thought of as steps in a procedure that, logically, 
cannot be skipped. Our example will be the procedure of COUNTING FROM ONE TO TEN, with 
respect to the steps of COUNTING FROM FIVE THROUGH SEVEN. 
 First, there are lots of ways to count from to ten: one can vocalize the words, “one, two, 
three...” or write them; one can have a machine do the counting or one can read the words “one, 
two three...” off of a page. There are many different ways to count from one to ten. Each of these 
ways, in turn, consists in different steps. When counting from one to ten verbally in English, for 
instance, one of the steps is pronouncing the word “one,” and another is verbally pronouncing 
the word “two,” and so on. 
 There are a myriad of ways to count to ten, but no matter how one does it, one cannot 
successfully count from one to ten without also successfully counting from five through seven. 
Without counting from five through seven, then, one cannot be counting from one to ten; one 
would be skipping necessary steps. Counting from five through seven, then, is a kind of logically 
necessary means for counting from one to ten. No matter what one’s physical technology, in 
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38 The view of properties as ends goes back to Plato, and was arguably maintained by Aristotle, for whom 
essences were teleologically unified: “If we wanted to grasp the species of animals, we should first of all 
determine the organs which are indispensable to every animal, as for example some organs of sense and 
the instruments of receiving and digesting food, such as the mouth and the stomach, besides organs of 
locomotion.” Politics 1290b25-30, emphasis added. On Aristotle and structural universals, see Loux 
(2006) and Scaltsas (1994).
other words, one cannot logically count from one to ten unless one completes certain 
intermediate steps. 
 On the Classical Platonist Account, being involved in a structural universal is just being a 
necessary step for a certain end. To illustrate, consider again the universal HOUSE CAT LIFE #17. 
According to Classical Platonism, HOUSE CAT LIFE #17 is something that cats do; it is an end 
whose achievement makes something a cat with a specific sort of life. Rather than being part of a 
cat, HOUSE CAT LIFE #17 is an end. 
 To answer the question of what involvement is, consider again the end of HOUSE CAT LIFE 
#17. This end is a structural universal. To achieve that end, a cat must achieve certain means, 
including having four cat legs, having a cat tail, having a cat brain, and so on. Each of these 
means, in turn, is correlated with a structural universal: BEING A LEFT CAT FORELEG, BEING A CAT 
TAIL, BEING A CAT BRAIN, and so on. The cat achieves the means to CAT LIFE #17 exactly when its 
parts achieve the ends of BEING A LEFT CAT FORELEG and the like. The relationship of involvement, 
therefore, is that of being a constitutive means, or a means whose achievement just is part of the 
end’s achievement. BEING A CAT BRAIN is among the constitutive means to achieving CAT-HOOD; 
CAT-HOOD is the constitutive end of BEING A CAT TAIL, BEING A CAT BRAIN, and the like.
 Critics may suspect that the difference between treating properties as ends and treating 
them as something else--parts, say--is merely verbal, but this is not so. By treating the 
involvement relation as the teleological relation between means and ends, Classical Platonism 
avoids all the problems faced by the standard solutions. Here’s how.
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6.7. Multiple Involvement. 
 First, because an achievement can consist in the same step being taken several times, and 
even several times at once, Classical Platonism has no problem with a structural universal 
involving another universal several times. Our ordinary, intuitive notion of a part does not allow 
a whole to have one and the same part several times simultaneously. Yet our ordinary notion of 
an end allows for an end to require the same step several times simultaneously. In this respect, 
the notion of an end is very unlike that of a part. It is built in to the notion of an end that it can 
require the same step several times.
 If an argument is wanted for the previous point, consider the following. Suppose that, 
instead of wanting to sing Three Blind Mice in a round, as it is normally sung, we wanted to sing 
it in stereo. What we want, in other words, is for multiple voices to sing Three Blind Mice at the 
same time, instead of in overlapping sequence. Our end is to sing Three Blind Mice in stereo, and 
the means to achieving this end is to sing the melody of Three Blind Mice. However, to sing in 
stereo, it is not enough for the melody to be sung once; it has to be sung several times. 
Furthermore, it cannot be sung several times at different times; it has to be sung several times at 
the same time. So we have one and the same end--namely, singing Three Blind Mice in stereo--
and it requires the same means several times at once, namely singing the melody. In so doing it 
does not violate our ordinary notion of an end. For an end to require one and the same step 
several times at once is not absurd; it is common. A whole cannot have a part several times at 
once, but an end can require the same means several times at once. For this reason, teleological 
theories of universals avoid problems that beset mereological accounts of involvement.
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6.8. Atomism. 
 Classical Platonism avoids commitments to atomism because, as we know from thinking 
about Zeno’s “Achilles and the Tortoise” case, it is possible to achieve ends with infinitely many 
steps. In order for Achilles to reach the tortoise, he has to cross half the distance between them, 
and then half of the remaining difference, and half of that... Yet somehow he reaches the tortoise 
anyway. Similarly, achieving the end of METHANE might also require an infinite number of steps, 
each of which is the instantiation of a more fundamental sort of particle. An account of 
involvement avoids atomism just in case it allows for infinite chains of it. Classical Platonism 
defines involvement in terms of the means-end relation, and allows for infinite chains between 
means and ends. So unlike the Linguistic Account, Classical Platonism avoids atomism.
6.9. Organisms. 
 Finally, the problem with relational accounts of involvement (as well as with variants that 
appeal to relational properties) is that they treat organisms as mere configurations of their parts. 
Classical Platonism does not categorize organisms this way. Instead, it treats organisms as 
sustained achievements that have ends of their own, like health, and treats the lives of such 
organisms as ongoing, goal-directed processes.
 A cat that achieves CAT LIFE #17, and this achievement, like the achievement of any 
organismic structure, takes time: in the first stages of living CAT LIFE #17, a zygote of felis catus 
begins to develop. Later stages involve a kitten’s birth, its development into adulthood, and 
finally death. Once the cat dies, it stops achieving CAT LIFE #17.
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 Ends may themselves have ends, and organisms, which are living achievements, 
invariably do. Cats, which are achievements of the Form of the Cat, have the goal of being 
maximally happy and healthy in the way proper to cats. Dragonflies, which are achievements of 
The Form of the Dragonfly, have the goal of being maximally happy and healthy in the way 
proper to dragonflies. And so on. Organismic structures have instances that aim at species-
specific health and happiness.
 Because organismic structures like HOUSE CAT LIFE #17 take time to instantiate, and 
because their instances have ends of their own, it follows that organisms like cats are ongoing, 
goal-directed achievements, which, over the course of a life, aim to flourish and do well. They 
need not be reduced to configurations of parts, as relational accounts require.39
 Relational accounts of involvement identify the well-being of an organism with the well-
being of its parts, which allows organisms to be perfectly well-off in Nozickean pleasure 
machines. Classical Platonism does not treat organisms as configurations of their parts, however, 
so there is no need to admit that a cat in a Nozickean pleasure machine is perfectly well-off. So 
the Classical Platonist solution to the problem of structural universals is superior to its 
competitors. 
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39 Because organisms exhibit goal-directed behavior, and because they are often classified by the goal-
directed behavior they exhibit, it is tempting to identify organismic structural universals with the structure 
of their flourishing or well-being. Thus, Aristotle famously identified an animal’s essence with its species-
specific mode of happiness. On such an account, cat-hood is the same thing as perfect cat health, and 
individual cats are living attempts to realize it. Similarly, Aristotle famously identifies the human essence 
with eudaimonia or human happiness, treating human beings as living attempts to achieve it.
 7. Sets of Determinants Complete the Classical Platonist Theory of Properties
Plato has often been criticized for assigning too much work to too few entities. His theory of the 
Forms is allegedly deficient because it requires the Forms to not only serve as the semantic 
values for proper functions, but to also for properties in general, regardless of whether their 
instantiation is the performance of a proper function. And so young Socrates is embarrassed 
when asked about the Forms of mud, dirt, and hair; for how can entities which serve as standards 
of perfection also serve as features of things which appear to have no such standards? There is no 
such thing as perfect mud, after all. “That is because you are inexperienced,” replies the 
Parmenides’ eponymous interlocutor. His rebuke is echoed in more recent years in Armstrong’s 
canonical study, as well as in other technical appraisals of Plato’s metaphysics.40 To the extent 
that Plato’s theory of the Forms is known to contemporary metaphysicians, it is rejected for its 
reputed failure to play these two roles. 
 But don’t believe the hype. Plato’s theory of the Forms, when correctly elaborated, can 
perform both roles perfectly well. For not only are the Forms suited to play the role of proper 
functions; but so are sets of Platonic Determinants well-suited to provide a theory of properties 
generally. 
 To see why, it is sufficient to note that Platonic Determinants are, for most intents and 
purposes, like Lewis’ possibilia, save that they are abstract rather than concrete--that is, they lack 
a spatial location rather than have one--and that consequently, they are not naturally grouped into 
worlds under spatial relations. Yet Classical Platonism admits a multitude of maximally specific 
ways to live a cat life, each of which is like a possible cat. 
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40 Armstrong (1978), vol. 2.
 By taking sets of Determinants as the referents of ordinary predicates, and by analyzing 
the resemblance of properties in terms of the resemblance of Determinants, the Classical 
Platonist has the same resources for a theory of properties as a Lewisian modal realist. To see 
why, just consider a few phrases that involve quantification over properties: “Being a tabby cat is 
fun”, “red resembles orange more than red resembles blue”, and “there are just four fundamental 
physical forces.” 
 On a Classical Platonist metaphysic, the analyses of such sentences are clear. “Being a 
tabby cat is fun” is true just in case every (contextually relevant) Determinant of the Cat Form 
that has TABBYNESS as a constitutive means also has BEING FUN as a constitutive means. 
 “Red resembles orange more than red resembles blue” is true just in case for any 
Determinant, D1, such that D1 that involves REDNESS; and for any determinant, D2, that involves 
BLUENESS; there is some determinant D3, which is such that D3 both involves ORANGE and 
resembles D1 more than D2 does. 
 Finally, “there are just four fundamental forces” is true just in case there are only four 
constitutive means--M1, M2, M3, and M4--which are such that any Determinant that involves 
the constitutive means of BEING A FUNDAMENTAL FORCE also involves either M1, M2, M3, or M4. 
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4  Objections to Classical Platonism
By identifying metaphysical priority with functional teleology, Classical Platonism accrues 
several objections. There is the charge that Classical Platonism precludes the possibility of 
mutual teleological dependence; that Classical Platonism includes nonexistent objects among its 
primary substances; that Classical Platonism is incompatible with scientific realism; that 
teleological facts are reducible in a way that falsifies Classical Platonism; that teleological facts 
are contingent in a way that falsifies Classical Platonism; and that Classical Platonism requires 
matter to have a purpose, without being able to say how. This chapter’s purpose is to nullify such 
objections. 
 1. The Circularity Objection
The Circularity Objection purports to show that teleological and metaphysical dependence are 
distinct, since the former permits, and the latter forbids, circular chains of dependence. A cat’s 
organs, for instance, work for the sake of the whole cat’s health; the whole cat, in turn, maintains 
the health of its organs. A government works for the sake of its citizenry; the citizenry, in turn, 
work for the sake of the government. Circles of teleological dependence are common. Circles of 
metaphysical dependence are impossible. So much the worse for Classical Platonism, goes the 
objection, since it identifies them.
 To see how the Classical Platonist avoids the Circularity Argument, remember that 
teleological idioms like “in order to” and “for the sake of” are ambiguous.1 Sometimes they 
suggest that a thing’s end is a kind of process or achievement—e.g. “the kidney exists for the 
sake of filtering the blood” or “the broom exists for the sake of sweeping floors.” At other times 
they suggest that a thing’s final cause is the beneficiary of such processes—e.g. “the kidney 
exists for the sake of the organism’s health” and “the broom exists for the sake of people who 
need floors swept.” Since teleological language is ambiguous between achievements and 
beneficiaries, it is easy to confuse them. 
 The Classical Platonist can avoid the Circularity Argument in two steps. First, by only 
identifying metaphysical priority with the achievement-based sort of teleology, and not with the 
beneficiary-based sort; and second, by pointing out that the achievement-based sort of teleology 
does not permit circularity, as the beneficiary-based sort does. A cat’s kidney works so as to 
benefit the cat, and the cat works so as to benefit the kidney. Yet it is the kidney’s sole purpose to 
benefit the cat; it is not the cat’s sole purpose to benefit the kidney. A state’s sole purpose is to 
benefit the citizenry; importantly, it is not the citizenry’s sole purpose to benefit the state. 
Because there is a kind of teleological dependence that avoids circularity, and because the 
Classical Platonist identifies metaphysical priority with it, Classical Platonism avoids the 
Circularity Argument.
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1 See chapter 3, §1.
 2. The Nonexistence Objection
The Nonexistence Objection is that, because an object can exist for the sake of something else 
that does not--as the United Nations might exist for the sake of world peace, even though there is 
no world peace, and as cats exist for the sake of perfect cat-health, even though there is no 
perfect cat health--Classical Platonism, which identifies the “for the sake of” relation with 
metaphysical dependence, entails that the United Nations and cats are metaphysically dependent 
on what does not exist, which is absurd. 
 The Nonexistence Argument can be avoided by stressing the distinction between an 
existing abstract object and a nonexistent object. Nonexistent objects, to the extent they can be 
sensibly discussed at all, include a kaleidoscopic array of disorderly characters: not just unicorns, 
round squares, and pairs of even primes, but also round squares that are neither round nor square, 
unicorns that are pairs of even primes, and worse. Of all the creatures in Cirque du 
Métaphysique, nonexistent objects are the most beastly and worst behaved. Fortunately, the 
Classical Platonist eschews them.
 The Classical Platonist’s primary substances are Forms, which, among other things, are 
abstract in the sense that they have no location in space or time. Peace, justice, perfect cat-
health, and the like are not nonexistent; they are abstract. You cannot poke a Platonic Form with 
a stick or hide behind one, but for all that they still exist. World peace may fail to be realized, but 
this does not make it nonexistent; it just makes it uninstantiated. Similarly, cats may fail to ever 
achieve perfect health, but this does not mean that there is no such thing as perfect cat-health; it 
just means that there are no instances of it. For the Classical Platonist, ideal states are not 
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nonexistent--on the contrary, they are fundamental! The Nonexistence Argument, like the 
Circularity Argument, is easily answered.
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 3. The Respectability Objection
The Respectably Objection purports to show that Classical Platonism turns ontology into a field 
that is not intellectually respectable, in the sense that it is incompatible with naturalism. Put 
formally, the argument is the following:
a. Ontology is an intellectually respectable enterprise.
b.If ontology requires the rejection of naturalism, ontology is not an intellectually 
respectable enterprise.
c. If Classical Platonism is true, ontology requires the rejection of naturalism.
d.So Classical Platonism is not true.
The argument is clearly valid. Its soundness depends on what the sense Classical Platonism is 
incompatible with naturalism. We will begin by distinguishing two views that could be called 
“naturalism.”
 First, one might use “naturalism” to name the view that everything exists in space-time, 
or that everything has a spatiotemporal location.2 Call this view metaphysical naturalism. 
Metaphysical naturalism might also be called “concretism,” since it is the denial of abstract 
entities.  
 The other contendor for the title of “naturalism” is the view that ontology cannot neglect 
science’s posits or contradict scientific claims with philosophical arguments. Call this scientific 
naturalism. Scientific naturalism is a very modest view. It is not the Quinean view that 
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2 The term “naturalism” has most famously been used this way by Armstrong (1978) and Plantinga 
(1978).
philosophers should “let total science decide” ontological questions, or that ontology can be read 
off of science.3 Rather, it is Davidson’s view that “philosophy does not take hostage to empirical 
fortune.” It is the view, in other words, that one’s ontology must account for scientific posits 
somehow, either as primary substances or else as dependent ones. It does not require scientific 
entities to be primary substances. Ontology cannot contradict science, and must acknowledge 
science’s posits. But it need not itself be part of the sciences for scientific naturalism to be true, 
nor must it defer to science to settle ontological matters.
 Having distinguished naturalism’s metaphysical and scientific versions, it is easy to see 
that the Respectability Argument equivocates between them. First, look at (b). If “naturalism” in 
(b) means scientific naturalism, then (b) is true. Scientific discoveries indeed inform us about the 
world’s contents, and they should consequently affect one’s ontology--even if there is more to the 
ontology than scientific posits. An ontology that took no account of science’s posits would lose 
respectability. Taken as a claim about scientific naturalism, (b) is true.
 If, however, the naturalism mentioned in (b) is metaphysical naturalism, its truth is far 
from obvious. In fact, it looks false. Consider a circumstance in which science discovers the 
existence of non-spatial entities. Then (b)’s metaphysical interpretation would require ontology 
to disagree with science. Metaphysical naturalism, in other words, licenses science from the 
armchair. To harbor medieval nominalist prejudices despite what science might tell us is not 
respectable, even if--per impossible!--nominalism were true. It is much better instead to be a 
realist about scientific methods, agreeing to countenance whatever they do. Taken as a claim 
about scientific naturalism, (b) is true; taken as a claim about metaphysical naturalism, (b) is 
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3 Quine (1948).
false. 
 The opposite is true of premise (c), which is true only if taken as a claim about 
metaphysical, rather than scientific, naturalism. Taken as a claim about metaphysical naturalism, 
(c) is obviously true. The Good does not have a spatial location, nor do any of the other Forms. 
A Classical Platonist’s primary substances are all non-spatial. She thereby rejects metaphysical 
naturalism.
 But must the Classical Platonist reject scientific naturalism? No! On the contrary, 
Classical Platonists are often better able to account for many scientific posits. Frictionless 
surfaces, perfect circles, unachievable speeds, numbers, and all the denizens of such models 
readily find home in a Platonic heaven.4 Classical Platonists have no problem with scientific 
realism; they can accept all of science’s posits, as well as cede authority where it is due. What 
she refuses to accommodate is the restriction of ontology to space-time. As a claim about 
scientific naturalism, (c) is false.
 So Classical Platonism does not require ontology to abandon science, and can even 
accommodate science’s posits. In this, it is a respectable discipline. It commits itself to abstracta 
from the outset, but it does so with the requirement of realism about scientific posits. Classical 
Platonism is not anti-scientific or unscientific; it can avoid the Respectability Argument. 
132
4 The term “in a Platonic heaven” is obviously metaphorical; Forms have no location, no matter how 
heavenly. Armstrong (1989), pp.76 is therefore mistaken to write, “Once you have uninstantiated 
universals, you need somewhere special to put them, a ‘Platonic heaven,’ as philosophers often say.”
 4. The Problem of Matter
The greatest objection to Classical Platonism is its apparent inability to account for the proper 
function of matter. Because Classical Platonism requires everything to have a proper function 
(with the exception of the Good), it requires matter to have a proper function too. Yet matter does 
not seem to have a proper function. Mud, dirt, and lonely asteroids do not seem to be for 
anything; they appear purposeless. Since matter does not appear to have a proper function, and 
since Classical Platonism requires it to, it appears that Classical Platonism is false. The greatest 
objection to Classical Platonism, then, is that it cannot account for the proper function of matter. 
Call this the Matter Problem for Classical Platonism (henceforth the Matter Problem).
 For the Classical Platonist to solve the Matter Problem, she must show that matter has a 
proper function, and there are only three strategies for doing this. She could be a Creationist, and 
argue that the material world is an artifact; she could be a Hylarchist, and argue that the material 
world is an organism; or she could accept Deep Ecology, and argue that the material world is a 
natural habitat. A survey of the options reveals the third to be the most plausible and the most 
modest in its commitments. Other things being equal, Classical Platonists should accept Deep 
Ecology. Let us compare the options.
4.1 Creationism
 Creationism holds that the world is an artifact--usually but not necessarily of divine 
origin--which is so intricately designed, and made with intentions so specific, that even mud, 
dirt, and lonely asteroids have purposes within it. Creationism responds to the Matter Problem, 
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then, by asserting that matter has artifactual teleology--i.e. that it has a proper function because it  
was designed.
 Historically, Creationism has been the most popular response to the Matter Problem, but 
for three simple reasons, I find its popularity to be inversely proportionate to its plausibility. 
First, there are great dissimilarities between the physical universe and a machine; second, 
creationism requires an otherwise unmotivated commitment to a demiurge or to demiurges; and 
third, creationism raises the question of the demiurge(s)’s intentions--a subject whose 
investigation is more mysterious than that of how matter could even have a purpose to begin 
with. Creationism therefore raises worse problems than the one it purports to solve. After briefly 
reviewing the objections to Creationism, we will turn to its competitors.
 The first objection to Creationism is that physical objects in the universe, unlike the parts 
of a machine, do not appear to work together. If the cosmos were an artifact, we would expect its 
purposive behavior would be more cooperative and unified than it actually is. The individual 
gears and springs of a watch do not strive to annihilate one another or compete for resources, but 
living things are constantly in such competition. Nor do any parts of a watch sit idly by, but 
many bits of matter appear completely idle. An artifact’s parts cooperate when they perform their 
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proper functions, but the world’s parts do not. So the world is not an artifact; Creationism is 
false.5
 A Creationist might respond to the apparent lack of cooperation by arguing that the 
universe is a special artifact--one whose parts are supposed to conflict or to remain idle. There 
are such artifacts, of course: gardens and ant farms are among them, as well as orchestrated 
battles and scenes of deliberate violence. Such a response, however, only strengthens the third 
objection to Creationism, which is the problem of finding evidence for the universe’s designer’s 
intentions. We will turn to this objection shortly, along with the prospects for “battlefield” 
ontologies. Ultimately, the world’s uncooperative character is a serious problem for Creationism. 
 The second objection to Creationism is that by identifying the physical world with an 
artifact, the creationist accrues an otherwise unmotivated commitment to the existence of a 
demiurge, or to demiurges. Such commitments are germane to anthropomorphic theism, but our 
current focus on the Matter Problem; and in the context of solving the Matter Problem, there is 
no reason to jump to an anthropomorphic theism any more than there is to jump to Hylarchist 
theism or mysticism. For the cosmos contains no clear, uncontroversial signs of artisanship: no 
signature of the artisan, no omnipresent voice announcing its designs, nor any other signal from a 
cosmic creator. There is no decisive evidence for a demiurge, and the natural teleology that 
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5 Against the world’s apparent lack of cooperation, one might argue that our view of its parts is 
insufficiently small, or our exposure to them insufficiently brief, or our cognitive capacities too limited in 
some way to clearly grasp nature’s unity. The problem with this response is that it undermines 
Creationism’s original motivation. Creationism begins with the idea that life aims at perfection, and 
explains this apparent fact by likening the world to a machine, whose parts are directed to purposive 
behavior. If it then turns out that the world does not resemble a machine, this is evidence against the 
world’s being an artifact. To emphasize our epistemic limitations is to admit that our world fails to 
resemble a machine in some respect--that it fails to resemble a machine up close, or within a brief 
duration, or from a certain perspective. So emphasizing our epistemic limitations is a way of pointing to 
dissimilarities between the universe and a machine. It is to provide evidence against Creationism, in other 
words. The Creationist cannot account for the world’s apparent lack of cooperation by emphasizing our 
epistemic limitations.
Creationism purports to explain through its commitment to one does not warrant Creationism 
any more than it warrants Hylarchism or Deep Ecology.
 Third, and finally, the world can be an artifact only if it is supposed to perform a specific 
function or functions, and it is unclear what its function could be. Pace Paley, it is unlikely that 
our universe is anything like a gigantic timepiece, and pace Schopenhauer, it is unlikely that it is 
torture device. So what, then, is it? Is it a gift from one demiurge to another? Is it a competitive 
game between demiurges? Or is it a theatrical production, as Shakespeare’s Jacques muses in As 
You Like It and Poe’s narrator laments in “The Conqueror Worm”? Just what, exactly, is the 
world supposed to do?
 Assuming that an artifact’s purpose can be traced to its designer’s intentions, the question 
of the world’s purpose becomes, for the Creationist, a question about the beliefs of supernatural 
agents. The fact that Creationism replaces the Matter Problem with something so occult is a 
problem for Creationism. For on what scientific or philosophical basis could one hope to 
advance the investigation into past beliefs of invisible super-persons? What would the intentions 
of our demiurge(s) be? 
 It seems particularly unwarranted to think of the world as a weapon, a torture device, or 
an scene of divinely orchestrated violence, for there is little if any value in such things. Since 
there is little if any value in such things, there is little if any reason for a demiurge to make 
them--no reason, anyway, that is not buttressed by ridiculous fantasies about warring spirits or 
evil demons. One could believe, of course, that the world was designed as a battlefield for 
supernatural forces of good and evil, or a painful test for separating good organisms from bad 
ones, but absent the incredible amount of miraculous evidence needed to substantiate such 
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fantasies, there is no reason for doing so. The intentions of a cosmic demiurge is already a 
mysterious affair; there is no need to compound the mystery by adding a cartoon mythology to it. 
It is absurd to think that the world is designed as a weapon or scene of violence. 
 If we adhere to the idea that life aims at perfection, it would seem natural for the 
Creationist to identify the world with an artificial wildlife preserve or zoo. As we will see, this 
proposal is similar to the Deep Ecologist’s, differing only in its ontological extravagance. Like 
the Creationist, the Deep Ecologist thinks that the universe is supposed to support life.6 Unlike 
the Creationist, however, the Deep Ecologist makes no commitment to a demiurge, and she 
denies that the world is an artifact. So other things being equal, the most natural Creationist 
response to the Matter Problem is an unnecessarily complicated version of Deep Ecology. I take 
this as a strong argument for Deep Ecology over Creationism. Before turning to Deep Ecology, 
however, we must assess the Hylarchist response to the Matter Problem.
4.2 Hylarchism
 In the sixth chapter of Hume’s Dialogues, the character Demea reminds us that something 
can have a purpose by being alive as well as by being designed, which means that the world can 
have a purpose if it is an organism. He then elucidates an alternative to Creationism, which, he 
claims, “was maintained by almost all the theists of antiquity, and chiefly prevails in their 
discourses and readings”7:
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6 More specifically, the universe is de re supposed to support life. Not only is it supposed to be the case 
that the universe supports life, in other words; the universe is also such that it has the proper function of 
supporting life. See chapter 3, §2.
7 Hume, Dialogues, VI.
Now, if we survey the universe, so far as it falls under our knowledge, it bears a great 
resemblance to an animal or an organized body, and seems actuated with a like principle 
of life and motion. A continual circulation of matter in it produces no disorder; a 
continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired: The closest sympathy is perceived 
throughout the entire system: And each part or member, in performing its proper offices, 
operates both to its own preservation and to that of the whole. The world, therefore, I 
infer, is an animal; and the Deity is the Soul of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it.8
Demea’s alternative holds that nature is an organism rather than an artifact, and that, if there is a 
supreme God, it is nature’s soul rather than its artisan. The “theists of antiquity” to whom he 
alludes--including Plato,9 Aristotle,10 Plotinus,11 Julian,12 Sallustius,13 Olympiodous,14 Proclus,15 
Simplicius,16 and, by ancient reports, the Stoics17--had no single name for this view, though 
Leibniz, while disputing it centuries later, referred to its posit as a “hylarchic principle”18 and we 
may as well let the name stick. Hylarchism is the thesis that the world is an organism.
 Like Creationism, Hylarchism has a strategy for guaranteeing a purpose for matter. Just as 
sticks and stones are, in a creationist ontology, little cogs and gears of a cosmic artifact, so in a 
Hylarchist ontology are they cells, blood vessels, and other organs. Just as the orderly movement 
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8 Ibid.
9 Timaeus 34a-b, 92c.
10 De Caelo 292a20-22. Compare also Metaphysics 1072a26-b1 with De Anima 433b10-12.
11 Enneads IV.3.4.26-28, V.1.2.20-25, and especially V.1.2.35-42.
12 Hymn to Helios
13 On the Gods and the Universe 17.3.7.
14 Commentary on Aristotle’s Meterology 143.15-17.
15 Commentary on the Timaeus I.239.29-240.12.
16 Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 9.253.17-18.
17 Diogenes Laertes’ Lives and Opinions of the Philosophers 7.142. See also Sellars (2003), pp. 91-107.
18 Essay on Dynamics in New Essays III: X: 14, “Considerations on the Principles of Life,” “On the 
Doctrine of a Universal Sprit”, and Appendix IV. 
of matter is, on a Creationist account, the churning of cosmic machine, so, on a Hylarchist 
account, is it the metabolism of a great creature. Both views, then, can present a response to the 
Matter Problem. But is the Hylarchist view any better than Creationism? 
 No. First, the universe is as dissimilar to an organism as it is to a machine; second, the 
commitment to a cosmic organism is as problematic as that to a demiurge; and finally, the 
Hylarchist faces a dilemma: either accept Hylozoism--the doctrine that all matter is alive19--or 
else claim that the world-organism’s body is vastly and mostly lifeless. Again, we will consider 
the objections in order. 
 First, because there are just as many dissimilarities between the world and an organism as 
there are between the world and a machine, Hylarchism faces the same first objection as 
Creationism. For organisms, like machines, have parts with cooperative proper functions. Unless 
an organism is injured or diseased, its organs will not function properly by working against one 
another, nor will they function properly by sitting idly by. Yet the cosmos brims with strife and 
idleness. If the cosmic organism is injured or diseased, where is the injury, and what is the 
disease? 
 The second major objection to Hylarchism is its ontological excess. Just as the existence of 
a demiurge is so huge a philosophical discovery as to make it a hazardous presupposition, so is 
the existence of a cosmic organism. There is no contradiction in the idea of a cosmic organism, 
of course, but there is no decisive evidence in its favor, either. Organisms are supposed to 
interact with their environment in a certain way, which is something the cosmos cannot do; the 
fact that the cosmos is all-encompassing precludes the possibility of it being in any kind 
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19 I take the term from Lycan (2007). Compare hylozoism to panpsychism, which holds that every material 
thing has mentation. If, as I believe, life is required for mentation, then panpsychism entails hylozoism.
environment, let alone one it interacts with. Organisms are supposed to be partitioned into 
different organs, and the world fails to resemble an organism in this respect as well: for where is 
the cosmos’ heart or lungs? Where is its immune system or its ribosomes? Rather than there 
being any evidence for the existence of a world-organism, there appears to be a great deal of 
evidence against it.
 Finally, Hylarchists face a dilemma: either commit to Hylozoism--the doctrine that matter 
is alive--or else admit that the vast majority of the world’s body is lifeless. Neither option is 
appealing. To say that the world’s body is mostly lifeless is to make it unlike any organism with 
which we are familiar. We might try to liken it to a monstrous hermit crab, whose unliving shell 
is immeasurably--perhaps infinitely--bigger than it. Or an infinitely hirsute Yorkshire terrier, 
whose miniscule speck of a body is immeasurably dwarfed by its mass of un-living hair. There is 
no contradiction in the idea of such a beast, but it is so unlike the life with which we are familiar 
as to raise serious doubts about Hylarchism. 
 If, however, the Hylarchist chooses to embrace Hylozoism and claim that all matter is 
alive, she faces the task of justifying Hylozoism. This task appears hopeless. For it certainly does 
not seem like all matter is alive. On the contrary, Hylozoism faces the same three-word objection 
as its close relative, panpsychism: “what about rocks?” The task of finding independent evidence 
for Hylozoism would rest on the Hylarchist, and it does not look like a task she can complete. 
 Because of the dissimilarities between the cosmos and an organism, because of its 
commitment to a world-organism, and because it faces the aforementioned dilemma over 
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Hylozoism, Hylarchism is as implausible as Creationism.20 Rather than looking like an organism 
and nothing else, the universe appears to be a collection of organisms in a nonliving habitat. 
Such a claim, however, just is the Deep Ecologist view, depending on what one means by 
“habitat.” So let us turn, finally, to Deep Ecology.
4.3 Deep Ecology
 The teleology of a habitat is best understood by proceeding in two stages, the first of which 
is to consider the real-life biological phenomenon of gastrolithy. A gastrolith is a nonliving 
biological organ, specifically a stone or a portion of sand, which is swallowed in order to aid the 
digestive process. Herbivorous birds, crocodilians, and seals have gastroliths, as did sauropod 
dinosaurs. 
 Philosophically, gastroliths are interesting for the following reason: as biological organs, 
they can function well or poorly; and because they can function well or poorly, there is a sense in 
which they can be harmed or benefitted, even though they are just bits of rock and sand. Just as 
dust is bad for pianos, rust is bad for cars, and anything that prevents an object from performing 
its proper function is bad for it, so are similar disintegrative forces bad for gastroliths.21 Drinking 
a certain acid, for instance, might be bad for an emu’s gastroliths, in addition to being bad for the 
emu itself and the emu’s other organs. Likewise, consuming another chemical might be good for 
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20 Hylarchism may not be superior to Creationism as a solution to the Matter Problem, but as Hume’s 
interlocutors point out, a Hylarchist theology may do better than a Creationist theology. For the former 
does not require “downward causation” from the immaterial to the material, nor does it require the god to 
change.
21 Thus Von Wright (1963), pp.50 writes, “It is not unnatural to say that lubrication is beneficial or good for 
the car, or that violent shocks will do harm to a watch... Therefore that which is good for the car or watch 
is something that will keep it fit or in good order with a view to serving its purpose well.” See also Kraut 
(2007), §1.1.
an emu’s gastroliths--say, by reinforcing them or increasing the comfort with which they are 
used. Even though they are made of mere stone, gastroliths can be harmed and benefitted. This 
does not mean that they can be harmed and benefitted all on their own, of course, but it is 
compatible with a related idea, which is that a gastrolith without an organism is, like a detached 
limb, missing from something--that it is an incomplete part of a teleological system. (As we will 
see, Deep Ecology rests on just such an idea.) Gastroliths demonstrate one way for nonliving 
matter to be benefitted, harmed, and teleologically dependent on life. As such, they promise a 
meager but firm “toe-hold” for nonliving matter in the Classical Platonist’s hierarchy. 
 The second step in understanding the teleology of habitats is to consider the close 
resemblance between an organism’s use of a gastrolith to digest and its use of a nearby star to 
see, or between an organism’s use of a gastrolith to digest and its use of wind for propulsion, its 
use of constellations for navigation, its use of rock hollows for shelter, and, in short, its use of its 
whole environment to live and flourish. Consider the whole environment, but as an instrument of 
survival. So considered, an atmosphere is not unlike an gastrolith--albeit one that is outside an 
organism’s body, which it shares with other living creatures. An atmosphere, like a gastrolith, is a 
portion of lifeless matter, which certain creatures use to flourish. Just as we may speak of a 
gastrolith being harmed or benefitted, so may we speak of a planet’s atmosphere, its oceans, and 
its mountains as being harmed or benefitted as well. The close, biologically important relation 
borne by gastroliths to their possessors, then, could be borne by an environment to organisms 
generally. Such environments are habitats: portions of the world, made mostly of nonliving 
matter, which can be harmed or benefitted relative to its inhabitants in the same way that a 
gastrolith might be harmed relative to its possessor.
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 For our purposes, Deep Ecology is the thesis that the cosmos is a habitat for life--like a 
great external gastrolith, shared by all living beings--and that every other possible world is a 
habitat for life, too. Deep Ecology holds that, just as gastroliths are supposed to facilitate 
digestion, so is matter supposed to facilitate the flourishing of life; and that a universe without 
any life is missing from something, like a gastrolith without its possessor or a detached limb. 
According to Deep Ecology, a lifeless cosmos is an incomplete part of a teleological hierarchy.
 Since the cosmos has been lifeless for most of its past existence, and since it will perhaps 
be lifeless for most of its future, too, the Deep Ecologist solution to the matter problem entails 
that the universe is a somewhat sad, failing ecosystem, whose flashes of success and flourishing 
are meager and immeasurably short-lived. This is not an argument against the Deep Ecologist 
view, however, any more than the existence of a perpetually sick organism is an argument against 
the claim that the organism has the proper function of flourishing. 
 Just as a gastrolith can be benefitted or harmed relative to its role in facilitating digestion, 
so can an entire cosmos be benefitted and harmed relative to its role in facilitating flourishing. If 
Deep Ecology is true, then not only is it good for life for life to flourish in the cosmos; it is also 
good for the cosmos for life to flourish in the cosmos. Just as it is good for a gastrolith to be used 
one way and not another, so is it good for the cosmos to have life flourish in it. So Deep Ecology 
holds that matter functions well by being a natural home for life, or a natural instrument of 
survival. Like Creationism and Hylarchism, then, Deep Ecology can assign a proper function to 
matter.
 Deep Ecology also dodges the main objections to Creationism and Hylarchism. While 
Creationism was threatened by the dissimilarities between cosmos and artifact, and Hylarchism 
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was threatened by the dissimilarities between cosmos and organism, the Deep Ecologist account 
faces no such hazards. For the cosmos does in fact resemble a habitat. It does resemble a place 
that ought to support life, even if its actual status as such a place is controversial. 
 Deep Ecology faces no need to account for the world’s lack of cooperation, since there is 
no prima facie reason why a habitat of organisms should have to be a habitat of cooperating 
organisms. Creationism and Hylarchism are threatened by the world’s lack of cooperation, and 
Deep Ecology is not.
 Unlike Creationism and Hylarchism, the Deep Ecologist solution to the Matter Problem 
does not require an additional commitment to a demiurge or world-organism. Its commitment to 
a world-habitat, while substantive, is far more modest.22 The Deep Ecologist suggests that the 
cosmos is a natural home for life--not because it was designed that way, nor because it is itself 
alive, but because the well-being of the cosmos is tied up with the well-being of the creatures 
inhabiting it in the same way that the well-being of a gastrolith is tied up with the well-being of 
its possessor. If Classical Platonism is true at all, and if no more evidence is relevant to the 
comparison of the Matter Problem’s three purported solutions, Deep Ecology clearly emerges as 
the correct one.
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 5.  Must Proper Functions Have Non-Teleological Bases?
Philosophers commonly think that things have proper functions because they have underlying 
features that are not themselves proper functions. Thus the broom has the proper function of 
sweeping because its designer(s) intended for it to sweep; the heart has the proper function of 
pumping blood because it is the result of certain selection pressures for blood-pumping hearts; 
and my hand’s waving motion has the proper function of greeting you because of our linguistic 
community’s innumerable conventions that associate waves with greetings. Philosophers 
commonly accept the following doctrine, then, which I call the Derivativeness of the Teleological 
(henceforth DT):
(DT): For any material object O1 and any proper function F, if O1 has F, then there is a 
material object O2 and features G, H, J..., such that (i) O2 has G, H, J...; (ii) O1 has F 
because O2 has G, H, J...; and (iii) none of G, H, J... are proper functions of O2.
As its name suggests, DT holds that descriptions of proper functions have an underlying non-
teleological base, and that this base helps to explain why things have the proper functions that 
they do. Philosophers who accept DT hold that teleological facts are metaphysically dependent 
on non-teleological facts, and that teleology is not a fundamental feature of the world.23 DT is 
therefore an ontological principle; it denies that the world’s most fundamental elements--or at 
least the world’s most fundamental material elements--have any proper functions.
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23 It is therefore accidental to the spirit of DT that its formulation mentions “features” and “material 
objects.” One may be a nominalist about features or an eliminitivist about material objects and still accept 
DT in spirit, even if not in letter; one may still deny that proper functions are irreducible features of the 
world.
 To deny DT, conversely, is to hold that there is at least one material object with a proper 
function that is not explainable in terms of any thing’s non-teleological features. A denial of DT, 
in other words, entails that some teleological feature of some material object is not reducible to 
or explainable in terms of the world’s purely descriptive features.
 DT is false. Though initially appealing, closer examination shows that DT has little 
evidence in its favor. The examples usually cited in its defense actually tell against it, and the 
best arguments for it are inconclusive. Ultimately, DT has less philosophical support than its 
denial. There is therefore no philosophical impropriety in rejecting it, or in endorsing a research 
program that begins with its rejection. 
5.2. The Usual Examples: Intentions and Natural Selection
 When we attempt to think of a proper function’s non-teleological base, we usually think 
of either an agent’s intentions or a species’ adaptation to selection pressures. When the proper 
function is artifactual, we usually think of the former. When it is biological, we usually think of 
the latter. So in explaining why bifocals have the proper function of correcting both near- and 
far-sighted vision, for instance, or why brooms have the proper function of sweeping, we usually 
appeal to the intentions of Benjamin Franklin or the intentions of the broom’s inventors; and in 
explaining why the heart has the proper function of pumping blood, or why the kidney has the 
proper function of filtering it, we usually appeal to the selection pressures that resulted in hearts 
and the selection pressures that resulted in kidneys. In explaining the proper functions of 
artifacts, in other words, we usually appeal to intentions, and in explaining the proper functions 
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of organs, we usually appeal to selection pressures. Intentions and selection pressures, then, are 
the usual examples of non-teleological bases for proper functions. 
 As bases, they seem legitimate. It seems that artifacts have their proper functions at least 
in part because of their designers’ intentions, and it also seems that biological organs have their 
proper functions at least in part because they are the result of adaptation to certain selection 
pressures. Intentions and selection pressures seem to help explain why things have the proper 
functions that they do. They appear to be bases for proper functions. The further and more 
important question is: are they really non-teleological? Close examination suggests not. Close 
examination, in other words, suggests that that the notions of both an intention and a selection 
pressure are irreducibly purposive notions. Intentions are just certain sorts of ends, and selection 
pressures are proper parts of larger teleological systems.
 Intentions are paradigmatically teleological; intentions are always intentions to do things, 
in some broad sense of “do” that counts things like thinking and being somewhere as doing 
something. It is impossible to have an intention, for instance, while not having an intention 
toward any belief or course of action. To have an intention, it seems, just is to have a belief or a 
course of action as an end. 
 Yet this prevents intentions from being proper functions’ non-teleological bases. If 
intentions are ends, then to appeal to a designer’s intentions in explaining why an artifact has a 
proper function is not to explain the purposeful in terms of the purposeless, but rather to explain 
the purpose of one thing by appealing to the purpose of another. It is to explain the teleology of 
an artifact, in other words, in terms of the teleology of the mental. The explanation may be 
perfectly good, but it is not reductive; it does not explain away the teleology in terms of anything 
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else. Rather than citing a non-teleological basis for proper functioning, such an explanation cites 
another teleological one. Intentions, then, seem teleological in a way that precludes their being 
non-teleological bases for proper functioning. 
 Against the claim that intentions are irreducibly teleological, one might point to the 
wealth of materialist literature in the philosophy of mind, where a variety of attempts have been 
made to show that the mental is not irreducibly teleological. 
 Originally, materialist philosophers hypothesized that mental states are simply identical 
to certain physical states, particularly brain states.24 Such a view, however--which was later 
known as “the Identity Theory of Mind”--ran up against the Multiple Realizability Argument, 
which points out that different physical states--such as the state of a human brain and the state of 
an octopus brain--could realize the same mental state--such as pain. Since one and the same 
mental state--pain--can be realized in two different physical states, it cannot be that mental states 
are numerically identical to the physical states that realize them. Otherwise there would be no 
difference between human brains and octopus brains. The simplest materialist view of mind, 
then--the Identity Theory--has come to be used as a foil for further, more complicated varieties of 
materialism. 
 The view commonly known as “machine functionalism” or “Türing Machine 
Functionalism,” for instance, purports to show that material states realize different types of 
mental states, depending on their causal role. Fodor’s canonical example is worth repeating: 
what makes something a mousetrap is not its chemical composition or makeup, but rather its role 
in relation to mice. A mousetrap is much like a mathematical function, which takes free mice as 
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input values and yields caught mice as unique outputs for every input.25 If we think of the mind 
as a complicated collection of mousetraps, different groups of which are set off in response to  
different stimuli, we come closer to having an actual, substantive theory of the mind. We also 
come much closer to the appealing idea that the brain is like a kind of physical computer, which 
runs different “programs” when it realizes different mental states. These programs, in turn, are 
like collections of mousetraps, which fire or go off in different patterns in response to different 
stimuli. It is for this reason that machine functionalism is also called “Türing Machine 
Functionalism,” since a Türing Machine is a simple computer that runs programs by instantiating 
a machine table, which is a complicated series of input and output values. The state of a Türing 
Machine will function as an input, and will determine what state to realize next. Thus, in Türing 
Machine Functionalism, we find the thesis that the mind is a physical computer, which realizes 
different mental states depending on the causal roles played by those states in relation to certain 
input and output values. 
 The mind’s “programs,” moreover, are defined in the same way that any mathematical 
function is defined: by abstract isomorphism. Sober’s example is particularly illustrative: when I 
add the number one to itself fourteen times, I am executing the same program as is executed on 
the beach when a new layer of sand is added to the shore once a night for two weeks.26 So if 
Türing Machine Functionalism is correct, a certain mental state M will be realized in two 
different systems just in case they bear a sufficiently close structural resemblance. Herein lies the 
problem.
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25 Fodor (1968), Sober (1985).
26 Sober (1985).
 First, the counterexample to sufficiency.27 Suppose that the entire nation of China has 
been organized in such a way as to be exactly similar in structure to my brain when it realizes the 
belief “I want some ice cream.” When I think, “I want some ice cream,” my neurons fire in a 
certain pattern and distribution. That exact pattern and distribution is realized by Chinese 
citizens: whenever one of my neurons fires, sending a signal to others, a particular Chinese 
citizen throws tennis balls at other Chinese citizens, sending simple signals to them. If Türing 
Machine Functionalism is correct, then my belief that I want ice cream is a certain structure in 
my brain, which can be realized by the nation of China; and moreover, realizing such a state just 
is to believe that one wants ice cream. It follows that the entire nation of China could easily be a 
kind of “hive mind,” believing that it wants ice cream. Yet this is absurd. Structural isomorphism 
is not sufficient for the sharing of mental states.
  Nor is it necessary.28 For just as two computers can realize the same program in different 
ways; and just as different people can count to fourteen in different ways, so too can the same 
mental state be realized by two dissimilar physical states. There is no reason why every mind that 
thinks of ice cream should instantiate a mathematical structure that is isomorphic to my brain’s 
when I entertain the thought. Consider a Martian, or an octopus, or some exotic creature whose 
“hardware,” so to speak, runs the same software as ours, but with very differently structured 
mechanisms. Structural isomorphism is not necessary for the sharing of mental states, any more 
than it is sufficient for them. 
 Discussions of Türing Machine Functionalism gave way to another, more promising 
view, which is more consonant with Classical Platonism. This is Teleological Functionalism, first 
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28 Block and Fodor (1972). 
defended separately by Lycan and Sober.29 Teleological Functionalism holds that mental states 
are the proper functions of physical states, in addition to being connected to certain states’ causal 
roles. Thus, on a Teleological Functionalist view, my brain realizes the belief, “I want ice cream” 
just in case my brain is in a certain state, and the proper function of that state is to convey 
information like the belief that I want ice cream. Likewise for other physical structures. To 
realize a mental state, it is not sufficient to simply be isomorphic in structure to something else 
that has the belief; one must also have the proper function of realizing that state. 
 Teleological Functionalism thus avoids Block’s “Nation of China” objection; for no 
matter how structured, China does not have the proper function of realizing beliefs like mine.30 It 
similarly avoids Block and Fodor’s objection that two different systems could realize the same 
program in different ways. On a Teleological Functionalist view, there is no reason why two 
different systems could perform the same proper function in very different ways; and so there is 
no extraneous requirement of structural similarity on systems that realize the same mental states. 
Teleological Functionalism quickly avoids the standard objections to Türing Machine 
Functionalism, then.
 The main objection to Teleological Functionalism, in fact, lies in its heavy reliance on a 
notion of proper functioning--one which has historically been viewed with suspicion. Defending 
Teleological Functionalism lies well beyond the scope of this dissertation, but it should be noted 
that, if its central argument is correct, the notion of proper functioning is just as central to 
ontology and to the correct theory of properties as it is to the mental. While it is both dialectically 
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30 Which is not to say that it could not. But for China to acquire such proper functions, it would have to be 
quite different from how it currently is. See Lycan (1987). 
unfair and historically premature to identify Teleological Functionalism as the correct theory, it is 
nonetheless one of the more sophisticated and plausible contenders in the philosophy of mind, 
and it is not entirely without warrant for a philosopher to place her bets on it. For as we saw, 
intentions are prima facie teleological. 
 Since intentions appear to be teleological, it would seem that natural selection is the best 
candidate for teleology’s non-teleological basis. The best prospect for explaining teleology in 
non-teleological terms, then, is not to cite the intentions of an agent, but to appeal to natural 
selection and to the notion of selecting for a trait. On such a proposal, the reason why something 
has a proper function--why the heart has the proper function of pumping blood, for instance, or 
why the kidney has the proper function of filtering it--is that the properties of having a blood-
pumping heart and having a blood-filtering kidney were naturally selected for. 
 Selection is defined in terms of causing survival and reproductive success: a trait F is 
selected for in a population p exactly when having F causes members of p to survive or 
reproduce. The best chance of explaining proper functions in terms of a non-teleological base, 
then, is to appeal to the idea that having a property can cause survival or reproductive success. 
 Natural selection is intensional in the sense that it distinguishes traits that are had by 
exactly the same individuals. It may be true, for instance, that all and only animals with a certain 
sort of jaw also have a certain sort of chin; yet jaws could be selected for while chins are not, just  
as jaws can have one proper function while chins have another. Natural selection is intensional, 
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then, because properties are the things selected for, and properties can be distinct even while 
having the same instances.31
 The notion of selecting for a property is not only intensional, however; it is also 
teleological. Its teleology is revealed in light of two facts: first, that an organism’s environment 
necessarily contributes to whether a certain trait causes survival or reproduction; and second, that 
life-supporting environments have proper functions because they select for traits in a way that 
supports life. Each point calls for elaboration.
 First, in different environments, the same trait can cause either survival or mortality, and 
either reproductive success or failure. Having stripes can cause survival in striped environments, 
for instance, but also mortality in solid-colored environments. Likewise, being feathered can 
cause survival in aerial environments, but mortality in aquatic ones; and being large can cause 
survival on a veldt, but mortality in a jungle. A trait causes survival or reproductive success in 
combination with its environment. A trait that is selected for, then, must be selected for in an 
environment that is conducive to its possessor’s survival or reproductive success. 
 This brings us to our second point, which is that by systematically causing certain 
organisms to survive and reproduce, an environment thereby constitutes part of a natural habitat, 
which exhibits a certain kind of teleology: they can be harmed and they can flourish. Moreover, 
an organism’s habitat can flourish and be harmed because its inhabitants have adapted to its 
selection pressures. Such pressures are part of what make the habitat a natural home for the 
153
31 A brief mention of a standard example is illustrative: the color of a white cue-ball is distinct from the 
mass of a white cue-ball, even if all and only white objects have a cue-ball’s mass. For the things that the 
cue-ball can do because of its color, such as blend in with a white background, are different from the 
things it can do because of its mass, such as depress a scale. Just as it is for the cue-ball, so it is for 
organisms: there are certain things an organism can do because of its chin, and other things it can do 
because of its jaw. If having jaws allows an organism to survive or reproduce while having a chin does 
not, then only jaws will be selected for, even if all and only chinned creatures are jawed ones. By 
distinguishing properties that have the same instances, natural selection is intensional.
creatures that dwell in it, and a home functions well by allowing its inhabitants to flourish. A 
natural habitat flourishes, or is doing well, then, when it supports the overall flourishing of its 
inhabitants; and it is harmed when it is prevented from supporting its inhabitants in this way. 
 As an example, consider the Rocky Mountains, which are a natural habitat for a variety of 
organisms. If someone were to fill the Rockies’ topsoil with carcinogens, or if natural forces 
produced a sudden ice age over North America, this would harm the Rockies. Not only would it 
harm the organisms who are living on the Rockies, but it would also harm the whole habitat, 
which includes the topsoil, fresh air, water, sunlight, and ozone, among other things. Freezing the 
Rockies’ topsoil or artificially filling it with carcinogens harms the Rocky Mountains: not just by  
harming individual organisms on the Rockies, but also by disrupting the whole network of 
supports for Rocky Mountain wildlife. Freezing or poisoning the Rockies harms them; it harms 
the Rockies as a whole habitat. 
 To see why, consider a situation in which the Rockies’ topsoil has just frozen, but in 
which the frost has not yet affected the wildlife. The wildlife are just about to be affected, but in 
the meantime they are still happy and healthy. Now ask: when the topsoil freezes, does this harm 
the natural habitat? It seems so. Freezing the topsoil still damages the network of supports for 
Rocky Mountain wildlife, and the biotic community as a whole. So the fact that the Rockies’ 
inhabitants have not been harmed yet does not tell against the harms being done to their habitat 
in the meantime. When the topsoil first freezes, the Rockies are harmed before their inhabitants. 
This shows that harm to a natural habitat is distinct from harm to its inhabitants. 
 One might counter that in such a case, the Rockies are only harmed because their 
inhabitants will be; but this response can be met by imagining that an asteroid demolishes the 
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Rockies as soon as the topsoil freezes, so that the wildlife is obliterated before being affected by 
the frost. In the asteroid case, the frost still harms the Rockies, and it still disrupts a network of 
supports for Rocky Mountain wildlife. Yet the climate change never harms the wildlife, which is 
demolished by an asteroid instead. As a natural habitat, then, the Rocky Mountains can be 
harmed independently of their inhabitants. 
 There is nothing special about the Rockies in this respect, however. What is true of the 
Rockies is true of any natural habitat, namely that natural habitats can be harmed, and these 
harms are separate from the harms that might befall their inhabitants. Again, this is not because 
mountains are alive or have feelings. It is because living beings have adapted to mountainous 
conditions, and because they now collectively depend on the mountains to exist. The mountains 
are part of a system of natural selection, in other words, and because they are part of a system of 
natural selection they are also part of a highly selective life-support system--one that preserves 
organisms with heritable, mountain-fit traits. To such inhabitants, the Rocky Mountains are a 
natural home. Habitats can be harmed, then, because biotic communities depend so crucially on 
them to exist. Because selection pressures are components of natural habitats, they are 
components of natural homes. To select for a trait, in other words, is to be part of a system that 
functions well by supporting, in a certain way, the life that has it. Natural habitats function well, 
in other words, by supporting the life whose traits they select for, and they function poorly--or 
are harmed--when they do otherwise.
 Readers who are familiar with ecology will know that natural habitats are constantly 
undergoing sudden, massive changes, however; and that many of their effects are just as drastic 
and disastrous as we might expect from a sudden North American ice age or from the addition of 
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carcinogens to Rocky Mountain topsoil. Natural habitats are constantly undergoing changes that 
are difficult to distinguish from harms, in other words, and so the idea that natural habitats can be 
harmed at all would appear to entail that they are also constantly being harmed. 
 Such a result is not disastrous, however. It would be, if it showed that the standards of 
health or well-being for natural habitats were arbitrary, or if it showed that no meaningful 
standards of harm can be applied to habitats. But this doctrine of constant habitative harm, as we 
might call it, does not show these things. Rather, it raises the question of natural habitats’ precise 
conditions of well-being. 
 A natural habitat contains ecological niches--that is, sets of conditions that facilitate 
certain uses of certain heritable traits to survive--and these niches, in turn, can be filled--that is, 
occupied by creatures that survive by using such traits. We may say that a natural habitat is 
harmed to the extent that either its ecological niches or its niches’ occupants are removed, and 
benefitted to the extent that new niches are produced and occupied while preserving the 
occupation of existing niches. The fact that natural habitats are constantly undergoing harms can 
be explained, then, by pointing to the fact that destroying one ecological niche may lead to the 
production of others, just as the removal of occupants from one niche may lead to its occupation 
by other creatures. Just as an ice age harms a natural habitat by demolishing whole populations 
and their ecological niches, so is the natural habitat also benefitted by the ensuing production and 
occupation of new tundra-bound ecological niches. We face no contradiction or absurdity in the 
fact that an ice age simultaneously harms and benefits a particular habitat; for the specification of 
effects on different niches and populations is sufficient to distinguish the various ways in which a 
habitat may be harmed and benefitted. A natural habitat may be harmed when it ceases to be able 
156
to support amphibians, or creatures without fatty tissue, for instance, but be benefitted by 
acquiring the ability to support creatures of other sorts. 
 We should expect there to be a vast multitude of ways in which a habitat could be harmed 
or benefitted, then, which correspond to the multitude of different sorts of organisms that a 
natural habitat might have niches for. Since natural habitats seem to be harmed when they lose 
the capacity to support life, and since they seem to be benefitted when their support of life is 
facilitated, the fact that there are different kinds of life, which flourish under different sorts of 
conditions, implies that there are different ways for habitats to be harmed and benefitted. Talk of 
ecological niches and their occupants assists us, therefore, in identifying these various ways.
 Returning to the question of proper functions’ non-teleological base, we find a strong 
case to be made against the idea that selection pressures are non-teleological. To explain the 
heart’s proper function by appealing to selection pressures is to derive the heart’s proper function 
from its place in a larger teleological system--a natural habitat. This habitat functions well, or is 
well off, by supporting chordates under certain conditions. To explain biological proper 
functioning in terms of selection pressures, then, is not to explain the teleological in terms of the 
non-teleological, nor to explain the purposeful in terms of the purposeless. Rather, it is like 
explaining an artifact’s proper function by citing its designer’s intentions. It is to explain one 
kind of teleology--the proper functioning of an organ--by appealing to another kind of 
teleology--the proper functioning of a natural habitat.  Selection pressures, like intentions, lay a 
very dubious claim to being free of purpose. 
 It appears that the usual examples fail to establish DT. Far from being non-teleological, 
both intentions and selection pressures appear to be quite teleological themselves. For an 
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intention just is a practical end, and a selection pressure just is a certain feature of a natural 
habitat. Neither intentions nor selection pressures appear free of teleology. If teleology has a non-
teleological basis, it must like elsewhere.
 
5.2  The Contingency Argument for DT, and the Heat-Death Counter-Argument
 One need not appeal to the usual examples in defending DT. One may also appeal to 
metaphysical arguments. Consider the following, for instance, which we will call the 
Contingency Argument for DT:
e. It is not necessary that the world contains objects with proper functions.
f. If it is not necessary that the world contains objects with proper functions, then the 
world’s most basic elements neither have nor are proper functions.
g. If the world’s most basic elements neither have nor are proper functions, then DT is 
true.
h. So DT is true.
The Contingency Argument is clearly valid; its soundness, therefore, turns on whether its 
premises are true. As we will see, premise (f) is false. For the fact that it is contingent whether 
the world’s occupants have proper functions exist does not imply that the world’s most basic 
elements lack a proper function, or even that its most basic material elements lack one. On the 
contrary, one may easily hold that the cosmos as a whole is the world’s most basic element, and 
that it has the proper function of being a natural habitat. Before elaborating on exactly which 
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way this is, however, it would be worth our attention to examine the Contingency Argument’s 
other controversial premise.
 Premise (g) states that, if the world’s most fundamental elements neither are nor have 
proper functions, then ascriptions of proper functions are to be explained in terms of ascriptions 
of other properties, which are not proper functions. Though complicated, this principle should 
have a great deal of intuitive force when understood. For what it assumes is that the fundamental 
facts explain the non-fundamental facts. It states that, since the fundamental elements are non-
teleological, ascriptions of proper functions must be explained in terms of non-teleological 
ascriptions. This would only seem true if we were antecedently supposing that ascriptions of 
teleology are to be explained in terms of the world’s most fundamental elements. Since these 
elements lack teleology, it follows that ascriptions of proper functions are explained in terms of 
other, non-teleological facts. In other words, DT.
 To the extent that one accepts any notion of fundamentality, one should accept the idea 
that the non-fundamental is somehow explained in terms of the fundamental. Without that, there 
is little meaning in describing anything as fundamental. Since the fundamental facts explain the 
non-fundamental facts, then the non-fundamentality of proper function ascriptions requires their 
ascriptions to be explained in terms of non-teleological facts. Premise (g) is therefore true; if the 
primary substances neither have nor are proper functions, DT follows. 
 As previously mentioned, premise (f) is in fact the weak link in the Contingency 
Argument’s dialectical chain; it is weak, however, in two related respects. First, it presupposes 
that the whole cosmos itself is not the world’s most basic element. If the whole cosmos were the 
world’s most basic element--or if the whole cosmos were at least the most basic among material 
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objects--it would be possible for the universe’s most basic element to have a proper function 
even though it is contingent whether any of its contents have proper functions. The whole 
cosmos might have had a proper function all on its own, while containing only functionless 
things, in other words. 
 The second weakness of (f) lies in the fact that there is independent evidence for 
ascribing organismic teleology--like that of a natural habitat--to the cosmos as a whole. The 
following argument, which we will call the Heat-Death Argument, shows that the universe 
exhibits the same kind of organismic teleology as a natural habitat does:
i. In the same way that it is bad for Rocky Mountain wildlife for the Rocky Mountains to 
undergo an ice age, so is it bad for the universe’s inhabitants for the universe to undergo a 
heat-death.
j. If (e), then it is possible for the universe to be harmed. 
k. So it is possible for the universe to be harmed.
The Heat-Death argument is certainly valid, with premises (i) and (j) doing an equal amount of 
the dialectical work. Premise (i) states that there is a close similarity between the way that an ice-
age would harm Rocky Mountain wildlife and the way that the universe’s heat-death would harm 
life in the universe. They resemble in at least this much: that both would be sites where life is 
harmed. The point of interest, though, is whether the universe’s heat-death would harm life both 
directly and by damaging a nonliving network of life supports. If so, then there would be reason 
to say that the universe itself is harmed by its heat-death, in the same way that the Rockies 
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themselves are harmed by the ice age. There would be reason, in other words, to treat the 
universe as an enormous natural habitat, and its heat-death as a harm to it.
 Would the universe’s heat-death consist in any damage to life supports in addition to 
damaging life? It would seem so. Stars, as far as we know, are necessary for the existence of any 
life or natural habitat that conforms to our laws of nature. Our sun is famously such a star; other 
stars are, in a sense, natural suns. Like oases in a cosmic desert, they produce nonliving 
resources that life needs, such as heat and light. These very things are often lethal to life, as is the 
radiation stars emit. Nonetheless, stars are necessary for natural habitats and for life as we know 
it, and necessary for planetary biospheres like our own. Any damage to them, whether natural or 
artificial, would be a harm to the natural habitat(s) of which they are parts. A cosmic heat-death 
is such a harm, albeit a natural and perhaps physically necessary one. So a cosmic heat-death 
harms the natural habitat(s) of which stars are parts. 
 Our sun is part of our natural habitat, just as other stars are parts of any natural habitats 
they support. Yet the stars are also parts of a larger whole, which a cosmic heat-death affects. 
Necessarily, a heat-death involves the cosmos as a whole, rather than one involving any 
particular set of stars. It is indeed bad for our solar system if our sun burns out, and similarly bad 
for every other solar system when each of their respective suns burns out. But the heat-death of 
the universe is not the sum of any particular solar collapses. It is a phenomenon defined by the 
fact that not only have these or those stars burned out, but also that those were all the stars! This 
latter fact is quite different from the former; it cannot be derived from the former, and presents a 
much more dire state of affairs. The cosmos as a whole is affected by a heat-death, and affected 
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negatively--like a mountain range suddenly encased in ice. As (k) concludes, the whole cosmos 
is harmed by a heat-death.
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